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ABSTRACT
After the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas, applicants to Baltimore’s public housing projects were legally allowed to apply for
residence in whichever projects they preferred, regardless of race. When it came to implementing
this desegregation policy, however, the reality was not so simple. By ignoring the legacy of
segregation and ongoing systemic racism and focusing on removing official barriers to “choice,”
housing officials and local leadership did little to actually alleviate segregation among public
housing residents. In the city’s three main arenas of conflict—planning, policy, and politics—
leaders embraced the rhetoric of “freedom of choice,” which allowed them to eschew more
substantive steps toward desegregation by blaming continued segregation on individual agency.

This dissertation examines the ways in which city planning, public policy, and local
politics intersected in the fight over segregation in Baltimore’s public housing during the
twentieth century. The critical period from the early 1940s to the early 1970s established patterns
of residential segregation that the city follows to this day. This dissertation relies upon close
readings of sources to get at the underlying implications and obfuscations by Baltimore policy
makers and public officials, and to highlight the places where the rhetoric of “freedom of choice”
was embraced by the public. This close-reading approach questions the underlying assumptions
and unspoken motivations policymakers had related to “choice”—What does choice mean?
When is choice meaningful, and when is it not? Ultimately, the espousal of “choice” in public
housing was more a way for city officials to avoid responsibility for meaningful desegregation
than honest attempt to support individual agency and decision-making . These changing uses of
“individual choice” in Baltimore created a path that other cities would follow in the more wellknown neoliberal policies after 1970. Rather than chronicling the important ways that tenants
worked within and challenged the limitations of the public housing systems, this dissertation
examines the ways that those systems were constructed and construed by city planners and
policy makers.

INDEX WORDS: Baltimore, City planning, Public housing, Desegregation, Residential
segregation, Housing policy
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1

INTRODUCTION

On the morning of August 20, 1995 a crowd gathered in the streets of downtown
Baltimore. Thirty thousand people formed an eight-block-long parade and party, complete with
band performances and vendors selling commemorative t-shirts and souvenirs. At noon, a hush
fell over the crowd, after which the countdown began. As the chant hit zero, a series of
explosions could be heard, and felt. In just twenty seconds, the six high-rise towers of the
Lafayette Courts housing projects crumbled into dust and rubble.1
This moment, decades in the making, bookended the rise and fall of public housing in
Baltimore. Planners initially envisioned Lafayette Courts as one of Le Corbusier’s “towers in a
park,” meant to replace overcrowded slums with clean, comfortable, affordable provisions for
the city’s working poor. Built in the mid-1950s as Baltimore’s first high-rise public housing,
Lafayette was also the first of Baltimore’s public housing to open as a desegregated project. 2 The
first residents in the project “were begging to get into this place,” former resident and custodian
Joe Lamma remembered.3 By 1995, however, the towers were plagued by constant maintenance
issues, crime, and categorical disinvestment by the city and the citizenry of Baltimore.
Still, reactions to the demolition were mixed. Former residents of the housing project
returned from as far away as Oakland, California to bear witness to the implosion. One resident,
Carolyn Lamma, said, “I’m just glad I was here in person. That was history.” While the husband
of another former resident insisted, “It’s a good thing. A lot of people who lived over there are

JoAnna Daemmrich, “Lafayette Courts Ends in 20 Seconds of Explosions, Cheers, Tears,” Baltimore Sun, August
20, 1995; Charles Cohen, “Destroying a Housing Project, to Save it,” New York Times, August 21, 1995.
2
Lafayette opened in 1956 as a desegregated project, a significant change by city officials following the 1954
Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board declared “separate but equal” to be inherently unconstitutional.
3
Cohen, “Destroying a Housing Project, to Save it”.
1

2

good people who deserve a better chance,” a woman could be heard wailing as the towers fell,
“They killed my building!” After plunging the ceremonial detonator, Mayor Kurt L. Schmoke
told one reporter, “We all had a tear in one eye and a big grin on our faces at the same time.”
Former resident Penny Dunlop summed it up similarly, saying, “I don’t know if I should take a
picture or cry.”4
Lafayette Courts was just the first of Baltimore’s public housing high-rises to come
down. Less than a year later, 15,000 onlookers gathered for another “festive atmosphere” to see
the five towers of Lexington Terrace fall.5 Murphy Homes, with its four 14-story high rise
towers and its grim moniker “Murder Homes,” followed in 1999.6 Baltimore’s demolitions in the
late twentieth century were part of a wider trend as public housing authorities across the country,
supported by federal HOPE VI funds, divested from their large-scale public housing
developments. As Baltimore Housing Authority spokesman Zack Germroth explained, “It made
no sense to repair them from a sociological, physical or maintenance standpoint.”7 Some units
were replaced with new public housing in mixed-income projects, the rest with Section 8
Housing Choice vouchers. The last of Baltimore’s low-income high-rises came down with the
2001 demolition of Flag House Courts.8
The rise and fall of public housing is a popular topic for urban historians. The story has
been told for cities from Chicago to Los Angeles, New York to San Francisco. While the story in
Baltimore may not, at first glance, seem unique, the city has become known for its public

Daemmrich, “Lafayette Courts Ends in 20 Seconds of Explosions, Cheers, Tears;” Cohen, “Destroying a Housing
Project, to Save it.”
5
“Baltimore to Demolish More Public Housing Units,” The Washington Post, September 30, 1995.
6
Dylan Waugh and Megan Miller, “Murphy Homes Gone, Not Forgotten,” Capital News Service Maryland,
December 19, 2008.
7
Sharon Cohen, “Demolition of Dangerous, Decaying Public Housing Begins,” LA Times, May 26, 1996.
8
Jewish Museum of Maryland, “Flag House Courts and Albemarle Square,” Explore Baltimore Heritage, accessed
June 3, 2018, https://explore.baltimoreheritage.org/items/show/374.
4
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housing and related issues of poverty, drugs, corruption, and crime since the critically-acclaimed
HBO series, The Wire, debuted in 2002. More recently, the tragic death of Freddie Gray and the
resulting uprising in the city’s streets have brought Baltimore’s housing problems back to the
public mainstream. Though its official motto is “The Greatest City in America,” Baltimore,
Maryland is more likely to be colloquially referred to by the pejorative, “Bodymore,
Murderland.”9
Yet the projects have been home to thousands of Baltimore residents since 1940, when
Poe Homes (named for one of the city’s most famous residents, Edgar Allen Poe) opened in
West Baltimore. Poe Homes, and the twelve housing projects that followed, were divided into
“Negro” and “White” projects. After 1954, when the Housing Authority of Baltimore City
(HABC) officially desegregated the projects in response to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, applicants to public housing were legally
allowed to apply for residence in whichever projects they preferred, regardless of race.
When it came to implementing this desegregation policy, however, the reality was not so
simple. By ignoring the legacy of segregation and ongoing systemic racism, the liberal focus on
removing official barriers to “choice” did little to actually alleviate segregation among public
housing residents. Even as federal officials mandated a new policy aimed at ending continued
segregation, allowing local control provided Baltimore officials and residents ample opportunity
to maintain several all-white projects—primarily in the interest of maintaining any white
residents on their public housing rolls. These three arenas of conflict—planning, policy, and
politics—coalesced around the rhetoric of “freedom of choice,” a key phrase and concept

For some of the many variations, see Frances Stead Sellers, “Life and death in Bulletmore, Murderland,” The
Guardian, January 17, 2008; Richard Byrne, “Bodymore, Murdaland,” The American Prospect, October 22, 2006;
Dewayne Wickham, “In ‘Bodymore, Murderland,’ Snitching Could Save Lives” USA Today, June 8, 2015.
9
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running through the history of Baltimore’s public housing in all its iterations. From the initial
emphasis on individual liberty as a solution to segregation during the post-World War II period,
to the neoliberal shift to Section 8 “Housing Choice” vouchers in the 1970s, this phrase “freedom
of choice” returns again and again in the context of local attempts to subvert changing federal
policy and in Baltimore official’s attempts to answer the fundamental questions of where public
housing should be built and who should live there.
This dissertation examines the ways that city planning, public policy, and local politics
intersected in decisions about Baltimore public housing in the twentieth century. The critical
period from the early 1940s to the early 1970s established the patterns of residential segregation
that the City of Baltimore follows to this day. The choice to end before the development of the
Section 8 voucher program is a deliberate one; while the neoliberal shift to supporting “choice”
through voucher programs now dominates low-income housing policy across the country, the
lack of national regulations protecting voucher recipients means that landlords can refuse to
participate, resulting in voucher use trends that mirror the very same segregation patterns
discussed here. By focusing on the periods during which public housing projects were physically
constructed in Baltimore’s communities, this project unpacks liberal assumptions of what
“freedom of choice” meant in theory and how it operated in public policy.
This dissertation relies upon close readings of sources to get at the underlying
implications and obfuscations by policy makers and public officials, and to highlight the places
where the rhetoric of “freedom of choice” was embraced by the public. It draws heavily from
official memos and minutes from the Baltimore Urban Renewal and Housing Authority, the
American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, and the Citizens Planning and Housing Agency.
Other official records came from the Baltimore City Archives. Newspaper accounts are drawn
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from two Baltimore papers of record: the Baltimore Sun, a mainstream daily press, and the
Baltimore Afro-American, one of the most influential black weekly newspapers in the country.
This close-reading approach questions the underlying assumptions and unspoken
motivations policymakers had related to “choice.” What does choice mean? When is choice
meaningful, and when is it not? Moreover, was the espousal of “choice” in public housing a way
for city officials to avoid responsibility for meaningful desegregation, or an honest attempt to
support individual agency and decision-making? Even if the latter is the case, how did the system
of structural racism in the city prevent public housing residents from having the ability to choose,
despite having the right to do so? And, in the case of Baltimore in particular, what do officials do
when there are not enough white people left in public housing to meaningfully integrate projects?
In this dissertation, I make four overarching arguments about Baltimore’s public housing
program. First, the rhetoric of “freedom of choice” allowed Baltimore housing officials to
eschew responsibility for affirmatively desegregating public housing and correcting the resulting
segregation patterns in the city. Second, deliberate choices made by local and federal agencies
created a situation that exacerbated white abandonment of public housing throughout the city and
resulted in severely limited options for low-income black residents. Third, when the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) attempted to advance policy
solutions to continued public housing segregation, local officials found ways to subvert these
policies and maintain the status quo of de facto segregation in Baltimore’s housing projects.
Finally, those local civil servants who did embrace the idea of deconcentrating public housing in
the mid- to late-1960s were stymied by elected officials who refused to advance fair housing
policies.

6

This focus on the changing policy through the rhetoric of “freedom of choice” is an
intervention into the historical literature of public housing because it shifts from the current
“bottom-up,” tenant-focused view of resident agency to questioning the ways that decisionmakers justified their top-down policies as promoting that choice.10 Rather than chronicling the
important ways that tenants worked within and challenged the limitations of the public housing
systems, this dissertation examines the ways that those systems were constructed and construed
by city planners and policy makers. Baltimore is unique in that it exist in a borderland—not quite
a southern city like Richmond or Atlanta, nor an industrial northern city like Philadelphia or
Pittsburgh. Its border positioning has left it out of much of the historiography because it does not
quite fit in either paradigm. What is instructive about Baltimore in this case, though, are the ways
that the language of choice as a way to avoid desegregation were first being hammered out.
While most cities which resisted housing desegregation after Brown v. Board in 1954, and the
Fair Housing Act in 1968 did so in direct refusal, Baltimore officials and policymakers were
experimenting with new ways to comply with the mandated legalities of desegregation while
avoiding integration and the fraught political realities that would entail. Though most public
housing authorities would eventually turn to the language of choice, and the emphasis on

10

Among such resident-centered work is Roberta Gold, When Tenants Claimed the City: The Struggle for
Citizenship in New York Housing (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2014); Gerald D. Suttles, Social
Order of the Slum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Lee Rainwater, Behind Ghetto Walls (Chicago:
Aldine, 1970); Lawrence Vale, Reclaiming Public Housing: A Half Century of Struggle in Three Public
Neighborhoods (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, American Project:
The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Talja Blokland, “'You
Got to Remember you Live in Public Housing'” Housing, Theory, and Society 25 (2008): 31-36; and Amy L.
Howard, More than Shelter: Activism and Community in San Francisco Public Housing (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2014). Books focusing specifically on women in public housing include Roberta M. Feldman and
Susan Stall, The Dignity of Resistance: Women Residents' Activism in Chicago Public Housing (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Rhonda Y. Williams, The Politics of Public Housing: Black Women's
Struggles Against Urban Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Also of note is the “American Public Housing at 75: Policy, Planning, and the Public Good” Special Issue
of the Journal of the American Planning Association 78, no. 4 (2012) focusing on public housing, and featuring
articles by such noted historians as Joseph Heathcott, Lawrence Vale, Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Amy Howard,
Edward Goetz, and Leigh Graham.
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individual decision making would be codified nation-wide with the turn to “housing choice”
vouchers, it is in this time and this place in Baltimore that this emphasis on choice began.
Throughout this dissertation, my examination of Baltimore public housing policy hinges
on the axis of choice and agency versus structural racism and systems of constraint. This
approach advances historical conversations on the interplay of urban poverty and political
systems, drawing from foundational scholars such as Douglas Massey, Nancy Denton, Michael
B. Katz, and Lawrence Mead.11 It also builds on the work of historians who look to structural
explanations of urban poverty and inequality, specifically targeting the American economic
system and racial discrimination as inextricably intertwined.12 Much like scholars of the history
of race and politics, like Kevin Kruse and Matthew Lassiter, I find the roots of modern urban
society in the racial politics of cities, especially those following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the resultant backlash of suburbanization.13 Finally, as in the recent works by Nathan D.B.

11

Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993); Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on
Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: Pantheon, 1989); Lawrence Mead, The New Politics of Poverty (New
York: Basic Books, 1992).
See also Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1968); Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, eds., The Moynihan Report and the Politics of
Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967); George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty(New York: Basic Books,
1981); Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984);
Myron Magnet, The Nightmare and the Dream: The Sixties Legacy to the Underclass (New York: William Morrow,
1993); Ken Auletta, The Underclass (New York: Random House, 1982); Christopher Jencks, Rethinking Social
Policy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993); and James T. Patterson, America's Struggle Against
Poverty, 1900-1994 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
12
The two strands are characterized by William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the
Underclass, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) on the one side and Gary Orfield,
“Ghettoization and Its Alternatives” in The New Urban Reality, ed. Paul E. Peterson (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1985), 161-95, and Massey and Denton, American Apartheid on the other.
13
Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2007); Kevin Kruse and Thomas Segrue, eds., The New Suburban History (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2006); and Matthew D. Lassiter (The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007). Important earlier works with a political-based focus include
Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American
Politics (New York: Norton, 1991); Jim Sleeper, The Closest of Strangers: Liberalism and the Politics of Race in
New York City (New York: Norton, 1990); and Jonathan Rieder, Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn
Against Liberalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
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Connolly and Richard Rothstein investigating the role of policy in creating the modern United
States’ housing system, I locate the origins of Baltimore’s ongoing struggles with population
decline, race relations, and citizen distrust of lawmakers in the housing decisions made
throughout the mid-twentieth century.14
I frame these topics through examinations of urban inequality and public housing in
twentieth-century Baltimore. Much recent scholarship on public housing history identifies a
structural pattern of policy decisions that conflate poverty with race and urban renewal with slum
clearance.15 Rather than focusing on the narrative of public housing’s decline, my work looks to
the—at times unintentional—patterns put into place beginning with the city’s very first
discussions of where to locate public housing projects, through later struggles to change these
patterns after they were engrained in the fabric of the city.16 As the location of one’s home has
reverberating effects on education, employment, political representation, and health outcomes,

14

Nathan D.B. Connolly, A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim Crow South Florida
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014); Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How
Our Government Segregated America (New York: Liveright Publishing Group, 2017).
15
Much recent work in public housing studies have focused attention public housing decline and the resultant
demolition through the HOPE VI program of the 1990s. At the forefront of this new movement are historians
Lawrence Vale, Purging the Poorest: Public Housing and the Design Politics of Twice-Cleared Communities
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013) and Edward G. Goetz, New Deal Ruins: Race, Economic Justice,
and Public Housing Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013). Additional work from the policy history
field includes Alexander Polikoff, Waiting for Gautreaux: A Story of Segregation, Housing, and the Black Ghetto
(Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2006); Mary Pattillo, Back on the Block: The Politics of Race and Class in
the City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2007); and Edward G. Goetz, “Better Neighborhoods, Better
Outcomes? Explaining Relocation Outcomes in HOPE VI,” Cityspace 12, no. 1 (2010), 5-31; James Hanlon,
“Beyond HOPE VI: Demolition/Disposition and the uncertain future of public housing in the U.S.,” Journal of
Housing and the Built Environment 27 (2012), 373-388.
16
Historians of public housing who have sought to understand the ultimate successes and failures of public housing
as a result of initial design include Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Public Housing that Worked: New York in the Twentieth
Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) and D. Bradford Hunt, Blueprint for Disaster: The
Unraveling of Chicago Public Housing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). Others taking a policycentered view are John Bauman, Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920-1974
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in
Chicago, 1940-1960 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Lawrence Vale, From the Puritans to the
Projects (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Charlotte Brooks, Alien Neighbors, Foreign
Friends: Asian Americans, Housing and the Transformation of Urban California (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2009).
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these residential segregation patterns affected generations of Baltimoreans well beyond the walls
of the public housing projects.17 The institutionalization of urban housing discrimination is the
result of seemingly non-racial economic decisions by public institutions and private companies,
reinforced through a lack of government intervention.18 While “disparate impact” studies often
elide blame, throughout this dissertation, I point to the direct lines between supposedly “racially
neutral” policies of choice and resultant racial discrimination. In Baltimore, as elsewhere across
the country, residential segregation was enforced not by government decree, but by individuals
abandoning “block-busted” neighborhoods for the suburbs, pressuring elected officials to stop
“encroachment,” and loudly proclaiming racially coded complaints about declining property
values.19
Although this dissertation does not chronicle the widespread change from public housing
projects to voucher programs, it does set the stage for the systems and policies that culminated in
demolition and subsidized housing vouchers through programs including Section 8, under
HUD’s HOPE VI program. The neoliberal shift toward a belief that free markets were better

17

The literature on these topics is voluminous, but of particular note for their importance to framing this dissertation
are two works examining school desegregation: Howell S. Baum, Brown in Baltimore: School Desegregation and
the Limits of Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010) and Ansley Erickson, Making the Unequal
Metropolis: School Desegregation and its Limits (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).
18
In The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2005), Thomas Segrue chronicles how decisions made regarding industrial plant location, deindustrialization,
and automation, when combined with a historic discrimination in housing and employment, made it possible for
businesses to actively discriminate against their black labor force without specifically targeting laborers by race.
Beryl Satter’s work, Family Properties: Race, Real Estate, and the Exploitation of Black Urban America (New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2009) examines how the refusal by banks to insure mortgages in black neighborhoods
resulted in racially-biased credit policies that resulted in financial discrimination and perpetuated residential
segregation without any need for laws to enforce it.
19
Historical works on residential segregation are numerous, but of particular note are Massey and Denton, American
Apartheid; Ronald H. Bayor, Race and the Shaping of Twentieth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1996); Preston H. Smith, Racial Democracy and the Black Metropolis: Housing Policy in Postwar
Chicago (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in
Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965); Camille
Zubrinsky Charles, “The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation,” Annual Review of Sociology 29 (2003), 167207; and a number of recent books on white flight including Kruse, White Flight; Lassiter, The Silent Majority; and
Eric Avila, Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight: Fear and Fantasy in Suburban Los Angeles (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2004).
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equipped to handle social needs (despite known market failures in affordable housing) has led to
what urban planners Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore termed “geographically uneven, socially
regressive, and politically volatile trajectories of institutional/spatial change.”20 As with the
uncritical acceptance of “freedom of choice” as a meaningful framework for the liberalist
policies of the 1950s, so-called “housing choice” vouchers rose to prominence in the 1980s and
persist today as the primary form of affordable housing subsidies for low-income families.21 As
Baltimore was forced to confront the arbitrary jurisdictional divisions between city and county
during the 1990s and early 2000s with the Federal District Court case of Thompson v. HUD, the
focus on neoliberalism has led historians to reevaluate the utility of an urban/suburban divide in
the study of American metropolises.22 Those public housing projects that do remain in the city
are now built in the style of the city’s quintessential rowhouses. As Mayor Schmoke proclaimed
when the towers of Lexington Terrace came down in 1996: “What we have done is torn down
what essentially have become warehouses of poverty, and what we’re creating is town houses of
choice.”23

Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, “Cities and the Geographies of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism,” Antipode 34,
no.3 (2002), 351.
21
Recent studies of neoliberalism include John F. Bauman, Roger Biles, and Kristin Szylvian, editors, From
Tenements to Taylor Homes: In Search of an Urban Housing Policy in Twentieth-Century America (University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000); Douglas W. Rae, City: Urbanism and Its End (New Haven: Yale
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In chapter one, I discuss the development of subsidized housing for war workers during
World War II. Though first planned as low-income housing, changes to federal funding and
wartime rationing meant that the only housing construction authorized in any city was to house
war industry workers. In Baltimore, despite desperate housing shortages for black migrants
coming to work in shipyards and other defense industries, city lawmakers insisted that no such
shortage existed. When officials did unveil plans for a black war worker housing project near a
white area of town, the outcry was strong and immediate. Protests against the Herring Run site
were successful in preventing construction of the proposed public housing project there; instead,
the units were built in Cherry Hill, close to the municipal incinerator. I argue that the effects of
this unsuccessful attempt to locate public housing outside of all-black neighborhoods
reverberated throughout the rest of the city’s public housing decisions in the twentieth century.
Having learned the vehemence of white public distaste for black public housing, elected officials
never again championed its creation.24
Chapter two delves into the liberal rhetoric of “freedom of choice” in public policy.
Following the 1954 Supreme Court case Brown v. the Board of Education, Baltimore officials
desegregated both public schools and public housing projects through the same method—
removal of de jure segregation. The liberal concept of “free choice,” with its emphasis on
individual action and refusal to acknowledge systemic or community influence on decisionmaking was key for elected officials and policy makers. Baltimore was one of the first southern
cities to desegregate its schools and public housing, and did so with relatively little strife. I argue
that this lack of conflict is due not to the success of desegregation through “freedom of choice,”
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but rather the inability of said choice to have any meaningful effect against a system of such
deeply rooted segregation.
In chapter three, I discuss the realities of Baltimore’s public housing program after the
city decided to “eliminate the factor of race” in public housing admission. Whether by declaring
segregated projects desegregated or opening new projects on a desegregated basis, Baltimore’s
public housing officials grappled with clear racial divides. Even those projects that did briefly
meet the threshold of “integrated” quickly changed over to all-black occupancy. More than a
decade after the city’s “freedom of choice” plan was implemented, public housing remained
effectively segregated; although the overwhelming majority of public housing residents in the
city were black, three housing projects maintained all-white occupancy. When HUD demanded
affirmative steps to desegregate these three projects, local officials again turned to the rhetoric of
“choice” to explain resistance by both white and black residents. I argue that this insistence on
maintaining the “freedom of choice” policy was rooted in a desire to elide responsibility for
dismantling the very system of residential segregation the HABC had helped create.
Chapter four further explores the conflict between federal officials and the HABC over
the emphasis on individual choice in public housing desegregation. In the late 1960s, HUD
revised their tenant selection policies and required public housing authorities across the country
to implement a new “first come––first served” program. HUD’s goal was to centralize public
housing waiting lists in an attempt to end situations like Baltimore’s, where housing authorities
were able to maintain all-white projects. I contend that after an unsuccessful attempt to argue that
these projects were, in fact, desegregated, Baltimore officials were able to use the language of
choice and emphasis on individual preferences to once again subvert the new HUD requirements
to the point of irrelevance.
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Chapter five shifts from a focus on tenant selection to one on site selection. In the late
1960s, HUD began efforts to deconcentrate public housing from low-income minority
neighborhoods and experimented with new forms of public housing construction, forming the
precursors to modern housing voucher programs. In Baltimore, officials struggled with decisions
over how to deconcentrate public housing in a city that was rapidly losing white and middleclass residents. While the city’s public housing civil servants generally accepted HUD’s site
selection guidelines and put forward requests to build housing in non-minority neighborhoods,
elected officials, remembering the lessons learned decades earlier at Herring Run, refused
permissions necessary to build new public housing outside of areas that were already majority
black. I argue that, by 1970, the combination of white flight from the city, an ever-larger
majority of black residents in public housing, and these site selection decisions created a
situation in which integration of Baltimore’s public housing projects had become impossible.
The policy rhetoric of “freedom of choice” continued even as the high-rise housing
projects came down. As with the original slum clearance efforts that gave rise to large-scale
public housing, proponents of HUD’s HOPE VI plan often touted its benefits as giving lowincome residents more choices about where to live––thus the moniker, “Housing Choice
Vouchers.” Despite releasing residents from the problems of pre-built public housing projects,
the neoliberal shift to vouchers is unable to further meaningful choice because of the reliance on
a private housing market that still operates within a society replete with systemic racism. Even as
the housing projects have come down, the decisions made by public housing officials and
chronicled in these pages established the segregated residential patterns in Baltimore that remain
today.
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CHAPTER ONE: HERRING RUN

Following years of debate, in 1937 Congress passed the first piece of federal legislation
to develop government-subsidized housing projects for low-income families. In the debate
surrounding the Housing Act of 1937, the key point of contention was whether the new housing
should be built on vacant land, thus increasing the available housing stock of cities, or be built on
cleared land, which would improve the quality of housing in blighted neighborhoods without
adding to the overall quantity of housing. Advocates for building on vacant land argued that the
creation of housing run as a public utility would lead to long-term “communitarian” values
among the working class.25 These modern housing reformers were more concerned with creating
European-style, avant-garde projects for the working classes than improving living conditions for
the urban poor. On the other side, progressive activists argued that elimination of slum
conditions was paramount not only for the individuals who lived in the blighted neighborhoods,
but for cities and society at large. Joined by the real estate lobby, which was concerned about
market competition from government subsidized construction, slum clearance advocates
prevailed. The 1937 Housing Act passed with an “equivalent elimination” provision,
guaranteeing that public housing would not lead to any substantial increases in the total housing
stock available.26
Housing availability was a particularly pressing issue in cities like Baltimore, where the
Great Depression led to a sharp decline in home building. In 1934, only 119 new houses were
constructed in Baltimore; for black residents, who depended on the secondhand housing market
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to open up new housing in the segregated city, this underproduction had cascading effects.27 As
the Great Migration brought a huge influx of African Americans from the rural South to the
industrial cities of the North, overcrowding of black neighborhoods in Baltimore became dire.
From 1940 to 1942, 33,000 new black residents moved to the city, primarily to work in the
burgeoning war industries, without any increase in the number of available housing units.28
Baltimore’s low-income housing projects, which under the terms of the 1937 Housing
Act focused on replacing rather than expanding housing stock, did nothing to alleviate the
problem. Despite African Americans making up an overwhelming majority of slum residents, the
regulations put in place by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City designated 45% of these
new public housing units for white people.29 The racially discriminatory patterns continued in
Baltimore even after the federal government passed the Lanham Act in 1940, which was
designed to expedite the creation of war worker housing through local housing authorities.
Municipal housing authorities signed on to participate in part because wartime housing projects
were able to circumvent material rationing and complete building projects that would otherwise
have been forced to sit partially finished until the end of the war. By 1943, the city had built or
designated seven housing projects for white war workers, but not a single project was designated
for black workers.30 All of these issues would crystalize in the fight over a proposed black
housing development in an area known as Herring Run.
By the time the United States entered World War II, the City of Baltimore had already
seen an influx of thousands of poor white and black rural Southerners. Hemmed in by strict
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residential segregation and unable to expand outward, the population density of black
neighborhoods skyrocketed. Despite the dire housing shortage for black residents, city leaders
did everything they could to avoid opening additional areas to black residency. In 1941, Mayor
Howard W. Jackson testified before a congressional panel that there was no housing shortage for
blacks in Baltimore. His statement directly contradicted that of Dr. Abel Wolman, Chairman of
the State Planning Commission, who testified that the city needed at least 9,000 housing units for
lower-income workers. Mayor Jackson and other politicians wished to reject federal funding
because they feared black workers would remain in the rent-free housing after the war ended,
destabilizing the city and placing an extra burden on public relief rolls. Congressman Harry
Streett Baldwin also claimed that “in-migrant colored laborers,” as opposed to “worthwhile
Baltimore citizens,” were lazy and unreliable. “That’s the kind we’re going to get,” he
proclaimed, “because there’s no other kind left to come. And what earthly good are these people
to the war industries?”31 Instead of building housing for these workers, Baldwin proposed they
should be put in trailer camps “so they can be easily moved out after the war is over.”32
The federal government was not persuaded by these protestations by city leaders,
especially after a 1942 spot-check of one city block found 590 workers sharing 121 rooms, with
only 53 bathtubs between them.33 On February 26, 1943, the National Housing Agency
authorized the construction of 2,000 new housing units for black war-workers.34 Once again, the
idea of using vacant land to increase the city’s housing stock was in play. Though activist groups
including the Citizens Planning and Housing Association insisted that the only solution to the
“Negro housing situation” was to designate additional land for black housing development, real
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estate men denied the need, claiming that the market was the final arbiter.35 One agent claimed
the existence of vacant homes near Baltimore war plants reflected a lack of demand, despite the
homeowners’ refusal to sell those homes to black buyers.36 In response to this disagreement,
Maryland Governor Herbert O’Conor created a Commission on Problems Affecting the Negro
Population. In their 1943 report, the Commission argued that vacant land “in and adjacent to the
City of Baltimore must be made available for Negro housing to take care of the present
overcrowded situation and for future development.” In the meantime, the report suggested,
dormitories and temporary barracks could be set up inside large buildings and public parks, and
residents not employed in the war industry should be encouraged to move further away from
defense plants to make space for war workers.37
Under the terms of the Lanham Act, the decision of where to place temporary housing for
war workers (white or black) was under the purview of the Federal Public Housing Authority
(FPHA), but it was the traditional practice of the FPHA to consult with local governments for
their input. The first seven housing sites for white war workers went ahead without much
dispute. When the FPHA began exploring locations for black war workers, however, they were
met with immediate resistance. The first proposed site, a vacant tract along Eastern Avenue, was
quickly abandoned after overwhelming protest by white residents in the neighboring areas. In
response, the FPHA chose Herring Run, an industrial area in the eastern portion of the city near
several defense plants, but away from the “semi-suburban developments” of East Baltimore.38
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Though the Lanham Act was only authorized to fund temporary emergency housing
during the war, the federal authority recommended that “sites selected...should have in mind
future permanent buildings,” especially in cities like Baltimore where chronic housing shortages
predated the influx of war workers. Statements like these did housing advocates no favors; from
the outset, public statements issued by the housing authority and disseminated by the press
stoked white fears about the creation of permanent black housing near their neighborhoods.39 It
seemed to many that whatever site picked to house black war workers would eventually become
a permanent black enclave. In April 1943, the Baltimore Sun quoted John D. Steele, chairman of
the City Plan Commission, who said that Herring Run, “lends itself to the purpose that we are
thinking of as the beginning of a permanent colored-area development along modern lines to
accommodate those in whatever financial strata.”40 To those fearful of “negro encroachment,”
then, a black housing development at Herring Run would allow the strictly delimited black
neighborhoods of Baltimore to spread into their backyards. Lutheran minister Luke Schmucker
declared that if a black housing project was placed at Herring Run, white war workers would be
set upon “in the streets, in the cars and buses, in the stores and movies, and even in the
schools.”41
Encouraged by success in blocking the plans for black war worker housing at an Eastern
Avenue site, an organization later known as the Northeast Civic Groups held a series of meetings
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to discuss challenging the proposed plans for Herring Run.42 Their president, speaking on behalf
of the Belair Road Improvement Association and “at least twenty-five” other groups, stated he
feared the new housing “would depreciate the value of present properties in the vicinity,” which
referred to those owned by whites.43 Similarly, Reverend T. Vincent Fitzgerald, the pastor of St.
Anthony’s Catholic Church, claimed that if the Herring Run development went forward, it would
jeopardize a $1,000,000 investment in the parish. If black housing were to be allowed at Herring
Run, he claimed, “I can’t pay it off.”44
In a meeting before the Housing Authority of Baltimore City45 (HABC) Chairman
Cleveland Bealmear, local residents claimed the plans for black housing at Herring Run would
“destroy property values.”46 Chairman Bealmear was no stranger to Mayor Jackson, and the two
had worked together in the past on a business-friendly agenda. In the 1930s, Jackson had
appointed Bealmear to the Baltimore Emergency Relief Commission (BERC). The BERC,
though ostensibly tasked with coordinating relief activities for Baltimoreans during the Great
Depression, was investigated by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration in 1933 and 1934
for mismanaging relief programs in efforts to reduce the number of people “on the dole.”47
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After James Edmunds resigned as chair of the HABC to pursue defense housing
contracts, Bealmear took on the leadership role. His appointment was clear evidence of the
Jackson administration’s distaste for public housing. As a realtor and former chairman of the
Real Estate Board’s Home Builders’ Division, Bealmear had lobbied against public housing in
the city, fearing it would “compete with private industry and private capital now invested in
housing.” Like many others in his field, Bealmear believed that public housing was “not
only...unfair competition, but a means of establishing what we believe will develop into a
permanent dole system for a large number of citizens.” Though Bealmear disliked public housing
in general, he especially objected to vacant land project development, denying any claims of
market failure and espousing instead that “private enterprise...if let alone by the government
would provide all housing in Baltimore for which there was effective demand.”48 Despite
Bealmear’s distrust of federal intervention in housing, under his leadership, the HABC calculated
that 22,700 households in the city lived on incomes so low that they could only afford rental
payments at or below $33 a month––the point at which housing was no longer profitable to the
private market.49
The HABC continued to disavow any input into the process in public meetings, including
one in which Bealmear once again emphasized that “The Baltimore Housing Authority has no
power to choose the site.” Furthermore, he claimed that when the HABC had refused to approve
the proposal of the original Eastern Avenue site, “Federal officials paid no attention to them and

48

Correspondence Cleveland Bealmear to A.R. Clas, 11 June 1935, H-2700.09, RG 196, PHA Project Files, Box
2017. National Archives..
49
Cleveland Bealmear, “Post-war Housing Program for Baltimore: Generate Statement, Part I,” (Preliminary
Report), January 1944, RG 29, S1, Box 29, File: Housing, Baltimore City Archives.
With this measure, the calculation for the 1944 projected housing need was 20,000 new units over 16 years. That
this figure was artificially low is evidenced by a revision upwards to 41,000 in 1945, and 60,000 in 1947 under new
HABC leadership. HABC, “The Story of Public Housing,” (Report, Baltimore: 1945); HABC, “Monthly Report of
Progress and Activities,” (Report, Baltimore, July 1949), 5.

22

only hesitated in their program when objectors staged a mass protest meeting.” With this
statement, Bealmear moved from distancing himself and his agency from any decision-making
power to actively encouraging white residents to once again resist the site placement in hopes
that they could do what Bealmear’s agency could not. Adding fuel to the fire, Bealmear told the
meeting, “‘there is no doubt in my mind’ that whatever site the Government selects will be used
as a permanent settlement,” a statement he surely knew would reignite white opposition to the
plans.50
Neighborhood objectors were listening. They quickly planned demonstrations and filed a
formal protest with the City Plan Commission, one of the groups responsible for suggesting
Herring Run. In addition, the president of the Belair Road Improvement Association led a
delegation to the mayor’s office, demanding the Herring Run site be withdrawn from
consideration. Mayor Jackson felt the effects of the increased pressure; when asked to comment,
he claimed that increased housing for black residents was not needed at all, despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Just weeks before the mayoral election, Jackson gave
very different statements to the mainstream press and to the black weekly newspaper. To the
Baltimore Sun, Jackson said, “We have a problem in regard to the housing of our permanent
Negro population. I agree that this problem must be solved. But it has not been proved, in my
opinion, that there is a need at the Martin plant or the Bethlehem Steel Company that would
warrant the building of this temporary Negro war workers’ housing.”51 On the other hand, in the
Baltimore Afro-American, Mayor Jackson was quoted as saying, “there should be prompt
construction of the homes, regardless of protests if the Federal Housing Authority feels that there
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is immediate need for them.”52 Though difficult to rectify these two positions, Jackson appeared
to be attempting to thread the needle of supporting the clear need for more housing for black
Baltimoreans, while objecting to the spread of black neighborhoods through the creation of black
war worker housing.
In mid-April of 1943, Baltimore’s housing officials submitted several sites for
consideration by the FPHA. Although the FPHA continued to insist that the chosen site would be
in the northeastern section of the city near manufacturing centers, the HABC submitted several
sites in the southwestern portion of the city, nearer to the existing black neighborhoods.53
Herring Run was also included on the list, due to insistence by the City Plan Commission. Even
so, HABC Chairman Bealmear insisted that his agency did not support the site and that the
HABC was “only lending its services as a matter of courtesy” to the FPHA by sending the
suggestions.54
Protesters were not convinced, and in part due to the negative response surrounding
Herring Run, Federal Housing Authority officials announced on April 26 that instead of building
temporary housing, the agency would now fund permanent housing for black war workers.55
While the FHA had authority under the Lanham Act to choose the location for temporary
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housing, this change to permanent housing placed the location decision in the hands of the
Baltimore government––specifically, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City. Encouraged by
control moving to local hands, protest group leaders stated they “had been given assurances” that
“all plans for the erection of Negro housing” in the Herring Run area had been abandoned. The
HABC denied such a definitive statement, saying that although Herring Run had not been
abandoned, “exhaustive studies are being made of other areas.”56
While this decision moved the focus of protest away from federal officials, it renewed
objections to the creation of permanent housing for black Baltimoreans and revived fears of
black residents “invading” white neighborhoods. Fifteen years earlier, attorney J.K. Barbour
claimed that “all of East Baltimore has been invaded,” and in 1943, protesters against the
Herring Run site again used the term to stoke fears about potential black residents.57 Northeast
Civic Groups attorney John Gontrum referred to the Great Migration as “the second time we
have had an invasion. The first was in 1814; and now they want to bring in another foreign
invasion of Southern laborers.”58 Others in the Northeast Civic Groups referred to Herring Run
as an “unwarranted intrusion,” including Reverend Fitzgerald of St. Anthony’s Catholic Church,
who claimed “I, personally, have no animosity towards colored people,” while objecting to
allowing black workers living ten blocks away from his church. Another said, “I believe that
colored people should have a decent place to live, but not in with us.”59 Northeast Civic Groups’
president, H.E. Thursby, went on the record saying, “We have nothing against colored people,
but we are unalterably opposed to and vigorously protest construction of the project” in their
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neighborhood.60 The group likewise spoke to white solidarity across the class divide, telling city
officials, “if they do this to us they can invade Roland Park where some of you gentlemen live. If
our rights are overridden, no rights of any one in Baltimore City or county will be protected.”61
With their newfound power to decide on the housing site, local authorities spent months in a
deadlock with the HABC refusing to approve Herring Run while the City Plan Commission
insisted upon it.
In the midst of this controversy, Baltimore held a mayoral election. During the campaign,
candidate Theodore McKeldin said of the incumbent, “the Mayor has not taken any part in the
discussion of the Negro housing project. The Mayor ought to make the initiative of that.”62
Following his win, McKeldin addressed the “crying need” for additional black housing in his
inaugural address, a topic on which “Mr. McKeldin spoke with deep conviction,” according to
the Baltimore Sun.63 In his first week as mayor, McKeldin convened an interracial commission to
study the problem and submit a recommendation.64 In theory, the interracial commission would
visit possible housing sites and meet with the HABC, the City Plan Commission, and
representatives of the FPHA to come to a solution. In July, however, McKeldin announced that
despite their best efforts, the interracial commission had been unable to come to an agreement on
a single site that had the approval of all the involved agencies. Three of the groups –– the
interracial commission, the City Plan Commission, and the Citizens Planning and Housing
Association –– all agreed that Herring Run should be the recommended site put forward to the
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FPHA for new black housing.65 The HABC still disagreed, and it was their choice that mattered
most.
McKeldin made attempts to convince Chairman Bealmear and the other members of the
HABC to select Herring Run by appealing to the poor physical condition of the site. Although
the land technically abutted Herring Run Park, few Baltimoreans would even recognize it as
such, because it was far away from the developed portions of the park on what the Baltimore Sun
referred to as "waste land." Moreover, the Sun writer argued, the land was not part of the
"pleasant semi-suburban developments" near Belair road and instead ran near a massive set of
power lines.66 Because of these limitations, McKeldin said, Herring Run would be the least
likely of the available sites to draw significant protest. McKeldin also appealed to the HABC’s
fiscal sense, pointing out that if the city failed to agree on a site, it risked losing significant
federal financial support to solve its ongoing housing crisis.67
With Mayor McKeldin on board for Herring Run, it seemed that final approvals were
forthcoming and construction could finally begin on the much-needed housing project. Oliver
Winston, FPHA Regional Director, went so far as to say that with the interracial commission,
City Plan Commission, and FPHA “in complete accord” on Herring Run, “there is absolutely no
reason to think that we cannot approve the site,” and “acceptance of it is a foregone
conclusion.”68 Winston spoke too soon. The HABC persisted in its rejection of Herring Run,
with Chairman Bealmear insisting that if the FPHA chose the site over their objections, they
would ask the Board of Estimates “to approve the proposal without our making a
recommendation on it,” effectively absolving the HABC from responsibility for opening up
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black housing in East Baltimore. Winston shot back, “Should the HABC come forward, even at
this late date, with an appropriate site...which represents as sound principles as the Herring Run
site, the FPHA will give it full consideration.” Instead, the HABC continued to recommend sites
only in Southwest Baltimore, knowing full well that the FPHA wanted war housing built near the
factories in the east. By making these recommendations, the HABC claimed to be working to
increase the housing stock of the city, while also signaling to white Baltimoreans that they were
fighting against federal authority to keep black people out of white neighborhoods.69
Neighborhood protests increased. In the intervening months, the Northeast Civic Groups
had grown to encompass 75 organizations.70 “The people out here don’t want it, and they are not
going to have it, even if we have to march 20,000 strong on the City Hall to prevent it,” the
group’s chairman insisted.71 And march they did. On July 13, a group of 750 gathered downtown
at the Baltimore War Memorial to confront McKeldin; a week later, another group of 800
marched.72 Both times the mayor attempted to limit the appearance of his own involvement in
the actual decision-making process. The first time he told the group, “If I had selected this site I
would have had the courage to stand up here and say so.”73 To the second group, he insisted, “I
tried to get the various bodies to agree on one site but that was utterly impossible. So I appointed
an interracial commission….That is all I have done.” Neither side was appeased –– white
protests continued, while the Afro-American accused McKeldin of “passing the buck” by
refusing to take a definitive stand for or against the project.74 The mayor continued to claim
neutrality, saying that it was not his “prerogative” to choose the site. “All I have done...is to
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submit recommendations to them from the two commissions,” he insisted. “Actually, I have
never even seen the Herring Run Park site.”75
Despite his attempts to walk the thin line of supporting the decision on Herring Run
without supporting the site itself, McKeldin found himself in political hot water. Seeing that their
protests had not been enough to halt the proposal, the Northeastern Civic Groups hired three
lawyers to wage a legal fight.76 Simultaneously, the City Plan Commission fell under fire by the
Baltimore City Council, particularly council vice president James F. Arthur, who asked members
of the commission if they were being “pressed” by federal authorities “who seem anxious to
encroach on the rights of our people.” He furthermore accused the commission of malfeasance,
claiming that the commissioners were violating a resolution that they should only consider sites
approved by the HABC. Since HABC Chairman Bealmear refused to back Herring Run, Arthur
claimed the commission had no right to consider the site.77 Following this scrutiny, the City Plan
Commission held two days of hearings with groups in favor of and against Herring Run. At the
end of them, the commission passed a new resolution affirming its recommendation of Herring
Run as “the most logical spot within the city limits” and “a site ideal for its purpose.”78
Undeterred, the lawyers employed by the Northeast Civic Groups went to work on Mayor
McKeldin directly. Backed by the city solicitor, the attorneys argued that neither of the
commissions had standing to approve housing sites on behalf of the city, and that the
“recommendation would have to come from the municipal corporation as a whole acting through
the City Council.”79 While the mayor acquiesced to the rights of the City Council to make a
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recommendation, he reminded them that, due to the War Powers Act, the federal government had
supreme authority over the city in developing war worker housing. In response, the City Council
immediately set to work drafting a city ordinance to prohibit the federal government from
constructing war housing in Baltimore without prior approval from the city.80
Alongside the City Council, several politicians joined the fray, including Democratic U.S.
Senator Millard Tydings, and Congressmen H. Streett Baldwin and Thomas J. D’Alesandro, Jr.
Baldwin went on the record saying that the Herring Run proposal “was part of a socialist
experiment being carried on all over the country,”81 and later referred to it as “a vast
development, entailing the expenditure of many millions of dollars as a social experiment.”82
D’Alesandro, seeing a great political opportunity, also joined in.83 He attacked McKeldin’s
handling of the recommendation process, saying that the mayor never attended any HABC
meetings or allowed the members to explain their reasons for refusing Herring Run. He further
sought to force McKeldin to declare his position for the record, saying, “There is just one
question I would like to ask Mayor McKeldin, Mr. Mayor are you or are you not in favor of the
Herring Run site?”84
McKeldin was unable to answer, as he had left for a two-week vacation to Maine shortly
after calling the City Council into session. In his absence, the council passed their new
ordinance. Under the new ordinance, the federal government was required to first apply to the
mayor for permission build on a site, who had to then submit to the City Council and the Board
of Estimates for approval.85 Supporters claimed that the provisions of the ordinance “were in line
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with the theories of local self-government,” and a matter of protecting the city’s interests.86 With
McKeldin away, it fell to the head of the City Council to sign the ordinance. Even with the
ordinance in place, FPHA leadership maintained that, due to the War Powers Act, the federal
government had the right to build worker housing with or without local approval.87
Even with McKeldin gone and the City Council asserting their authority, Representative
D’Alesandro did not let up his pressure on the mayor. He released a letter to the Baltimore Sun in
which he again called upon McKeldin to give a definitive answer on whether or not he approved
of the Herring Run site. As D’Alesandro pointed out, McKeldin’s approval of the
recommendation by the City Plan Commission and the interracial commission had been taken as
tacit approval of the site itself. D’Alesandro wrote, “Washington has interpreted your action in
forwarding these recommendations as an approval by you, as the Mayor of Baltimore, of this
particular site,” and thus approval by the “duly constituted authorities” of the city.88
Perhaps because of that implied approval, or because they were tired of the months of
political dealings with the city officials, FPHA representatives continued to move forward with
plans for Herring Run. On July 30, FPHA Commissioner Herbert Emmerich announced that not
only had the federal agency officially selected the Herring Run site, but that the work would
begin “as rapidly as possible” because of the immediate need for worker housing as part of the
war effort. He reminded the City Council that there was no requirement in federal law to seek
city approval before building war housing, and “as a matter of fact, there is an express provision
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in the Lanham Act that these projects may be constructed without regard to any municipal laws,
ordinances, rules, or regulations.”89
Having failed to stop Herring Run through city ordinance, City Council members and the
Northeastern Civic Groups’ lawyers continued to threaten legal action, pledging to take their
fight “to the Supreme Court if necessary.”90 City Councilman James F. Arthur, taking over duties
as acting mayor, called Herring Run, “a large expensive and elaborate permanent housing site for
Negroes in Baltimore in the nature of a socialistic experiment.”91 He claimed, “the issue raised is
one of States’ rights and local self-government vs. arbitrary Federal bureaucracy,” elevating the
matter from a disagreement over a single plan to erect housing to a matter of the federal
government forcing integration onto local bodies despite their protests, a reframing of integration
efforts that would continue to echo into the 1950s and 1960s.
Still on his vacation in Maine, McKeldin continued to “pass the buck” as he dodged
requests to go on the record as approving Herring Run. In a phone call to the Sun, he stated the
FPHA “obviously has the right to select the site. I don’t see any way to stop it.” “At this
distance,” he said, “it seems to me I have done all I can possibly do….Now it is up to the Federal
Government to build the houses.”92 The City Solicitor, F. Murray Benson, disagreed. In his view,
since, as Mayor McKeldin insisted, he had “simply forwarded the findings” by the commissions
on to the FPHA, that was not enough to constitute city approval. In this case, Benson argued,
such authority belonged only to the HABC, which had repeatedly and consistently refused the
Herring Run location. In Benson’s opinion, the FPHA was acting “illegally and improperly, and
under the guise of the war emergency, to accomplish the avowed purpose of permanently
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altering the traditional plan for the development of Baltimore city.”93 Benson’s phrasing is
important –– in addition to accusing the agency of using World War II as an excuse to expand
federal powers, he was directly linking this expansion of powers to forced integration, rights for
black residents, and civil rights writ large.
Pressure came down from Congress on the FPHA as well, when Senator Tydings and
Representatives Baldwin and D’Alesandro convened a meeting in Washington. D’Alesandro
warned that any effort by the FPHA to move forward with the Herring Run site “may bring a
Congressional investigation.” Baldwin threatened the FPHA’s funding, saying “if Congress
knew the money (for the site) was to be used for this kind of project you would not have gotten
it, and you would not get any more,” again raising the specter of federal meddling in racial
affairs. The other congressmen also echoed these claims of federal encroachment on state and
local governance. Said D’Alesandro, “This country is a democracy and the people speak through
their chosen representatives. As such, I respectfully recommend that you reconsider your
decision.” Senator Tydings pointed out, “opposition is ten times greater than ever to the selection
of the site,” and told Commissioner Emmerich, “I can’t see the reason for building these houses
when the whole city is protesting….I don’t say these protests are fair or not, but I do say the
protestants are within their rights to oppose this site.”94 In this framing, Tydings endorsed the
rights of individuals to protest because of their racist views, without endorsing their viewpoint
himself.
The FPHA’s choice to change the plans from temporary to permanent housing, and thus
try to avoid protest by passing the responsibility of site selection to the city, was proving to be a
mistake. Finding their position tenuous, FPHA officials recognized the need for definitive
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approval by some elected city official to proceed with the construction of Herring Run. As such,
Commissioner Emmerich called upon Mayor McKeldin, now returned from Maine, to give an
official statement for or against “using the Herring Run Park site for a Negro housing
development.”95 Though McKeldin had been able to skirt the issue for months, the FPHA was
now bringing pressure directly to bear on him. The FPHA had heard from multiple elected
officials against the site, while McKeldin still refused to speak on the project. As Regional
Director Winston explained, “If there are any such proponents, they have kept quiet; they haven’t
come to us; all we get is the opposition group.”96 Writing to McKeldin, Commission Emmerich
told him, “We had every reason...to conclude that you joined in these recommendations and
spoke for the city,” but now found it necessary that the mayor answer “definitively and
promptly” whether he approved of the development at Herring Run.97
When McKeldin again responded that the choice was not his responsibility, the FPHA
continued to press for a clear yes or no answer, “whether or not the city government approves the
selection.” If McKeldin did not give his official approval on behalf of the city, the federal agents
emphasized, the plans to build permanent housing at Herring Run would be scrapped.98 Instead
of building permanent housing, thereby helping to relieve dire housing shortages for black
residents and creating a housing site that would become the property of the HABC after the war,
the FPHA would go back to their original plans of building temporary housing instead. The city
would thus lose out on millions of dollars of federally subsidized construction that could
otherwise be used to alleviate the city’s housing problems.
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Mayor McKeldin had nowhere left to hide, no buck to pass along, and had to officially
take a stand. Faced with the opposition of an entirely Democratic City Council, the Republican
mayor caved.99 Still avoiding saying whether he personally favored the Herring Run site, the
Mayor instead backed the right of Baltimore City Council to choose the housing site as covered
by their city ordinance. He said, “As Mayor it is my duty to respect the ordinance. I have been
fully informed as to the sentiments of the individual Councilmen and they have not and will not
select Herring Run.” His choice made, McKeldin declared “Herring Run is as dead as the
dodo.”100 The Afro-American placed the blame for losing the site clearly on McKeldin’s
shoulders, as did the NAACP of Baltimore, which issued a letter accusing him of damaging the
war effort by causing the city to lose “this gravely needed project.” “We discover that your
interest in housing for colored people is limited by expedience,” they wrote, and failing to
support Herring Run “caused a lot of us who had great faith in you...to experience grave
disappointment.”101 Having lost the black community’s support, McKeldin also lost his 1947 reelection bid –– to Representative D’Alesandro.
True to their word, the FPHA announced that, lacking city approval for permanent
housing at Herring Run, “there is only one course open to us, build temporary housing on sites
we will choose.” Due to the urgent need for black war worker housing in Baltimore, the FPHA
endeavored to build “as quickly as possible.”102 As temporary projects built under the Lanham
Act, the housing on site would be torn down within two years of the war’s end. Following this
announcement, the editors of the Baltimore Sun ran an impassioned argument against the
decision, charging that “the great long-range need” was to “find an area offering the Negro
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population of Baltimore an opportunity to escape from the enclaves in which their homes are
now confined” by opening up new areas to black residents. Temporary housing, they feared,
would not go far enough.103
While it was the usual policy of the Federal Government to lease property upon which
temporary war housing was built, in this case, the FPHA brought legal condemnation
proceedings to acquire the land for Herring Run out of fear that landowners would refuse to
cooperate. In addition to asserting the rights of the Federal Government to take possession of any
necessary location to build war worker housing, FPHA officials explained that Herring Run was
selected “after full consideration of all factors involved,” and “the advisory opinions received
during the many and lengthy consultations...with local public officials and with various citizens
groups.” As soon as the condemnation proceedings were filed with the courts, the City Council
directed the city solicitor to contest the suit. In his statement to the press, Councilman Arthur
again framed the case as a matter of federal authorities forcing their will on matters of local
governance, saying, “The Federal Government has abandoned its traditional position of
recognizing the rights of the subdivisions of the sovereign States and has decided to work its will
in a most autocratic and dictatorial manner.” He further accused the FPHA themselves of
damaging the war effort, producing “resentment and lack of confidence in the short-sighted and
incompetent men...during this tragic war,” and damaging the “peace and good order of Baltimore
city...beyond calculation.”104
Northeastern Civic Groups’ attorneys and the city solicitor again joined forces to fight
against and stall the condemnation proceedings. Solicitor Benson filed a motion with the court to
deny the land use to the FPHA. Among the complaints listed were that the location of Herring
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Run did not “conform in location and design to local planning and tradition” in accordance with
federal statute; that taking Herring Run through condemnation did not follow the new city
ordinance requiring approval by the city council and the mayor; that officials feared even though
the FPHA was now claiming they would erect only temporary housing, “the city believes that the
Government intends to erect permanent housing on the land;” and finally, that the condemnation
was illegal because compensation had not yet been deposited with the courts.105 In an ironic twist
for a segregated city, the citizen protesters filed motion on the basis that, “a Negro war housing
project constructed on a site surrounded by an area wholly occupied by persons of the white race
constitutes the establishment of a racially segregated area in violation of the Constitutions of the
United States and the State of Maryland,” and further, “since the land will be used for homes for
Negroes who are neither citizens nor residents of Maryland, the project also will exclude the
petitioners.”106 While exclusion of black people was a right defended by the courts, exclusion of
these middle-class white men from black war-worker housing was, in their minds, indefensible.
Instead of moving forward with either the condemnations or the motions to dismiss,
Judge William C. Coleman repeatedly postponed the hearings.107 When the first postponement
failed to result in an agreement between the parties, Coleman issued a rebuke to the FPHA that
there had been “a good deal of fanning of air and wasting of time” by the federal government
because they had not followed proper procedures for site approval in the very beginning. While
he acknowledged the government’s rights to seize property under the War Powers Act, he stated
that he hoped the agency “preferred to work something out” rather than proceeding “by force of
sheer power.” “What good does it do to build houses if you are going to have disagreements and
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uprisings?” he asked. His advice was to “attempt to satisfy the greatest number of people” ––
with the clear subtext that this referred only to the “greatest number” of white people.108
Following the second postponement, understanding that Coleman was not going to allow
the condemnations to proceed, FPHA Commissioner Emmerich agreed to “confer personally”
with representatives of the HABC and “discuss seriously all alternatives” to the Herring Run
site.109 Despite having insisted for months that housing for black war workers needed to be
located near the defense industry in eastern Baltimore, at this point, the FPHA finally relented to
local political pressure and agreed to consider new sites in other areas of the city. When no
alternatives had been presented two weeks later, FPHA Regional Director Winston warned,
“Unless [the HABC] can produce an alternate site in the immediate future,” the FPHA would
push forward with condemnation proceedings to take not only Herring Run, but also a second
nearby site for another black housing project.110
In response, city officials quickly cobbled together a plan. Instead of one large, 1,400unit development at Herring Run, the HABC proposed four different sites with 200-600 units
each. Rather than being in the eastern portion of the city near the defense plants, all four sites
were located in the black areas of South and Southeastern Baltimore. In fact, two of them did not
even fall within the city limits, but required Baltimore County approval instead.111 All four of the
locations had been suggested to the FPHA before, but were each rejected as “inadequate and
inferior” to Herring Run.112 Despite these issues, and weary from months of delays, the FPHA
approved of the plan with the provision that one site, Cherry Hill, be built as a permanent black
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housing development and transferred to the HABC for low-income housing after the war was
over. Referring back to the mess of the past seven months, Commission Emmerich declared that
there was now “complete agreement” by the FPHA, the HABC, the Mayor, the City of
Baltimore, and Baltimore County. In sum, said Mayor McKeldin, “the problem is settled.”113
The largest of the replacement sites chosen was Cherry Hill. Like Herring Run, the
location for Cherry Hill was in a generally unprofitable location and condition, on a peninsula on
the Patapsco River. What the site did have, as white protesters were no doubt aware, was a B&O
Railroad right-of-way cutting it off from the rest of the city. In describing the site, former police
magistrate Charles H. Heintzeman called it “a damnable selection.” He explained that the area
was polluted with railroad engines “puffing smoke and cinders on an upgrade to the
manufacturing plants in Curtis Bay,” and the site was “bounded on the north by Spring Gardens
with tugboats belching forth their cinders and soot.” Even worse than the smoke from trains and
tugboats, though, the Cherry Hill site was located near the municipal incinerator. Heintzeman
described, “On sultry days the odor and fumes from this plant are very objectionable and when
the atmosphere is heavy and the wind is blowing from the southeast, it covers this location,
making it unfit for any housing.”114
While not garnering white protest, the selection of Cherry Hill was not without
complaint. City Councilwoman Ella Bailey, who represented the South Baltimore district in
which Cherry Hill was situated, objected to the choice of her district for the new location. She
said, “I heartily favor anything that may be done to improve the housing conditions of the
Baltimore Negroes, but I am, on the other hand, unalterably opposed to any attempt to house in-
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migrant Negroes at Cherry Hill.”115 Though class division would soon become a dividing line in
arguments over where to place black public housing projects, in this case, it was the migrant
status of black workers that caused objection. If the site was not to house Baltimoreans,
Councilwoman Bailey insisted, it should be developed into a water-front park for the benefit of
South Baltimore residents.116 The Urban League of Baltimore also expressed reservations about
Cherry Hill, primarily the limited ability to expand the area, which they feared would cause it to
deteriorate into “another blighted area” as it became overwhelmed and overcrowded by the
continued black housing shortage.117 Even so, FPHA Commissioner Emmerich expressed hopes
that Cherry Hill would become a “new permanent and well-rounded neighborhood for Negro
families” in Baltimore.118 Despite these objections, the selection of Cherry Hill passed without
much fanfare.119
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Figure 2.1 Locations of Baltimore Public Housing Projects, 1940 120

Simultaneous to the approval of the sites, the FPHA dropped the condemnation suit for
Herring Run. The other sites chosen were rife with problems as well. Urban League executive
secretary J. Harvey Kerns criticized the choice of the Holabird Avenue site because of “a
polluted stream” to the west, its “low and flat” geographical plain, and “that it is in a heavy
industrial area with no nearby community facilities.” Likewise, the Turner Station site was of
poor quality, which he described as “low land...infested with mosquitoes due to standing water
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on its fringes,” and “hemmed in by the municipal airport on one side and a large body of water
on the other... two miles from the nearest shopping district.”121 Nevertheless, plans continued
unopposed and the HABC quickly acquired rights to the land and began construction.122 The
white working class of eastern Baltimore had successfully fended off the “invasion” of black
residents, and city officials continued to follow the pattern of concentrating public housing
projects in majority-black areas of Baltimore for the rest of the century, as later chapters discuss.
The argument over Herring Run was more than simple resistance to housing black
residents near white neighborhoods –– it was the opening salvo in an ongoing war over who
public housing should serve, whose rights and priorities should be emphasized, and how much
influence local government should have over projects funded by federal dollars. In this period,
appointed civil servants in the Housing Authority of Baltimore generally aligned in their views
with elected representatives and could thus join forces against “unwarranted intrusion” by the
federal government into city planning decisions. In later years, with changes in HABC
leadership, the divide shifted and deepened, and this coalition of Baltimore civil servants and city
leaders dissolved at exactly that moment the federal government began insisting on stronger
policy control over local decisions –– an issue that the following chapters explore.
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3

CHAPTER TWO: DESEGREGATION IN THEORY

As World War II drew to a close, questions about the legality and ethics of segregation
entered the white American public consciousness as never before. Before President Harry S.
Truman desegregated the Armed Forces with Executive Order 9981 in 1948, black troops
overseas and on the homefront used their position as defenders of American freedom to press for
equal rights, a precursor to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s now
acknowledged by historians as part of a longer tradition of black political struggle.123 In this
same period, the wartime shortages that had slowed home building lifted and the Baltimore
Housing Authority (HABC) began making plans to change its war worker stock back to lowincome housing. By 1954, the HABC operated thirteen low-income housing projects along
segregated lines –– seven designated for white residents, and six for black.124 As the city
wrestled with questions of segregation following the 1954 Brown v. Board Supreme Court
decision, the issues raised in desegregating public schools and public housing fell along nearly
identical lines. Although schools had attracted more newspaper coverage leading up to Brown,
when public housing became part of the civil rights agenda, white Baltimoreans raised similar
concerns and authorities sought to put similar policies into place to eschew federal directives.
In Brown in Baltimore: School Desegregation and the Limits of Liberalism, Historian
Howell S. Baum argued that the “freedom of choice” desegregation policy implemented by the
Baltimore City School Board following Brown v. Board was an understandable extension of a
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national emphasis on the tenets of liberalism. Baum’s interpretation of liberal thought as
expressed in the individual choice model of desegregation closely mirrors the desegregation of
Baltimore’s housing projects. Placing the two desegregation policies in the framework of
liberalism offers additional context for understanding the broader paradigms of individualism
and choice that directly influenced the effectiveness of Baltimore’s housing desegregation
policy. By applying Baum’s framework of liberalism to the public housing desegregation policy
and giving particular attention to the language of “choice,” this chapter argues that the HABC
not only created a policy that could speak to the language of desegregation without having to
actually address the reality of segregation, but that it did so because of a focus not on the
aggregate outcomes of the system of segregation, but instead on providing individual opportunity
to choose otherwise. Because of their fundamental rooting in individualism and its entrancement
by the chimera of “choice,” the desegregation plans never had any real ability to reckon with
enduring, systemic inequality in housing or in schools.
Despite having the nation’s largest antebellum free black population, the city of
Baltimore did not provide schools for black children until 1867, when the state’s postReconstruction constitutional convention acquiesced to provide public schools for black
students.125 Despite a rapidly growing black student population, the city school system refused to
replace or update the overcrowded and dilapidated buildings. Over the next few decades,
crowding became so endemic that, from 1905-1920, most black children attended school only
part-time, splitting the day in two shifts. The school system built ten new buildings for black
students and handed down an additional twelve that were deemed no longer “suitable” for white
students by 1933, enabling all students to attend classes full-time. Even so, overcrowding and
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poor conditions continued to plague Baltimore’s black-designated schools. In the late 1930s, the
Baltimore NAACP began concerted efforts to improve conditions in black schools while
simultaneously filing legal suits to challenge segregation.126
While the topic of school desegregation had thus been circulating in white newspapers
for years by the post-World War II era, the idea of desegregating public housing came as a
surprise to those who relied on the Baltimore Sun for their news. The Baltimore Afro-American,
in contrast, reported heavily on housing segregation challenges throughout the 1940s and into the
1950s. This coverage included a 1941 article about limited integration in Philadelphia housing
projects, statements by First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt to the Washington Housing Association
that she was “opposed to any new planning to set up any segregation on any grounds whatsoever
since this is a barrier to teaching people to live side by side with one another as Americans,” and
the approval by the Boston city council of a resolution banning discrimination in public housing.
In addition to coverage of successfully integrated public housing programs like those in Queens,
New York, the Afro-American followed legal challenges to public housing segregation in
Detroit; Newark; Atlantic City; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Toledo; Elizabeth, New Jersey; San
Francisco; and Washington, DC.127
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In contrast, for those who read only the mainstream Baltimore Sun, coverage of public
housing segregation was extremely limited. In December 1949, the Sun recounted that the
federal Public Housing Administration refused a loan to the city of Charlotte, North Carolina to
fund the creation of a black-only housing project. The reason for the refusal was not the funding
of a segregated project, but that the Charlotte plan did not include a “separate but equal” whitesonly project as well and thus constituted discrimination against whites. According to the account,
“Federal officials insisted that if the Charlotte Housing Authority wanted any Federal money, it
would have to treat whites and Negroes equally.”128 Even in this instance, where the event was
detailed in both papers, the nature of the coverage distinctly diverged. In the Afro-American’s
article, the focus was on the announcement by the Charlotte Housing Authority that their
allocated funds would create integrated housing projects, a distinction left out by the Sun.129 For
the Sun’s audience, it was automatically assumed that local distribution of federal housing funds
would be “separate but equal”; in contrast, the Afro-American chose to highlight an instance of
local decision-making leading to integrated housing. The next instance of coverage related to
public housing segregation in the Sun would not come until five years later, when the question of
desegregation was at the forefront of the national consciousness.
In the summer of 1954, the Commissioners of the Housing Authority of Baltimore City
(HABC) received a memo from their General Council, Eugene M. Feinblatt, that dramatically
altered their approach to public housing.130 Just months before, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down segregation in public schools in the Brown v. Board of Education decision, but the memo
centered on an even more relevant court case from the previous year, Banks v. San Francisco
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Housing Authority, which essentially banned discrimination in public housing.131 Although the
ruling did not directly affect them, the HABC decided to reexamine their own policy of
segregation in the city’s housing projects in light of the legal precedent set by Banks. As
Feinblatt made clear in his memo, “Even if it be assumed that segregated projects are in and of
themselves legal, the present policy applicable to the admission and assignment...is certainly
discriminatory and illegal.”132
The HABC immediately began discussions to craft a new policy. In a staff meeting,
Director of Management Ellis Ash noted that “the national trend” was moving toward
desegregation, and that, as an agency “subsist[ing] to a great extent on federal assistance,” the
HABC would eventually be forced to do the same. In light of that reality, Ash recommended the
HABC “take the action without being forced to do it,” so they could better control the
development of a new policy and manage its implementation.133 Through this anticipatory
strategy, the HABC hoped to be able to decide for themselves what desegregation would look
like in Baltimore’s public housing, rather than being forced into a vision designated by the
federal government or the court system.
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Figure 3.1 Locations of Baltimore Public Housing Projects, 1950 134

In discussing the new desegregation policy, HABC officials held starkly divided
opinions. Despite raising initial concerns, General Counsel Eugene Feinblatt stood on the side of
maintaining segregated housing projects. In his memo following the Banks decision, Feinblatt
accused the California court of overstepping its boundaries and exercising judicial activism.
Feinblatt further disagreed with assertions that the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the Banks
case signified an approval of the ruling, claiming that “despite its general acceptance, this view is
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not justified by either law or precedent.” It should come as no surprise, then, that Feinblatt also
did not believe the Brown decision applied to the realm of housing accommodations either.
Instead, he claimed that there was “no rule of law” that prohibited public housing segregation,
and that there would be none, “unless it can be found as a factual matter” that segregation was
“so detrimental to the occupants of public housing” as to constitute a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. This distinction of “so detrimental” was an undefined bar,
but indicated an implicit acceptance of some level of harm caused by segregated housing, but not
one that rose to the level of psychological damage done by school segregation. In sum, Feinblatt
believed that the ruling of “separate but equal” from Plessy v. Ferguson remained generally valid
except in the specific places laid out in the Brown decision.135
While projecting confidence in his interpretation of legal precedent, Feinblatt also noted
that, despite his objections, the general trend of the Supreme Court would likely be to continue
limiting the legality of segregation.136 As such, he came to the conclusion that maintaining
segregation in public housing –– no matter its legality, in his view –– would become increasingly
difficult. As in the discussions surrounding school segregation, maintaining substantially equal
offerings to satisfy the legal requirements of Plessy would prove prohibitively expensive.137 Like
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the housing authority commissioners, Feinblatt recommended that the HABC, “as a practical
matter,” begin “to embark...on a policy of limited integration.” In doing this, he suggested that
the commission make more housing units available to black residents, and alter the admission
policy, “so that applicants will be considered solely on the basis of their statutory priorities and
preferences, without regard to race or color.” While he warned, “In the absence of a change in
political climate,” the HABC “must be prepared to accept an ever increasing measure of
integration,” Feinblatt hoped that, “If our efforts are genuine and we constructively experiment
with integration, there is every reason to believe that we will be insulated from adverse court
action.”138
In the midst of this debate among Housing Authority commissioners, the Baltimore
Public School Board was contending with many of the same issues. Although the School Board
had voted in 1952 to allow black male students to enroll in a specialized engineering course at a
white high school, by 1954, the board faced a lawsuit regarding high school offerings for black
female students. Despite claims that white and black schools were generally equal, black schools
were severely overcrowded. Booker T. Washington Junior High, for example, had 2,500 pupils
in a building designated for only 1,200. Both that school and the Dunbar Senior-Junior High had
returned to educating students using “double shifts” of school days lasting just four hours –– all
while seats sat vacant in white schools.139
School Superintendent John Fischer claimed there had never been “qualitative
distinctions...in providing facilities for white and Negro pupils,” while simultaneously blaming
the overcrowded, dilapidated condition of black schools on the neighborhoods where they were

138

Memorandum Eugene M. Feinblatt to Commissioners of the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, BRG48-13,
Box 5, Folder 1, BCA.
139
E.M. David, “Blurring the Color Line,” The Urban Review, 26 no. 4, December 1994: 246; Baum, 44-45.

50

situated.140 Fischer himself was an American boot-strap success story. He taught science in
Baltimore’s public schools while earning his bachelor’s degree through night classes at Johns
Hopkins, and later earned his master’s degree and doctorate while working as Deputy
Superintendent. He believed that “individual initiative” was the key to success, telling a
Baltimore Evening Sun reporter that “government should be as decentralized as possible with as
high a degree of local autonomy as can be achieved.”141 Fischer likewise claimed to be led by the
“principles of the Founding Fathers” –– what he determined to be an emphasis on classical
liberalism, or what would today be generally termed libertarianism. In the discussion of school
desegregation, Fischer would later write, “We believe it wrong to manipulate people to create a
segregated situation. We believe it equally wrong to manipulate people to create an integrated
situation.”142 Seemingly many of his white contemporaries in Baltimore’s housing leadership
shared his beliefs.
After studying the question of housing desegregation, the appointed HABC staff
committee issued a report of their own. First, they soundly rejected a “separate but equal”
proposal to pair each white housing project with a black project such that “substantial equality
could be achieved.” They called the proposal “futile,” expecting that a court case directly related
to housing “might well come along within the next couple of years.”143 Moreover, it was the
likelihood of a court case against the HABC that the committee, and the authority as a whole,
most wished to avoid. They feared that if forced to integrate by court decision, “the pressure
groups...will continue to breathe down our necks to make sure that we do not attempt to evade
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the effect of the decision,” noting “this lack of freedom in carrying out an enforced integration
policy could lead to trouble.”144 By forging and implementing their own policy ahead of any
court orders, the commissioners hoped the HABC might be subject to less scrutiny and oversight
of their progress.
In deciding the appropriate way to proceed in desegregating public housing, the
authority’s committee split between those who wanted to wait until legally forced, and those who
wished to take immediate steps toward desegregation. One member in favor of waiting until
legally compelled worried that to do otherwise would be taken as the authority “using its powers
as a participant in the crusade for integration,” and an attempt “to leap too far ahead of the
normal line of growth” for black areas of the city. He claimed to fear such actions “would retard,
rather than advance, eventual integration,” due to the backlash it would cause. Even still, the
member conceded, “there is no logical reason for discrimination or segregation of the Negro
from the community other than by individual or collective prejudice.”145
Even with reservations such as these, the majority of the staff committee favored
immediate desegregation. One spoke against accommodationism and gradualism, writing, “The
entire history of race relations in this country is filled with instances where the traditional
argument for either the ‘status quo,’ or gradualism as the next desirable alternative, develops its
case on the existence of fears and prejudices in the community.” Furthermore, their report noted,
taking action in advance of a lawsuit “would avoid the embarrassment” of defending continued
segregation “when it appears that no real defense is possible.” In their discussion of the matter,
HABC officials came back several times to the need to follow a path that would “win us the
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maximum of friends and supporters.” Although they differed on their preferred methods of
implementing desegregation, the commissioners expressed that they themselves generally
favored an end of racial prejudice within the public housing system.146
Before the HABC came to a decision, the school board announced its new policy. The
school had previously operated under a system of “open enrollment” rather than districting,
meaning that students could apply for enrollment in any school assigned to their race, regardless
of its proximity to their home. On June 10, 1954, the school board announced a small but
important change: “All the standards and criteria which are now in force with respect to the
admission of pupils to schools, grades, or curricula shall continue in force except that the race of
the pupil shall not be a consideration.” In order to ensure that “no child shall be required to
attend any particular school,” the board continued its rejection of districting, with the important
exception that if a school was determined to be overcrowded, a district line could be drawn to
close off open enrollment for that school by those who lived beyond the line.147 As historian
Howell Baum described, “Officials construed students’ freedom of choice, or individual liberty,
in negative terms. They had in mind freedom from external restraint, rather than freedom to get
or achieve anything in particular.”148 This school desegregation plan was unanimously adopted
by the school commissioners on June 25, 1954.149
The desegregation plan adopted by Housing Authority commissioners was strikingly
similar to that of the school board, in that it kept all the same requirements with the sole change
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of “eliminating the factor of race” in admission decisions.150 In a press release announcing their
decision, HABC officials wrote:
The attention of the Commission has been directed to an examination of
its racial occupancy policies by reason of the significant events of the past few
months, both locally and nationally, establishing a clear trend toward the
abandonment of policies sanctioning segregation. The Commission recognizes
that this trend affects the Authority’s own policies.
Furthermore, an examination of such legal opinion as is available results
in the conclusion that the existing policies would be extremely difficult to
administer to satisfy legal requirements and still be workable, acceptable, and
practical.
Accordingly, the Authority is proceeding to revise its admission policies
by eliminating the factor of race in the selection of eligible tenants, consistent
with the present admission procedures.
The staff is directed to develop the necessary administrative changes and
arrangements towards this end.151
It is telling that in this statement the authority failed to condemn the practice of
segregation, instead distancing itself from the issue by pointing to local and national “trends.”
Though a small difference, this is an important way in which the HABC shifted responsibility,
and thus potential blame, for its actions. Simultaneously, the statement shifted focus to the
authority’s inability to effectively meet the increasingly burdensome requirements of nondiscrimination within a segregated system, giving another discursive slip to its own agency.
While the intentions of the HABC commissioners were important, most housing authority
employees were never privy to the conversations actually crafting the new policy. Their
introduction to the change came from HABC Executive Director Oliver C. Winston, former
FPHA Regional Director during the Herring Run debacle, who addressed an assembly of
employees on June 30, 1954.152 He began by reading the official press release announcing the
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new desegregation policy. Winston could have followed the commissioners’ lead and focused on
the difficulties of the changing legal structures of segregation, but instead, much of his speech
extolled the virtues of the decision to desegregate the projects. Like the press release, Winston
pointed to the national trend toward “eliminating discrimination and segregation practices in all
areas of human activity,” as well as the “unmistakable trend of legal opinion” that segregation
was unconstitutional.153 Unlike the release, though, Winston placed the responsibility to uphold
the desegregation decision onto agency employees. He told the group, “The policy is not just the
Commission’s policy, it is in every sense of the word our policy. I want you to get in the habit of
thinking about it that way.”154 This rhetorical emphasis is important, as it collapsed the distance
between the HABC employees and commissioners, framing the policy as something the entire
staff was embracing rather than a decree from above. Though the official press release sought to
limit the assumed agency of the HABC, Winston emphasized to the employees that it was not
just a national trend toward desegregation driving the change, but also a moral responsibility to
end discrimination.
Winston also directly addressed those employees who would wish to maintain
segregation in the housing projects. Unlike the residents of public housing, for whom the right to
individual choice was of tantamount importance, agency employees were required to comply
with the desegregation policy regardless of their personal feelings on the matter. Winston warned
that the authority would not allow employees “to express contrary personal opinions...while
engaged in the performance of their official duties.” Employees were not allowed to make
statements such as, “I agree the decision is bad, but what can I do about it?” Winston explained,
because such statements would decrease the new policy’s effectiveness. Finally, he reminded
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those employees who felt “prejudices...so strong that he cannot perform his job” within these
parameters that they would be subject to dismissal under the employee code of conduct. Here
again, Winston placed responsibility for ending racial discrimination on the shoulders of each
individual employee.155
Despite Winston’s strong language in his speech to the staff, behind closed doors, he
made it clear that he felt the need to be careful in how the HABC presented the new policy to the
public. Having learned from his time as FPHA Regional Director during the controversy
surrounding Herring Run, Winston recognized the importance of presenting the decision as a
collaborative effort, not a mandate handed down from an overzealous bureaucrat. In a meeting of
HABC officials on November 5, he told the commissioners that any interpretation of the
desegregation policy given to community partners “must be presented in a manner which could
not be construed by any person as being a ‘crusade’ entered into by the Housing Authority.” He
went on to say, “At no time should we give the appearance of ‘bowling something through on the
community.’”156 Even though he had encouraged lower-level staff to take ownership of the
desegregation policy and overtly threatened employees with dismissal for expressing
disagreement, for dealing with community groups, Winston encouraged language that once again
downplayed the HABC’s agency. By shifting culpability away from the housing authority,
commissioners positioned themselves to play both sides––with any community groups who
disapproved of the changes, the HABC could claim to be a similarly aggrieved party acted upon
by broader societal change, while with more progressive groups who were in favor of
desegregation, the HABC could claim to be leaders in housing desegregation.
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As shown, the new policy was presented differently to the private audience of the HABC
commissioners and the public-facing group of employees. The policy was presented in a third
way when discussed with the officials of other municipal housing authorities at the Human
Rights Day Institute in St. Louis, Missouri in December 1955.157 At the Institute, HABC Deputy
Director Ellis Ash gave a speech titled “The Baltimore Story,” a tale meant to inspire and
encourage other housing authorities facing similar challenges as desegregation loomed large on
the national stage. While it is necessary to read between the lines in Ash’s speech, there are
moments where his message was explicitly clear––that desegregation was only going to go as far
as the “individual choices” by housing residents forced it to go.
Likewise, Baltimore School Superintendent John Fischer recognized that the “freedom of
choice” policy would not lead to a true end to school segregation. Following the Baltimore
School Board’s decision, Fischer told teachers, “Will our school system be reorganized to
integrate all schools? The answer to that question is ‘No.’...No effort will be made deliberately to
transfer children of either race for the purpose of ‘mixing’ schools. We have had the last of
placing children anywhere for racial reasons.”158 Fischer would return to this point again and
again. In 1959, he said, “Negroes have been free to remain in their own schools or, if they chose,
to transfer to a white school. The one thing we have resisted is to manipulate people. We are just
opposed to pushing people around. The school system has never adopted any plan to achieve a
good balance. We feel there is no merit in having a particular racial composition.”159 A few years
later Fischer returned to this theme of integration as manipulation, calling school integration
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“social engineering” and claiming that “even the most desirable end does not justify
manipulating people to create a structure pleasing to some master planner.”160 As Baum
explained, “Explicitly, [the school board] would not discriminate against black children;
implicitly, neither would it act on their behalf.”161
As in Baltimore’s schools, the bulk of the responsibility for housing integration was thus
placed upon the black residents of the projects––or, as Ash described it, “every applicant can
now express a preference for any project.” In this way, integration was up to black housing
applicants, not the HABC. This was a conscious choice made by the commissioners, and it was
working exactly as planned, with several projects still 100 percent white-occupied. As Ash
claimed in the aforementioned speech, “At this stage, a number of projects have had no
applicants from members of the racial group formerly excluded from consideration.” The
continued de facto segregation in the HABC project system was the responsibility, and thus the
fault, of black residents, who, in Ash’s telling, simply did not want to integrate the O’Donnell
Heights, Claremont Homes, and Brooklyn Homes projects. Ash emphasized this point clearly to
the gathered participants at the institute, telling them proudly, “The Baltimore Authority has not
applied its policy on the premise that integration must be achieved throughout the program, if
that means that families are required to either live in particular projects or sacrifice their
opportunity for housing.” Ultimately, the HABC was willing to remove the legal mandate that
segregated housing projects, but would not take any meaningful steps toward their integration.162
The promise by housing commissioners that “We are not going to require anyone to live
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anywhere against their wishes,” cut both ways.163 It meant that black residents would not be
forced into segregated housing, but also that white residents would not be compelled to live
alongside black neighbors. It was the black applicants who were making the decision to move in
next door to potentially unwelcoming whites, not the city officials who were placing them there.
Ash clearly knew that this system of voluntary housing project choice was not the way to
achieve integration, ending his speech saying he did not wish to give the false impression, “that
all projects operated by the Baltimore Authority are now integrated. Frankly, I don’t know when
that will occur.”164 From their first conversation on desegregating the projects, HABC
commissioners had shown that integration was not the end goal of the policy change. As their
report stated in 1954, “If we wait for a court decision we will not only have no control over the
types of families we select to begin the integration process, but probably not enough control over
where we place them within a project either.”165 Ash’s speech puts those conversations in a
clearer relief: it was not just a fear of government intervention in the speed of desegregation that
made commissioners nervous, but also that government oversight of the process may force actual
integration, which could have devastating political consequences. Others had recognized the
limitations of the “choice” system, as when Winston told HABC employees that “there is a good
probability that all our projects will not attract persons of different races than the present
pattern.”166 HABC officials recognized the limitations of the individual choice system, yet
embraced it despite –– and potentially because of –– those limits.
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Director Ash could not plead ignorance of this likely outcome. In July 1954, Director of
Housing Management Harry B. Weiss warned Ash, “It should be recognized that segregation is
not necessarily forced; it may be voluntary, since persons may prefer to live among others of
similar cultural background. Conversely, integration is not necessarily voluntary, since the denial
of free choice may be required to insure against a continuance or a resurgence of a segregated
pattern.”167 Perversely, Ash called back to this same language in “The Baltimore Story,” telling
the gathered officials that it was no surprise that Baltimore’s projects remained partially
segregated since the city was “still a community with essentially segregated living, and
institutional resources such as shopping, entertainment, and religious facilities [for black people]
are not available in the neighborhoods adjacent to a number of the projects.”168 What Weiss had
raised as a point of concern about a structural flaw in the policy, Ash used as a justification for
the authority’s limited actions toward integration.
With so little reporting on housing desegregation efforts by the Sun leading up to the
HABC announcement, one can only imagine it must have come as a surprise to the majority of
the Sun’s white readership. In contrast, for Baltimore Afro-American readers, it likely seemed a
long time coming. Just a few months earlier, the Afro-American reported on the very California
court case that spurred the HABC to action, Banks v. San Francisco. Savvy readers of the paper
might have remembered the Afro-American reporting earlier that year that “The Superior Court
ordered the housing authority [of San Francisco] to admit all qualified applicants to any and all
available low-rent public housing units, subject only to the rules and regulations which applied to
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all applicants and without regard to race or color.”169 Running almost twice the length of the Sun
piece, the Afro-American’s report on the HABC’s decision quoted the press release in its
entirety. In addition, it gave background on the projects currently under operation, the
construction of two new projects in progress, and listed the members of the HABC board who
made the decision. Where the Sun echoed the language of the HABC press release, the AfroAmerican made small but important changes. Even the very headlines run by the two newspapers
differed in how they viewed the change: while the Sun reported that “Segregation is Ruled Out,”
the Afro-American more optimistically declared “Housing Integrated in Baltimore City.”170
Unfortunately, as discussed, the Sun’s headline was closer to the mark in the end. For the AfroAmerican, though, its coverage of the issue was not done with this piece. The following week,
the paper reported on Oliver Winston’s address to all the HABC employees, the text of which
was discussed earlier in this chapter. In addition to an editorial calling Winston’s address a
“temperate, reasoned, statesmanlike document,” the paper dedicated most of a page to reprinting
the address in its entirety.171
Before the HABC decided to desegregate its projects, the Sun remained either unaware of
or uninterested in the housing segregation policies of other cities. This is in sharp contrast with
the Afro-American. After the decision, however, the Sun ran a few articles about other cities,
many of them related to the Brown v. Board decision and its aftermath. For instance, a 1956
article about an Alabama voter initiative detailed plans in that state to maintain segregation in the
face of the Supreme Court ruling.172 The Sun article opened, “Segregation-conscious Alabama
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voters will decide tomorrow on two measures designed to prevent race-mixing in the schools and
public recreational and housing facilities.” The article carefully walked the line of detailing how
the proposed plan would enable Alabama officials to maintain segregation in schools and public
facilities while taking the segregation laws off the books, yet not explicitly suggesting that
Baltimore lawmakers do the same. Combining the extremely value-laden term “race-mixing”
with the tacit endorsement of such a plan, the Sun was able to take the side of segregation
without directly saying so.
Other instances of the Sun’s failure to denounce clearly racist policies as anything of the
sort include a 1957 Associated Press article detailing the ludicrous plan by a Georgia lawmaker
to send black families to New England and the Midwest in hopes that forcing white residents in
those regions to live next to black families would increase their racism and thus garner support
for continuing segregation.173 It is not clear whether the original article by the AP was intended
to be tongue-in-cheek, poking fun at such a ridiculous plan, or slyly supporting the proposal as
the Sun did in the previously discussed article. Either way, the fact that the Sun editors chose to
run the piece, combined with other racial sentiments expressed in the paper, suggests that the Sun
did to some extent support those who were pushing back against integration.
Another AP article run by the Sun is a 1958 piece about the workings of the public
housing desegregation plan undertaken by the New York City housing authority. This article
decried the failure of desegregation in that city’s public housing, saying, “A policy to prevent
discrimination against Negroes in city housing has resulted in whites moving out, thereby
defeating its purpose of integration.” 174 It went on to describe a survey report by the Citizens
Housing and Planning Council of New York, Inc., which suggested a policy of affirmative action

173
174

“Plan to Resettle Negroes is Told,” Baltimore Sun, Aug. 25, 1957.
“N.Y. Housing Race-Policy Shift Asked,” Baltimore Sun, June 9, 1958.

62

should be adopted over the current “color-blind” plan. The report also suggested the NYC
authority “issue a firm and unequivocal statement as to its determination to develop and maintain
integration,” a far cry from the HABC method of ending blatant discrimination but going no
further. The Sun itself recognized that the HABC decision had not led to integration, as when
Edward C. Burks reported, “Segregation regulations were dropped several years ago, but in
practice there has been little intermingling of the races in the assigning of apartment space.”175
Despite this acknowledgment, when the HABC was faced with potential interference by the
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development just a few years later, the Sun
dramatically changed its tune, declaring, “As for our eighteen public housing projects,
integration prevails in fifteen of them, there being only three which are all white – and these only
because there have been no Negro applicants.”176
While the Sun otherwise avoided discussion of desegregation policies across the country
with the aforementioned exceptions, the Afro-American continued its regular reporting of legal
challenges, successes, and failures in public housing desegregation throughout the 1950s. In
addition to single-article reporting on integration efforts in Chester, Pennsylvania; St. Louis; and
Hartford, Connecticut, the Afro-American followed debates in several other cities through
multiple years. The paper reported on the NAACP’s suit against the Detroit Housing
Commission in 1950, and proudly announced when the judge in that case declared “separate
housing facilities are inherently unequal” in 1954. In addition to reporting when the Newark
Housing Authority abolished segregation in their housing projects in 1950, the paper followed
the case in nearby Elizabeth, New Jersey, where black plaintiffs filed against the local housing
authority in 1953 and won the suit the following year. Likewise, the Afro-American reported on
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housing discrimination lawsuits in Toledo, Ohio in 1953. Perhaps the most surprising city
missing from the Sun’s reporting and present in the Afro-American was Washington, D.C., where
the decision to desegregate public housing and its implementation dragged on for years.177
As a final example, even when the Sun and the Afro-American did report on the same
lawsuit, the depth of coverage and direction of the editorializing differed greatly. An AP article
on Savannah, Georgia selected by Sun editors to run in the paper in July 1958 began, “The
principle of voluntary racial segregation was approved by a Federal appellate court today in a
decision against integration in a Savannah public housing project.”178 According to the piece, the
Fifth District United States Court of Appeals decided, “If Negroes and whites desire to maintain
voluntary segregation for the common good, there is certainly no law to prevent such
cooperation. Neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth Amendment operates positively to command
integration of the races but only negatively to forbid governmentally enforced segregation.” It is
interesting that the court would term its decision in such a way, since if “Negroes and whites
desire[d] to maintain voluntary segregation,” the lawsuit in question would never have existed. It
is also valuable to recognize this distinction made yet again about “voluntary” segregation, the
same excuse made by the HABC for the lack of substantive desegregation efforts in its own
project housing.
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What the Sun article failed to mention was the background of the Savannah lawsuit. The
suit was brought forward by Queen M. Cohen, a black woman who was denied housing in the
Fred Wessels Homes, a white-designated project. Although the first time this project came to the
attention of the Sun was this appellate court decision, the Afro-American had begun following
the case five years earlier. In 1953, the Afro-American ran an article about a court challenge to
plans to begin construction on the Fred Wessels Homes.179 It is only in the Afro-American that
readers discover the Fred Wessels Homes were constructed “on the ‘Old Fort’ site, an area
inhabited by colored families.” The Afro-American reported on the case again in 1954, when the
U.S. Court of Appeals dismissed a suit brought against the Savannah Housing Authority on a
filing technicality, saying “the ‘important constitutional issues’ raised were not ready for
decision.”180 This background provides depth to the 1958 articles. In the Afro-American’s report,
and missing in the Sun’s account, was the statement by the appellate court, that “there was ‘no
indication’ that Mrs. Cohen actually wished to live in the project, since the case had been
brought as ‘a test’ by the NAACP.”181 Setting aside all discussion of the case itself, the Sun did
not mention that the plaintiff in the case was a former resident of the neighborhood where these
projects were built, which was cleared to make way for white housing, and she was then denied
entrance into the public housing development. For the Sun to state that she did not actually want
to live there but was just a pawn of the NAACP is quite telling of the paper’s perspective on the
subject of housing desegregation.
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Baltimore’s black elites praised the “free choice” policies of both the school board and
the HABC. The NAACP claimed credit for the school board policy, stating, “The policy
statements...embodied the requests made by the [Baltimore] Branch,” and branch president Lillie
Jackson told the Afro-American, “The Baltimore Branch NAACP heartily commends the
Baltimore City School Board for the magnificent decision.”182 In the days following the school
desegregation announcement, the Afro-American declared, “In Maryland, we are face to face
with integration.”183 Failing to draw a distinction between desegregation and integration, the
Afro-American likewise celebrated the revised HABC policy as “one of integration.”184 In the
elite black community, a colorblind liberalism focused on individual opportunity held sway. As
Betty Murphy Phillips, daughter of the Afro-American’s owner explained, “there will be only a
few colored pupils in many schools in our city. But that’s not important –– the important thing is
that [individual black students] will now have an opportunity to avail themselves of all the public
school facilities this city offers.”185 Phillips embraced the color-blindness of the policy. In
another article, she expressed hope that “in the next 15 years...we get all our young people ––
white and colored –– to stop thinking in terms of race.”186
In both schools and public housing, those who championed integration hoped that the
new policies adopted after Brown v. Board would open a path toward racial integration, and
through that, an end to racial discrimination. In the school system, nearly the opposite was true.
Though some individual black families bravely chose to send their children to formerly all-white
schools, for a variety of reasons, the vast majority of black children remained in all-black
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schools. For the 1954-55 school year, fewer than 5 percent of black students attended schools
with white classmates.187 In the 1960s, due to a boom in Baltimore’s black population, more
black children were attending all-black schools than had before Brown v. Board; by the end of
the century, the racial composition of Baltimore public schools would shift from 60 percent
white, to 89 percent black.188 This pattern of limited desegregation followed by re-segregation as
a result of large-scale abandonment by white families would likewise play out in the public
housing sector, as the following chapters detail.
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4

CHAPTER THREE: DESEGREGATION IN PRACTICE

In 1954, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC), following what it saw as a
national trend challenging overt segregation, declared its public housing projects desegregated.189
As in Baltimore’s public schools, the liberal policy of “freedom of choice” applied public
housing projects, hinged on the power of individual decision making in the face of long-standing,
systemic, codified segregation. This “color-blind” plan was easy to declare, absolving local
authorities of responsibility for integration, but left open questions about implementation that
housing officials struggled with for the rest of the 1950s and into the 1960s. More than a decade
after officially ending segregation policies in its projects, Baltimore public housing remained
racially segregated on a de facto basis, due in part to a combination of factors including the city’s
history of residential segregation, overt racism, and unequal opportunity supporting white
upward mobility; but primarily, Baltimore’s public housing remained segregated because of the
lack of institutional support inherent in the classically liberal idea of “free choice.”
Even after the HABC resolved to “eliminate the factor of race” in public housing
admissions, questions remained about how exactly to implement the new policy.190 The
department first looked to Fairfield Homes, a project constructed by the federal government in
1943 as war housing for employees at the Bethlehem-Fairfield shipyards, located on an industrial
peninsula alongside the Patapsco River.191 Complementing the all-white Fairfield Homes, was a
separate temporary project built for black workers, called Banneker Homes. Although both
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projects were turned over to the HABC for low-income housing following the war, Banneker
was torn down in the early 1950s, and in 1953, the HABC had begun the process of redesignating Fairfield Homes for all-black residency.192 By then, the area surrounding Fairfield
had deteriorated significantly, contaminated with industrial pollution and detritus.
Simultaneously, the area suffered from what historian Nicole King refers to as “disinvestment”
from city officials who, among other things, failed to modernize the site with the water and
sewer lines constructed throughout the majority of the city following the war.193 No longer
desirable, the site was to be given over to black residency; unlike the fights over Herring Run in
the 1940s, the move garnered little resistance from white residents.
The large-scale changeover from white to black occupancy at Fairfield had already begun
by the time of the HABC’s 1954 desegregation decision. Seeing this moment as an opportunity
to test out integration in public housing, the HABC halted transfers of white residents out of
Fairfield Homes. By that point, however, most of the residents had already left, and only 69
white families remained in the project.194 Eight black families became the first to integrate
Fairfield Homes on November 16, 1954, and by August of the following year, the project was
once again near full capacity.195 Despite this “integration,” within a year, Fairfield was 90
percent black––effectively the same racial turnover the HABC had planned before instituting
their “free choice” desegregation policy.196
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The next phase of implementing the new housing policy came about in the summer of
1955. On May 31, nine black families moved into Perkins Homes in Southeast Baltimore, near
the ethnic enclave known as Little Italy. The next day, seven black families moved into Latrobe
Homes, just a mile north. Despite having made the decision to move black families into formerly
all-white projects as vacancies became available, officials held back applications for black
residency until a group of sufficient size had amassed to enable a cohort.197 In both Latrobe and
Perkins, like in Fairfield Homes, the scales of racial balance tipped quickly. By 1964 both
projects were majority black, and by 1970, had further increased to 80-90 percent black
residency.198
The first three integrated projects were the result of moving black residents into formerly
all-white housing facilities, but the HABC also had several new public housing projects in the
pipeline at the time of their desegregation decision. As HABC Director of Housing Management
Harry Weiss explained, this provided an opportunity to open new housing on an integrated basis,
drawing a distinction between desegregation and integration: “In the case of existing projects
desegregation is the issue while with the new projects integration can begin at initial
occupancy.”199 This distinction between desegregation and integration was unusual, as the terms
were used interchangeably by most HABC officials at the time; moreover, Weiss highlighted a
difference in process, not in outcome. Despite all new public housing projects after 1954 opening
on an integrated basis, all of these saw the same trend of rapid turnover to all-black occupancy.
Lafayette Homes, for example, opened in 1955 with only nine white families. By the following
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year, that number had dropped to four, all of whom left within the decade.200 Another project,
Flag House, opened on the edge of Little Italy in 1954 with 76 percent white occupancy. By
1958, that had dropped to 60 percent––still a laudable enough number that the Sun reported,
“Segregation regulations were dropped several years ago, but in practice there has been little
intermingling of the races in the assigning of apartment space except for Flag House Courts.”
Although its location on the border of Little Italy, a low-income ethnic white neighborhood,
slowed the racial turnover, by 1970, even Flag House had become 95 percent black.201 In fact, all
eight projects opened on a “desegregated basis” were overwhelmingly black-occupied by
1970.202
Despite their stated hopes for integration of the public housing project, officials soon
realized the limits of their success. In a late 1959 memo, five years after desegregation was
announced, Weiss wrote to Edgar Ewing regarding the “steadily rising percentage of Negro
occupancy at all projects.” Furthermore, he noted, “The future projects that are presently planned
are likely to be substantially Negro in occupancy, if not completely so.”203 This same trend of
racial turnover had been experienced by housing officials in other cities, including Chicago.
Despite the Chicago Housing Authority opening Wentworth Gardens as an integrated project in
1947, the combination of long-term residential segregation and housing shortages in black
neighborhoods led to an applicant pool that was entirely black. According to reports, when white
people arrived to find a line of black applicants, the white people left without applying. As a
staffer noted, “Unless a public relations job is done in advance of the actual selection of tenants,
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the project will become uni-racial as a result of the overwhelming need among Negro
families.”204 At another public housing project in Chicago, officials had hoped for 20 percent
white occupancy upon opening to mirror the neighborhood before the redevelopment. Instead,
like with Lafayette Homes and Flag House Courts, the few white tenants who initially moved
into the project soon left.205
HABC officials were well aware of the possibility of this “re-segregation.” Years earlier,
Weiss had warned the housing program director that segregation was, “not necessarily forced; it
may be voluntary, since persons may prefer to live among others of similar cultural background.”
Likewise, he noted that integration was not necessarily voluntary either, because “the denial of
free choice may be required to insure against a continuance or resurgence of a segregated
pattern.”206 To the public housing officials in Baltimore, the matter of deepest concern was the
appearance of free choice, rather than the outcome of continued segregation. This supposed
“choice” was disconnected from any consideration of systemic racial or class barriers that could
prevent individuals from making a choice, or any discussion of whether a choice was actually
meaningful. By embracing this stance, officials were able to willfully avoid having to address
segregation caused by decades of residential discrimination and racially based policy decisions.
To force integration at the cost of free choice proved unacceptable to housing officials, not only
because of the ideologically liberal focus on individual decision making disconnected from
societal factors, but also because of the more practical benefit––the continued ability to avoid
responsibility for correcting the situation.
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As the previous chapter argued, Baltimore was one of the first cities to apply the
individualist tenets of classical liberalism to desegregation of the school system, which prevented
school board members from taking steps to positively address the system’s racial disparities, but
this avoidance of responsibility was not unique to Baltimore. As Ansley Erickson explored in her
recent book, Making the Unequal Metropolis: School Desegregation and its Limits, school
desegregation in Nashville followed different patterns stemming from the same processes. She
wrote of the Nashville school board, “Their stunted vision was as much material as cultural; their
racism a system of power as much as a matter of individual feeling.” These “basic political and
economic structures,” stemming from a racially-based and racially-biased system, hindered
efforts to proactively further desegregation through busing in the late 1960s and 1970s.207 In a
broader sense, American society fundamentally emphasized the supposed link between
worthiness, effort, and success––in which case poverty was evidence not of systemic racial
injustice, but personal failure.208
Weiss’s 1954 letter to Ash had also warned that “selection solely on the basis of ‘need’
might well re-establish segregation.”209 Applicants displaced from their homes due to city urban
renewal projects were placed at the top of the public housing waiting lists. As Weiss recognized,
most of these urban renewal areas were black neighborhoods, which meant a high percentage of
those placed in public housing would be black. This only served to exacerbate the long-standing
shortages of housing available to black residents.
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In many cities across the nation, neighborhood residents who were displaced by urban
renewal or to make room for new housing projects were unable to return, even after the projects
were desegregated. Housing historian Lawrence Vale estimated that in Boston, only between 2
and 12 percent of those displaced from public housing sites were admitted to the subsequently
constructed housing projects; figures from New York City are only slightly higher, at 18
percent.210 In other cities like Chicago, neighborhood composition rules were used to justify low
percentages of returning residents. In the Jane Addams Homes project in Chicago, data showing
only 35 black families living on the site before clearance was used as justification for admitting
only 30 black families back into the 1,027-unit project.211 As Vale explained, housing reformers
“proposed to replace ‘housing conditions’ with better housing...not necessarily say that the
people lifted bodily out of their present homes would be the same bodies selected to return to the
improved district.”212 Housing shortages were further exacerbated when demolished land was not
replaced by low-rent housing, but commercial or market-rate development.213
The racial turnover in Baltimore public housing was not without local precedent. Until
1917, housing in Baltimore was not racially segregated. Black families were spread throughout
the city, generally living in two-story alley houses. At the turn of the century, the “best” black
families began moving into the northwestern part of the city, along the westernmost border of the
affluent white Eutaw Place neighborhood.214 The backlash to this black migration foreshadowed
the debates over Herring Run described in earlier chapters, as well as Baltimore public housing
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writ large. In the summer of 1910, black lawyer George W.F. McMechen moved into a house on
McCulloh Street, becoming the first black family to cross the racial divide into Eutaw Place. In
response, the Baltimore City Council passed an ordinance forbidding black families from
moving onto any block that was more than 50 percent white-occupied.215 When the law was
ruled unconstitutional by the 1917 U.S. Supreme Court Case Buchanan v. Warley, white
neighborhoods instead turned to the use of restrictive covenants.216 Racist lending practices
known as “redlining,” backed by the Homeowners Loan Corporation, further exacerbated the
shortages caused by in-migration of African Americans during the Great Migration and World
War II. A 1946 survey by the Baltimore Urban League found that black homeowners were
paying an average of 170 percent above prewar levels and at least 75 percent above present
market values.217 By the time the U.S. Supreme Court ruled such covenants unconstitutional in
the 1948 Shelly v. Kraemer decision, demand for decent black housing combined with white
hysteria had reached critical mass. Blockbusting fervor swept the city, with panicked whites
selling their homes in transitioning areas.218 In the decade from 1955 to 1965, the West
Baltimore neighborhood of Edmonson Village went from nearly all-white to nearly all-black.219
This trend presaged the racial turnover that occurred in Baltimore’s public housing. The
numbers of white applications to HABC-administered housing dropped precipitously in the years
after the desegregation policy was announced, from 2,563 in 1950 to 807 in 1966. While black
families faced federal policies that limited their housing choices, white families were granted an
abundance of options from mortgage loan assistance to GI Bill benefits that encouraged home
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ownership and enabled white flight from diversifying neighborhoods to the suburbs. Baltimore
historian Edward Orser referred to this pattern as the “proverbial pull and push of
suburbanization: the attraction of new housing in a suburban setting, the push of groups from
whom they sought social distance.”220 Programs meant to benefit upwardly mobile residents and
prevent the need for subsidized public housing disproportionately benefited whites, often by
design.221 Like at the Wentworth Gardens and Cabrini projects in Chicago, poor whites had
choices not available to poor black residents, and often exercised those options to avoid
desegregated public housing. In Baltimore’s public housing projects, desegregation did not lead
to integration, but instead single-race occupancy by black residents. As George J. Marder said in
a 1965 article in the Baltimore Afro-American newspaper, “What starts out as open housing to all
races often ends up all-colored.”222
The same patterns were replicated throughout the HABC project areas. During World
War II, HABC had operated six black-only projects. Despite ostensible desegregation of the
housing program, not a single one of these projects had become home to a white family by the
1970s.223 On the opposite end of the spectrum, the white-only projects of Brooklyn Homes,
Claremont Homes, and O’Donnell Heights remained exclusively white until well into the 1960s.
Even thereafter, these projects remained 80-90 percent white, only marginally desegregated.224
Of the 1,601 white families in the HABC housing system during 1970s, 1,393 of them lived in
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these three projects. The vast majority of white public housing residents were thus concentrated
in these mostly white projects. This was likely the result of two mutually reinforcing factors: the
lack of integration in these projects meant white residents were less likely to flee and cause racial
changeover, and those who did leave the projects for the suburbs or market-rate housing would
be replaced by other white applicants who chose those projects because of its lack of integration.
Despite a majority-black waiting list for HABC-administered housing, all new residents in these
three projects were white until 1967.225

Figure 4.1 Locations of Baltimore Public Housing Projects, 1960 226
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That Brooklyn, Claremont, and O’Donnell remained overwhelmingly white despite
desegregation was not a fluke, but by design. The HABC officially blamed these racial
disparities on the black housing recipients, saying that “unless a family had its roots” in the
surrounding neighborhoods, “they were not interested.”227 The fact that a history of residential
segregation meant that no black applicants would have such “roots” in the white neighborhoods
surrounding the projects was not considered. Instead, as the Sun dutifully declared in 1962,
“integration prevails” in fifteen of the eighteen projects administered by HABC, “there being
only three which are all white––and these only because there have been no Negro applicants.”228
In a 1971 memo, HUD administrators described policies they called “freedom of choice” tenant
selection plans. HUD acknowledged that under such plans, at least theoretically, “If a black
applicant wanted to live in a white project,” he need simply apply and, should a unit be available,
he would be eligible to rent it.229 Indeed, this was exactly as the HABC described and defended
their program. In reality, freedom of choice plans did little to change racial occupancy patterns.
While conforming to the letter of the law, these plans did not take affirmative actions to
encourage integration, but merely put in place requirements to avoid codified discrimination. The
onus of action was on individual residents to make changes. As the HUD memo described,
freedom of choice plans were insufficient to “counteract social inhibitions which had become
institutionalized to such an extent that people were afraid to exercise their freedoms.” Indeed,
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local administrators often managed freedom of choice plans in ways that worked to “preclude
both freedom and choice.”230
In July 1966, HUD questioned HABC on the continued segregation in Brooklyn,
Claremont, and O’Donnell housing projects.231 Rather than undertaking a policy to more broadly
desegregate the projects, HABC responded by trying to attract enough black residents into the
white projects to satisfy HUD scrutiny.232 In an HABC committee meeting, the housing officials
created a plan to encourage black Baltimoreans to apply for standing vacancies in white projects.
This time, instead of using racially coded language to justify their discrimination, the HABC
used administratively coded language. Commissioners began by making plans to desegregate
O’Donnell Heights, which at the time consistently maintained 30-40 standing vacancies––
approximately a 4 percent vacancy rate, more than double the maximum allowable under HUD
regulations. The committee also noted that the vacancies were mostly in large-sized dwelling
units. When planning the desegregation of O’Donnell, however, the committee determined that
they should not transfer in “overcrowded families” from other projects in order to fill the
vacancies. Families whose units were too small for their large number of household members
and needed the kinds of larger units standing vacant in O’Donnell were specifically excluded
from the desegregation effort. The justification given by the board was that white residents
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would feel more receptive to incoming black residents drawn from the “general community”
rather than from other projects.233
HABC commissioners also suggested that the Housing Application Office be required to
“notify all prospective tenants of available dwelling units, and their waiting time.” This policy,
which actually already existed, allowed the housing authority to put the onus on potential black
residents to seek out information on O’Donnell Heights rather than soliciting non-white tenants
and actively working to desegregate the project. Once an applicant expressed interest, however,
the office was required to immediately notify the director and provide the housing, in the interest
of increasing the number of non-white families in the project. Even so, they decided that, for
their own safety, new black residents would be moved into the white projects as cohorts of at
least three families.234 The plans further implemented procedures to “encourage standard families
to apply for public housing.” At this time, “standard families” referred to two-parent families and
generally required that at least one parent be employed. Although this statement stayed within
the required policy of openness to single-parent families and welfare recipients, encouraging
“standard families” to apply increased these more “respectable” applicants to the pool so they
could then be selected for the desegregation effort.
For the initial cohort of black families in O’Donnell Heights, the HABC plan was even
more specific, stating, “At first, only standard families including husband and wife, with or
without children (preferably not more than two) will be referred.”235 Thus, although operating
within an official policy allowing applications from any type of family, officials were clear that
they planned to select a specific type of black family for residence in O’Donnell Heights. This is
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a unique glimpse into the respectability politics behind the veneer of HABC’s “freedom of
choice”––while the housing authority constantly pointed to the freedom of applicants to apply
wherever they wanted as evidence of non-discrimination, the authority clearly had no qualms
about selecting those who most closely fit the middle-class white ideal. Moreover, as previously
mentioned, HABC commissioners purposely chose to initially accept only small families, despite
the abundance of large unit vacancies in O’Donnell––exactly the type of units desperately
needed by larger families the agency often had trouble placing. Yet here, when they had large
units sitting vacant, HABC not only decided to disallow overcrowded black families already
within the public housing system to move in, but also to exclude large families on the waiting
lists to be placed.236
This choice to prioritize new applicants over those already in public housing is notable,
considering that the proposed policy did allow that, if needed to enable three families to move in
simultaneously, “existing public housing families” could be transferred.237 This distinction
played into stereotypes about people who lived in public housing, a population that HABC had
openly described as “more and more broken, old-age, and single-person families.”238
Transferring larger, less traditionally structured families into bigger vacant units would have
solved two problems at once, and yet officials bowed to societal pressures that considered new
residents preferable to those who seemingly embodied the worst characteristics assumed of
public housing residents. The HABC officials planned to move these new black residents in
during the fall or winter months, explaining, “During this period there is less movement of

236

Memorandum from R. L. Steiner to BURHA Staff listed, Aug. 1, 1966, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 5,
Exhibit 152, ACLU.
237
Memorandum from R.L. Steiner to Saul M. Perdue, Interim Report - Recommended Procedures for Filling
Standing Vacancies, July 19, 1966, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 5, Exhibit 152A, ACLU.
238
Carroll E Williams, “New Trends Alter Public Housing Here,” Baltimore Sun, Nov. 28, 1957.

81

individuals outside their respective homes,” and that children were less likely spend time outside.
Instead, “The interests and energies of the children would be directed more to the structured
school programs.”239 Here, too, officials relied on stereotypes of “problem families” for policy
making, playing into fears and assumptions that black youth were likely to cause problems in the
new projects.240
These new guidelines, though meant to support the existing “freedom of choice” plan,
show that the original plan was flawed and led to “self-segregation” of housing applicants––or,
in the parlance of the HABC policy, applicants “choosing” to remain segregated. That there were
so many standing vacancies in O’Donnell Heights either means that black applicants on the long
wait lists were not told that there were openings available in the white projects, or were being
discouraged or rejected from applying to those openings. Though this is “freedom of choice” on
one level, in that the black applicants had not actively pursued the vacancies in O’Donnell
Heights, it necessarily leads to questions about how much information is necessary for such
choices to be meaningful. Putting the onus of “choosing desegregation” on the black residents
themselves absolved the HABC from responsibility for managing and facilitating desegregation
and non-discrimination in its public housing projects. It thus became the failure of individuals for
not choosing to live in integrated projects––precisely the liberalism inherent in the desegregation
program from the start.
Although the new policy plan was drafted in July 1966, by November, no concrete steps
had been taken to desegregate O’Donnell, Claremont, or Brooklyn Homes. That month, Mayor
McKeldin, Ewing, and Feinblatt went to Washington, D.C. for a meeting with HUD Secretary
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Robert Weaver.241 In that meeting, Weaver warned the group that a change would be coming in
HUD policy regarding “freedom of choice” plans. Weaver promised a public statement would be
issued, but soundly refused to go into specifics or allow the HABC to review the statement
before it was released to the public. He did indicate that the statement, “would not question the
intention, the integrity or the commitment of Baltimore,” but fell short of promising not to
criticize the HABC program or its implementation. Furthermore, Weaver warned that HUD
would not be approving plans for the multi-million dollar Inner Harbor redevelopment, “until
HUD is satisfied with...a full and complete explanation of our public housing picture,”
particularly in relation to integrating the three remaining all-white projects.
Spurred into action by the threat of funding cuts for their commercial urban renewal,
HABC Director Steiner met with Baltimore Police Commissioner Donald D. Pomerleau. In his
letter following up with Pomerleau, Steiner reiterated the stance that HABC was taking on
desegregating the three white projects. Despite HUD requiring that HABC end segregation in
Brooklyn, Claremont, and O’Donnell, Steiner explained, HABC “is making no special effort to
house nonwhite families” in the three projects. However, he wrote, “In the process of filling
vacant apartments, if a nonwhite family is on the eligible list of families to be housed, then it will
be housed in the project of its choice, which may be O’Donnell Heights, Claremont, or Brooklyn
Homes.”242 “Freedom of choice” thus protected HABC officials both from the responsibility of
managing desegregation, and from possible blame when desegregation did happen. Since it was
an individual applicant who would have to choose to move in and desegregate the white projects,
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the HABC was able to shift responsibility, and thus potential political backlash, away from
themselves for such action.
The HABC continued forward with the plan it had laid out in July. On December 22, the
housing office sent notification letters to the current residents of Brooklyn, Claremont, and
O’Donnell for the express purpose of explaining the policy of “eligibility for residence” in public
housing.243 The letters informed residents, “It has been the policy of this Agency since 1954 that
race would not be a factor in determining where any eligible family might live in the public
housing projects,” and yet “to date, no non-white family has asked” to move into the white
projects. Echoing the language used in the letter to Chief Pomerleau, the letter continued, “In the
process of filling such vacant dwellings, it is possible that some Negro families may request
housing” in their project. In these letters, HABC directly blamed any black applicants who
requested housing within the still-white projects for the desegregation that was set to occur.
Though the letter concluded with the hope that residents understood federal requirements and
would “do everything possible to preserve harmonious neighborly relations if a Negro family
does move in at some time in the future,” it is foolish to believe that officials believed white
residents of these projects, which had become the safe haven of white public housing residents,
would allow the change without pushback. Moreover, having disavowed their own control over
the situation and placed responsibility squarely on the shoulders of any black residents who
would cross the racial barrier, HABC officials put a target on the backs of the new black
residents. The danger of the situation would become clear when a copy of the letter to the
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O’Donnell Heights residents was returned, emblazoned with a swastika and the words “WE ARE
READY.”244

Figure 4.2 "We Are Ready" Letter to O’Donnell Heights Residents, 1966 245
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Despite the attempts by HABC officials to shift public perception of responsibility
through framing desegregation as something being done by individual black applicants rather
than the agency, protesters against the change made no such distinction. One flyer, titled
“Negroes and O’Donnel [sic] Heights,” proclaimed elected officials to be “race-mixers,” while
calling the urban renewal director Director Richard Steiner “a jew from the city.” It went on to
say, “The people you have elected to office are rewarding you with their garbage. They are about
to make O’donnel [sic] Heights a City Dump by sending you the City’s trash...the Negro.” It
proclaimed that black residents would lead to “vandelism [sic], yokings, rapes, beatings, filfth
[sic] and fear that the negro brings with him from the Black City.” The flyer referred to
Baltimore as “McKeldin’s Town,” displaying animosity towards the Mayor for his support for
the city’s black community, whose support had helped him win reelection in 1963. Invoking
southern myths of rapacious violent blacks, the flyer asked readers to consider “when your kids
will be afraid to walk your streets in peace, when your daughters will be molested, when you will
not even be able to sit on your steps in peace,” to then “think of those that you have elected to
office and wonder if THEY are putting up with this where they live. You can be your sweet life
they are NOT.” That the flyer referred to ownership of “your steps” is curious, showing little
distinction between homeownership and residency in public housing––at least, for white
residents. The sentiment in the flyer emphasized not only class and racial difference, but physical
distance: “Those who have decided that you and the blacks will live in harmony and love are the
same ones that live far, far away from the negroes.” Finally, the same language of “invasion”
prevalent in discussions of residential segregation during the Herring Run debates of the 1940s
again featured prominently, with the flyer instructing readers, “You and your White neighbors
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had better band together and be prepared for this invasion. Be prepared to defend yourself and
your loved ones...with White Power, if necessary.” The flyer also included Director Steiner’s
home address and telephone number.246
Another flyer that was distributed by O’Donnell resident Faith Gosnell read in part,
“People of O’Donnell Heights and surrounding areas––LISTEN!! Stand up for yourselves!
Negroes in your neighborhoods mean CRIME! Murder, rape, assault, robbery upon you and your
family. Fight for your rights NOW!!! Before it is too late.” Interviewed by the Baltimore Sun,
Gosnell “denied she believed in racial superiority but said she believed there was an ‘inborn
tendency’ for Negroes to be more violent than whites.”247 Since white public housing residents
could not frame their resistance to desegregation in terms of lowered property values, Gosnell
attempted to legitimate her protest through supposed concerns over crime, equating black people
with violence, a stereotype common throughout the racial history of the United States, but
especially prevalent in debates around urban renewal.
Soon after the protests, Gosnell’s mother, Anna Broyles, was served notice of eviction
from their unit in O’Donnell Heights. Broyles filed an official complaint that the eviction was in
retaliation for Gosnell’s picketing, a charge that project management vehemently denied. In fact,
Broyles had been served the first notice of eviction back in June due to four other residents living
illegally in Broyles’ unit, including Faith Gosnell. Even so, Broyles went to the Maryland
Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations complaining, “I feel I’m being intimidated
because of my daughter’s picketing.”248 Broyles’ stunning display of hypocrisy was not limited
to white tenants breaking the rules while complaining about black malfeasance, but also in her
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assertion that management was “intimidating” her into silence while her daughter was actively
and maliciously attempting to intimidate potential black residents to keep them from moving into
O’Donnell Heights.
In January 1967, while Gosnell and others were distributing flyers and picketing, no
black people had yet applied for housing at O’Donnell Heights. That changed in the spring, as
HABC unveiled a new program meant to encourage black applications to the three all-white
projects. First, intake officials would actually tell black applicants to public housing that the
three projects were available to them, with the caveat that the interviewer would “point out the
family’s best opportunities for housing within a reasonable time.” Next, applicants would have a
group meeting and tour of the “traditionally white neighborhoods” around Brooklyn, Claremont,
and O’Donnell, and discuss the opportunities presented by moving to such areas. The meeting
and tour would last three hours, a significant demand of their time.249 If applicants did not attend
the group meetings, intake officials would attempt to meet with them individually, with the
unwritten insinuation that those who resisted these meeting attempts would not be considered as
having completed the application process. As the final step, applicants had to submit to a home
visit by HABC officials to their current residences.250 In this fashion, HABC hoped to avoid
being seen as mandating desegregation, while ensuring enough desegregation to satisfy HUD’s
requirements. Officials could continue to present their actions as simply allowing black residents
“freedom of choice,” rather than of having actively engineered their relocation into white
projects.
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Esther Frank Siegel was one of many who performed the visits to applicants’ homes. Her
notes and report to HABC Housing Director Van Story Branch have an air of middle-class
progressive paternalism, grading both the applicants and their homes. Of one Mrs. Jessie Bell, a
black applicant to Claremont, Siegel wrote, “We visited her home in the country on November
21 and it is one of a group of dilapidated single homes close to the water. Like Mrs. Bell herself,
the house was meticulous.”251 Siegel took great care to describe both the misery of Bell’s
situation, and the ways in which Bell managed to adhere to middle-class values despite her
poverty. Siegel’s report seemed unaware that she objectified Bell, drawing parallels between the
applicant’s meticulously kept but dilapidated house, and the meticulously kept but dilapidated
person. Siegel’s other reports show additional benevolent racism. For example, in another report
to HABC Director Branch, Siegel described three black families who attended a group meeting
for potential applicants. She described Mrs. Joseph Fortune as, “being alert and mature.” Of Mr.
and Mrs. Isaiah Banks she wrote, “They are young but they appear alert and able.” She reported
that Mr. and Mrs. James Little “appeared alert and they were immaculate,” and said that their
home visit “disclosed children and home as neat and tidy as the parents.”252
In the final preparations for the first black tenants to move into O’Donnell Heights and
Brooklyn Homes in the summer of 1967, HABC paid installation fees and twelve months of
telephone services for the new tenants. Director Branch said to the Sun that the telephones were
provided so the black residents could call for help if they encountered “organized opposition.”
Earlier in the summer, Ku Klux Klan members had rallied outside the projects, activity that the
Sun downplayed as “anti-Negro organizations picket[ing].” Even with the Klan actively present,
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the newspaper reported that integration was a success, since the “majority” of white tenants
“showed no particular reaction.” The Sun quoted HABC official David Filker saying that at first,
officials “were afraid perhaps that was just apathy,” but that white families had proven to be
“intelligently responsive to the change.” Despite the evidence of Klan resistance, in August,
Director Branch declared the “period of crisis” was over.253
Branch’s optimism proved premature, as Klan members returned to the Brooklyn Homes
housing project in September 1967. For three nights in a row, Klansmen rallied outside the house
of Shirley Rivers, a black mother who lived in Brooklyn Homes with her three preschool-aged
children. On the third night of their demonstrations, 25 Klan members led a march down the
block in front of a gathered crowd of 350 people, while ten members of the Congress of Racial
Equality stood watch outside Rivers’ front door. Though police had been present for the first two
nights, it was only on the third that they acted, arresting fourteen men, including a “selfproclaimed exalted cyclops” and charging them with disorderly conduct.”254 Overt
demonstrations against integration in the projects ended.
Despite intimidation by the Klan, the HABC continued to make real efforts to encourage
black applications to the all-white projects. In working to identify prospective black residents to
move into Claremont, HABC reviewed applications, made home visits for interviews, and
invited prospective residents to attend group meetings and tours. Once again, reports from these
efforts discredit the agency’s repeated claims that black people simply were not interested in
living in Claremont, O’Donnell, or Brooklyn Homes. Of Mrs. Geraldine Pate, the intake official
wrote she was “very eager” to live in Claremont, but if she could not get a unit there, she would
consider O’Donnell. Her original choices of the majority-black Latrobe, Perkins, and Douglass
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had fallen to the bottom of the list. In fact, Claremont Homes was so popular with black
applicants that a memo recommended foregoing the tours of Claremont until the “desired
number” (20 to 25) of black residents had moved into Brooklyn.255 In so doing, HABC was
acknowledging for the first time that giving black applicants true choice would lead to black
people integrating the remaining all-white projects, and that withholding knowledge of that
option would again passively push black residents into other project sites.
Despite desegregation becoming the official policy in Baltimore public housing in 1954,
more than a decade later, the city’s housing projects remained clearly divided along racial lines.
Even so, in 1967, Branch proclaimed, “Even with the tension in all the other cities we took a
bold step and succeeded.”256 That Branch, who was himself black, would declare such token
desegregation to be a success is in part a result of the racial tensions that erupted in the 1967
Detroit riots, but also a measure of how long other HABC officials had allowed de facto
segregation to remain after officially “desegregating.”
Though pushed to action by HUD in 1967 to begin to moving black families into the
remaining majority-white projects, HABC continued to insist on maintaining its “freedom of
choice” plan, absolving the housing authority of responsibility for dismantling the system of
residential segregation inherent in the city and its public housing. HUD would seek to further
affirmatively address the continued segregation present in Baltimore and other housing
authorities across the country as the decade came to a close, as the coming chapters will discuss.
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5

CHAPTER FOUR: FIRST COME – FIRST SERVED

The Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) operated its projects under an
unrestricted “freedom of choice” plan from 1954 to 1966. In that year, following investigation by
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) into three of the city’s
housing projects that maintained 100 percent white occupancy, the HABC created a system of
group interviews and began actively encouraging black applicants to the white projects—a
process detailed in the previous chapter. Despite these changes, HUD soon released new
requirements nation-wide in an attempt to fully desegregate the country’s housing projects
through a centralized and regulated system of application tracking and mandated procedures for
the assignment of housing units to public housing applicants. While the HABC was unsuccessful
in its initial attempts to avoid the new requirements altogether, local officials used the language
of choice to argue for, and eventually gain, HUD acceptance of a plan that subverted the new
requirements to the point of irrelevance.
HABC’s measures to finally integrate the all-white projects of Brooklyn, Claremont, and
O’Donnell in 1966 proved too late to stave off additional federal involvement. By 1967, HUD
recognized the need for an updated national policy regarding racial segregation rather than
continuing to allow the patchwork of locally adopted “freedom of choice” plans, which had
resulted in many projects remaining segregated. In a 1967 memo describing the issues with
“freedom of choice” desegregation, HUD officials could have been speaking directly to the
situation in Baltimore. The memo referenced projects wherein the buildings used predominantly
by one race (generally black) had vacancies while applicants of another race (generally white)
lingered on waiting lists, a clear example of institutional acceptance of continued segregation.

92

Although HUD noted, “Even without inducement of Local Authority staff, the plans tended to
perpetuate patterns of racial segregation,” the Baltimore Afro-American newspaper published
complaints that HABC officials were exacerbating the problem.257 As one article explained, the
HABC administration of “free choice” included the option for applicants to wait indefinitely
before accepting an available housing unit. In addition to enabling white applicants to wait until
units in all-white buildings came available, the Afro-American claimed officials were likewise
holding back black applications until units were available in all-black buildings, a practice that
was not specifically prohibited by federal law. “Although never the announced policy,” the AfroAmerican stated, “the practice in public housing... was to re-inforce segregated housing.”258
Thus, while HABC claimed that continued segregation in housing was a result of individual
choices by public housing residents, black and white, the system only truly offered such a choice
to white residents.
Also in 1967, HUD Secretary Robert Weaver wrote to the Special Counsel to the
President to report on the department’s compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which prohibited discrimination based on race in federally financed programs, including public
housing. One problem HUD faced in complying with Title VI regulations was the regulations
themselves—while they prohibited the type of discrimination inherent in segregated projects,
“They do not direct affirmative action to integrate housing.” In the report, Weaver chose his
words carefully; rather than discussing the number of desegregated projects, he referred to those
that were “nonsegregated”—meaning at least one family was of a different race, but meaningful
desegregation was not necessarily achieved within the project. While this categorization is no
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longer used today, it served an important purpose for Weaver to be able to acknowledge that
token measures to eliminate strict segregation did not rise to the level of desegregation. Even
under this expansive definition of “nonsegregation,” Weaver reported, only 19 percent of
federally-assisted low-income housing projects were nonsegregated in 1962, and only 30 percent
by 1964.
These low rates of nonsegregation grew directly from the classically liberal policies of
free choice, which Baltimore and other local housing authorities had adopted. According to
Weaver, however, “HUD has now determined that this [freedom of choice policy] is not
feasible,” and was preparing to issue new instructions to local housing authorities by 1967. These
new guidelines would require local authorities to maintain system-wide waiting lists of public
housing applicants and assign tenants based on the order of application. They would also develop
a safeguard against white applicants waiting indefinitely for vacancies in all-white projects by
limiting the number of units an applicant could reject before being moved to the bottom of the
waiting list.259
Director Ash had bragged at the 1955 Human Rights Day Institute in St. Louis that “The
Baltimore Authority has not applied its policy [of desegregation] on the premise that integration
must be achieved throughout the program, if this means that families are required to either live in
particular projects or sacrifice their opportunities for housing;” yet it was exactly this type of
plan that HUD would now mandate.260 In July 1967, HUD released the new requirements for the
administration of public housing, which the agency termed “First Come––First Served.” The new
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plan intervened in two significant ways: first, local authorities would be required to maintain
applications on a community-wide basis rather than separate waiting lists for individual projects;
and second, applicants must be offered housing in the order they applied, and in the project with
the most vacancies, rather than holding back some applications to wait for openings in certain
projects. Understanding that applicants could have legitimate reasons that were not based on
Title VI-prohibited discrimination to avoid a given project, HUD allowed local authorities to
offer up to three project placements before an applicant would be moved to the bottom of the
waiting list.261
In addition to the new regulations, HUD distributed its “Basis for Revised Requirements”
explaining the reasons for the new restrictions. In addition to noting that freedom of choice plans
often “did not afford freedom of choice in fact,” the memo explained that placing the burden of
desegregation on individuals did not acknowledge how long-standing patterns of segregated
housing affected the ability of individuals to make such choices. Whether due to internal factors,
fear of reprisal by the community, or inducement by the local authority, placing the onus on
individual housing applicants without providing institutional support to overcome the systemic
patterns and pressures of racial discrimination, “did not provide applicants with actual freedom
of access to, or full availability of, housing in all projects and locations,” according to HUD. In
this statement, the federal agency was acknowledging both that systemic discrimination limited
the type of choice lauded by proponents of liberalism, and that it was the responsibility of the
government to step in and rectify such a situation. The memo did stop short of claims that local
authorities were purposefully maintaining segregation, specifically stating, “Even without
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inducement of Local Authority staff, the [freedom of choice] plans tended to perpetuate patterns
of racial segregation.” Indeed, HUD recognized that the long-standing segregated housing
pattern, “was in itself a major obstacle to true freedom of choice.” This pivot in responsibility,
from offering choices to offering meaningful choices, is an important one. For the first time, the
agency acknowledged that “few applicants have the courage to make a choice by which they
would be the first to change the pattern.” Instead of blaming black applicants for not applying to
all-white projects, the agency placed responsibility on local authorities to change the pattern on
an institutional level––a major shift from the rhetoric of liberalism and individual choice.
In changing the policy, HUD allowed local authorities to request a waiver from
compliance, provided the authority could prove that they had already achieved “substantial
desegregation” and maintained low vacancy rates in all of their projects. While Weaver had
earlier referred to “nonsegregation” as residency by one or more members of another race, the
“substantial desegregation” needed for a waiver required “at least two-thirds of the housing
projects...desegregated on more than a token basis.” Furthermore, the local authority had to show
that following the new requirements would likely cause even more segregation and lower
occupancy than the authority’s current plan.262 In the case of Baltimore, the Afro-American
referred to the these tasks as “proving the unprovable,” but that did not stop the HABC from
trying.263
When HABC staff leadership received their copy of the new HUD regulations, they
immediately wrote a response to Vincent Marino, Assistant Regional Administrator for HUD.
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The Baltimore agency took umbrage at the creation of new regulations, complaining they were
created with a “presumption” that local programs were not complying with Title VI, and a
“supposition...that discrimination does in fact exist” in the tenant assignment policies. In
contrast, HABC officials insisted their program had, “operated free of discrimination under its
voluntarily adopted policy of desegregation since 1954.” HABC also rejected the notion that the
freedom of choice plan had allowed tenants “the privilege to express a preference” for specific
projects. While HUD was requiring substantial desegregation to be in compliance with Title VI,
HABC was purposely conflating a lack of mandated discrimination with desegregation.264 Just
months before, HABC had maintained three projects without a single non-white resident, yet
they continued to claim this was due only to tenants having the “privilege” of determining where
they wanted to live.
The letter repeatedly reiterated the HABC’s emphasis that “choice” was the only factor
causing the still-segregated projects. Although, as described in the last chapter, the HABC only
undertook limited desegregation of the Claremont, Brooklyn, and O’Donnell projects after HUD
threatened to tie up funding for the Charles Center commercial urban renewal project, the letter
told a much different story, stating repeatedly that the agency took “extraordinary measures,”
completely “voluntarily,” to find black residents to move into the all-white projects. The officials
wrote that more than 2,000 applications were reviewed, but failed to mention the stringent
requirements for family size, marital status, and income—over and beyond those agencymandated requirements for housing—to which those applicants were subjected. Officials also
claimed they had to “motivate and encourage” applicants to accept residency in the three
projects, despite evidence to the contrary; once project space was made explicitly available,
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black applicants willingly expressed preference for assignment to the all-white projects. Under
the new regulations, HABC would no longer be able to hand-pick the few black families living
in the white projects; yet, in their retelling, he policy changes would be problematic, as officials
would no longer be able to take their voluntary, extraordinary measures to encourage black
applicants “to accept occupancy in those projects where they had not previously lived.”265
The HABC letter also lamented that the new regulations would anger and scare off white
applicants who were already shying away from the housing projects. At the time, only 319 of the
2,714 active applications on file were from white families—just shy of 12 percent. This disparity
is even more significant in the context of the overall decline in applications, shown below.266
Table 1 Percentage White Applicants to HABC Public Housing, 1950-1967 267
Total # of
# White
% White
Year
Applicants Applicants Applicants
1950
5,882
2,563
43.57%
1960
3,674
1,309
35.63%
1967
2,714
319
11.75%
(7 months)

While the ranks of black applicants on public housing waiting lists swelled as a result of
urban renewal demolition, the numbers of white applicants simultaneously dropped due to
distaste for desegregation and the pull of the federally-subsidized lily-white suburbs. Because the
new HUD regulations mandated assigning housing to applicants based only on the order in

265

Draft letter from BURHA to Vincent Marino, Assistant Regional Administrator for Housing Assistance at HUD,
August 4, 1967, Series 3, Local Defendant Exhibits, Box 2, Exhibit 180, ACLU.
266
The claim of 12% white applicant rate should be viewed with some skepticism. The following year, Van Story
Branch reported to Robert Embry that in 1966, 16% of applications received were from white families, and in
September 1968 that number had actually increased to nearly 20%.
267
Created from data in Draft letter from BURHA to Vincent Marino, Assistant Regional Administrator for Housing
Assistance at HUD, August 4, 1967, Series 3, Local Defendant Exhibits, Box 2, Exhibit 180, ACLU and
Memorandum from Van Story Branch to R. C. Embry, Requirements for Administration of Low-Rent Housing
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Selection of Applicants and Assignment of Dwelling Units, Oct. 16,
1968, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 5, Exhibit 162, ACLU.

98

which they applied, HABC rightly noted that the new regulations would lead to approximately
nine out of ten housing referrals being for black applicants. Even so, HABC’s characterization
that the regulations would “mean that, by and large, only Negro applicants will be referred to any
vacancy” distorts that truth.268
The HABC also argued that compliance with waiver requirements in the new regulations
would likely cause an increase in vacancy rates. In their letter to Marino, officials warned of the
potential that “a large number of non-white applicants are unwilling...to move to the most
recently integrated projects.” Similar to their exaggeration of the effort needed to “motivate and
encourage” black applicants to Claremont, Brooklyn, and O’Donnell, this line of reasoning
understated the willingness of black residents to move into all-white projects as long as they
were provided institutional support from potential white hostility. The officials also warned that
if the black applicants “should eventually agree to accept such vacancies” in the white projects,
“it is highly possible that integration could disappear all together [sic] and a complete non-white
occupancy result” as it had in Lafayette Homes and Flag House Courts. Officials were thus
arguing that complying with the new regulations would either lead to an increase in vacancies or
a decrease in the limited level of integration they had thus far achieved. In effect, the HABC’s
request for a waiver was truly an attempt to maintain unofficially segregated projects for white
residents in an effort to keep any white residents in the public housing system at all.269
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Despite HABC’s immediate request for a waiver from the new regulations, its application
languished for nearly a year before being denied. HABC officials were then left facing two
choices: Plan A, in which an applicant’s refusal to move into the first available housing unit
would place them at the bottom of the waiting list, or Plan B, in which applicants could reject
three placements before moving to the bottom of the list. In a memo laying out the situation, Van
Story Branch repeated many of the same claims from the original letter to HUD. First and
foremost, HABC officials declared, “the Local Authority has been operating free of
discrimination under its voluntarily adopted policy of desegregation.”270 Conflating the lack of
overt discrimination with success in desegregation was key to understanding the HABC
“freedom of choice” policy. This conflation actually had legal precedent—in the decision of
Brown II, the Supreme Court’s 1955 follow-up ruling to the previous year’s Brown v. Board
case, the court defined desegregation as the operation of a “racially nondiscriminatory school
system.”271 As with the absence of a defined difference between desegregation and integration,
no distinction yet existed between lack of discrimination and actual desegregation. Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act repeated this problem, prohibiting discrimination without directing
affirmative effort to actively integrate, a problem that HUD itself lamented as limiting their
effectiveness in ending patterns of housing segregation.272
By removing the policy of mandated segregation, the HABC reached the bar of
“nondiscrimination,” and was thus able to justify any remaining segregation as a result of
individual choice. This line of thinking, made explicit as early as the 1955 Human Rights Day
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speech, was also seen in school segregation cases including Briggs v. Elliott in 1955. On appeal
following Brown v. Board, the District Court found that Brown, “has not decided that the states
must mix person of different races...or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools
they attend,” but that so long as schools were open to children of all races, “no violation of the
Constitution is involved even though the children of different races voluntarily attend different
schools.” The District Court decision in Briggs became an important piece of case law for school
segregation challenges following Brown and Brown II, explicitly for its grounding in the idea of
free choice:
Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes
away from the people freedom to choose the schools they attend. The
Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids
discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of
voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental powers to enforce
segregation.273

HABC officials indirectly referenced this determination in the response to their waiver
application denial, which described their “existing non-discriminatory plan of tenant selection.”
Even here, though, officials continued to belie their claims of nondiscrimination and truly
voluntary segregation. In detailing the current application procedure, Branch wrote, “Applicants
are given a choice where they wish to live although they are advised of the reality or unreality of
their choices in terms of being housed within a reasonable time.” While Branch failed to go into
specifics about what applicants were advised, this question of the “reality or unreality” of being
placed quickly as justification for continued lack of black applicants to white projects was in
direct contrast to the actual vacancy rates in the white projects, which were substantially higher
than those for majority-black projects from 1966-1967.274
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Table 2 Vacancy Rates by Project, 1966-1968 275
7/11/66
– 6/3067
Latrobe
1.02%
McCulloh
0.17%
Perkins
1.16%
Douglass
1.04%
Gilmor
0.66%
O’Donnell
5.36%
Somerset
1.55%
Cherry Hill 2-11
1.01%
Cherry Hill 2-12
0.96%
Cherry Hill 2-17
0.74%
Fairfield
2.41%
Lafayette
2.00%
Flag House
1.59%
Brooklyn
4.73%
Westport
1.25%
Westport Ext.
1.04%
Lexington
1.06%
Murphy
0.38%
Claremont
0.68%
1.67%
Average

7/1/67 –
6/30/68
0.84%
0.17%
1.36%
1.06%
0.82%
2.69%
0.67%
1.13%
1.07%
0.67%
2.31%
1.65%
2.14%
2.05%
1.37%
0.75%
0.86%
1.09%
0.99%
1.29%

HABC officials insisted that “good occupancy patterns had been established,” referring to
the low overall vacancy rates in the city’s public housing projects. All but one of the project sites
had vacancies within the allowable HUD-mandated threshold of 5 percent during the 1967
budget year; only O’Donnell exceeded the limit at 5.36 percent, though Brooklyn came close at
4.73 percent. The vacancy rates at these two majority-white projects dropped by half the
following year, to 2.69 percent and 2.05 percent, respectively. HABC officials claimed credit for
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this change as proof that their freedom of choice policy worked, writing, “It would appear
then...that in giving applicants a choice, we reduce our vacancy rate.” This statement ignored,
however, that the drop was only made possible because of new efforts to actively attract black
applicants to those projects where, by design or by circumstance, they had previously felt
unwelcomed. Prior to the implementation of the group interview program, officials had insisted
that specifically encouraging black applicants to pursue residency in the white projects would be
inappropriate interference in the opportunity for free choice. Now, facing further federal
intervention, those same officials claimed credit for implementing the group interviews, insisting
the program was necessary to allow applicants a choice. Moreover, despite the significant
decrease in vacancy rates in O’Donnell and Brooklyn by August 1968, these now “desegregated”
projects were still overwhelmingly white.276

Table 3 Black Families in Public Housing Residence, 1967-1968 277
# Black % Black
# Black
% Black
Families Families Families
Families
June
June
August
August
1967
1967
1968
1968
O’Donnell
10
1.1%
55
6.1%
Brooklyn
8
1.6%
19
3.8%
Claremont
0
0.0%
18
6.1%

The significant decrease in vacancies in the majority-white projects was especially
important when viewed in light of the dwindling numbers of white applicants to public housing,
both in Baltimore and across the country. The HABC maintained that the new requirements for
“first come––first served” assignments would scare off even more white applicants, and thus
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increase segregation through wholesale abandonment of the public housing system by white
families. Officials argued that such a prospect would “defeat...the intent of the Civil Rights Act,”
insisting that three essentially all-white projects were acceptable to avoid losing white residents
across the public housing system overall. The HABC memo noted that despite “conscious efforts
to stimulate applications from white families,” the numbers of white applicants continued to
diminish.
Table 4 Public Housing Applicants, 1950-1968 278
Total
Number
Year
White
of
Applicants
1950
5,882
2,563
1955
7,705
1,846
1960
3,674
1,309
1965
4,706
1,055
1966
4,930
807
1968
(9 months)
2,561
510

Black
3,319
5,859
2,352
3,651
4,123
2,051

Brooklyn and O’Donnell had maintained the highest vacancy rates within the HABC
system even as white applications dwindled, meaning officials had either consciously held out
vacancies to entice white applicants to remain in the public housing pool, or had accepted that
fewer white applicants would necessarily mean higher vacancies in the white projects. Whatever
the reason, the effect was that as soon as residency was opened to black applicants through the
affirmative interview program, vacancy rates dropped.279
In describing the interview process, officials continued to insist that while program staff
would present applicants with information on all of the available projects, the decision “must rest
Reproduced from Memorandum from Branch to Embry, Oct. 16, 1968, with the heading “Negro” changed to
“Black”.
279
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with the applicant.” HABC officials repeatedly fell back on this type of language to emphasize
supposed tenant agency while also absolving themselves from responsibility for the resulting
segregation patterns. Although the HABC insisted that applicants were advised of the wait times
for their preferred projects, the significantly higher vacancy rates in O’Donnell and Brooklyn
strongly suggest that black applicants, consciously or unconsciously, were steered away from
applying for those projects. Until 1966, officials insisted that the white projects had been
“mentioned” but were rejected by black applicants. Once encouraged and supported through the
group interview process and protection of a cohort system of black residents moving in
simultaneously, the vacancy rates in these projects quickly dropped. Surprisingly, most of the
white residents remained. 280
Even with the lower vacancy rates, HABC officials needed to explain away the lingering
segregation in their projects. First, they pointed to the location of O’Donnell, Brooklyn, and
Claremont in “traditionally white neighborhoods” that were “away from the pulse and heartbeat
of the CITY” [emphasis in original], echoing 1940s-era insistence that housing projected be
located along the “traditional plan for the development of Baltimore city.”281 Officials insisted
that “unless a family has its roots” in those traditionally white neighborhoods, “they were not
interested.” Of course, as in many cities, that these areas had remained racially exclusive was not
a matter of chance but of specific, sustained effort by policymakers, local officials, and white
residents.282
While the group interviews and cohort system had successfully served to bring some
black families into the white projects, this outcome calls into question the housing authority’s
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commitment to choice. It is possible that despite showing no previous interest in the white
projects, black applicants became independently and simultaneously interested at the time the
HABC began group interviews and took advantage of the procedures HABC had in place
allowing free choice; perhaps all it took was group meetings and a brief tour to solicit black
applicants to the white projects, regardless of not having their “roots” in the area. What seems
more likely is that black applicants had been steered away from the white projects as discussed,
or they had not been given the opportunity to make an informed choice. The latter explanation
seems most likely. As the memo from Van Story Branch, the highest-ranking black official of
the HABC, emphasized, “If housing is going to prove meaningful in the lives of people...they
must be exposed to alternatives,” and “above all they must, with the proper tools, make their own
decisions.” It is worth noting, however, that Branch was suggesting the HABC had always
offered, and thus should be allowed to continue offering “free choice,” while admitting the ways
that the HABC had failed, whether through malice or neglect, to give residents the “proper tools”
to make informed and meaningful decisions.
While officials had many complaints about and arguments against the first come-first
served policy, their primary emphasis was still the necessity of choice. As Branch wrote in the
HABC memo, choice was, in their view, “a necessary ingredient to self-respect.” “To threaten
people who reject an already specified dwelling one, two or three times, and tell them they will
‘be placed at the bottom of the list,’ is unrealistic. It can also be disastrous,” Branch wrote, both
in its effects on applicants’ self-respect, and on the public housing program budgets. 283 Housing
officials were continually fretting about the effects of policies on the willingness of white
residents to participate in public housing at all. If those applicants with qualifying but relatively
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higher incomes stopped applying to public housing, the program would no longer be financially
viable. The financial solvency of public housing was a constant struggle, due in large part to the
very design of public housing subsidies, which paid for construction of housing projects while
operations were to be funded through tenant rents. As early as 1953, HABC officials voiced
concerns about the increasing number of black “welfare families” in the housing projects, whose
federally mandated rents were too low to defray the cost of operations and maintenance for a
housing unit. Part of the gap in rental rates was racial, due to the myriad factors influencing the
wage gap between black and white Baltimoreans––the median income of white applicants in
1953 was $3,051, but only $2,160 for black applicants. Even before desegregation, the eligible
white applicant pool was shrinking due to rising post-war prosperity for whites––in 1951, 41
percent of white applicants to Baltimore’s public housing were income-eligible, but by 1953, the
number had dropped to 27 percent. Although the HABC raised income limits in 1953 in an
attempt to capture more white residents whose higher rents would help balance their financial
position, the timing of the Brown decision rendered their efforts moot.284
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Having failed to receive a waiver from the new regulations despite their claims of
nondiscriminatory administration, the HABC conceded to accept the first come-first served plan
“if ‘location(s)’ and ‘undue hardship or handicap’ can be broadly interpreted.” It was this broad
interpretation that was the true undoing of HUD’s plan. In administering the plan, HUD stated
that applicants should be offered a vacancy in the “location that contains the largest number of
vacancies,” and could refuse referral to three locations before being moved to the bottom of the
waiting list. The regulations defined location as “any low-rent housing site...except that when
sites are adjacent or within a block of each other, such sites collectively shall be considered one
location.” HABC officials insisted, however, that to individually maintain appropriate records for
all of their project locations would be “unwieldy.”
Instead, the authority asked to group together the individual projects into four “areas.”
Applicants would then designate their preferred area, satisfying HABC’s desire to facilitate
individual choice, and be offered a place in that area’s project with the highest number of
vacancies. By modifying the plan thusly, HABC’s request stated, “We broaden the applicant’s
opportunities for housing. He has already defined the area in which he will live, and he can still
exercise choice.” The “area” plan would also loosen the requirement that applicants be given
only three refusals before being moved to the bottom of the waitlist. HABC officials wrote, “The
prediction is that [an applicant] will not find it necessary to reject three areas, whereas he might
well reject three individual projects.”285 Applicants could then decline placement an unlimited
number of times within their specified area without counting toward their three refusals; the
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three-strikes rule only came into play if an applicant refused placement in three of the separate
housing areas.286
Although the four new “areas” were ostensibly determined by geographic boundaries,
distances between projects far exceeded the one-block rule. Through the HABC’s loose
definition of “nearby projects,” the majority-white O’Donnell Heights and Claremont Homes
were grouped into the “East Location.” The third majority-white project Brooklyn Homes, too
far to justify grouping with the others, became part of the “Southeast Location.” Thus, if white
applicants specified a preference for the East Location, they would be guarantees a placement in
a majority-white project. If an applicant’s employment necessitated they live in the southern
portion of the city, they could specify a preference for the southeast location and use their
unlimited refusals until given a placement in Brooklyn Homes.
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Figure 5.1 Baltimore City Map Housing Project Locations (as submitted to HUD, 1968)
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The first come-first served plan also allowed for hardship waivers that would prevent
refusal of a project placement from counting toward an applicant’s three strikes. In the
regulations, HUD gave examples of such hardships “not related to considerations of race, color,
or national origin,” including “inaccessibility to source of employment, children’s day care, and
the like.” In their revision of the plan, Baltimore officials greatly expanded these parameters.
Accepted hardships included not just proximity to employment and access to special educational
resources, but also “being close to family or friends to whom one can take the children for care,”
“being close to a hospital, clinic or doctor, or church,” and “being close to the familiar for
emotional stability.” Any of these could be effectively used to refuse housing outside of one’s
current, segregated neighborhood without the repercussion of losing one’s place on the waiting
list. While acknowledging that hardship claims could not be based on race, the HABC gave no
specifics on how they would ensure that the claim was not a racialized one.288 Despite these
problems, HUD accepted the revised plan on January 17, 1969.289
Reporting about the new plan differed greatly from HUD’s initial announcement of
changes in 1967 to the approval of HABC’s plan in 1969. When the Afro-American first
announced HUD’s new requirements, the paper described it as “nearly, but not quite, put[ting]
public housing on a ‘first come, first served’ basis.” At that time, the Afro-American was not shy
about pointing out how the “freedom of choice” plan reinforced housing segregation.290 Just a
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few months later, the paper reported on Atlanta’s attempts to refuse the change, quoting Atlanta
Housing Authority member Frank Etheridge who declared, “Let’s test them (federal officials).
We ought to spar with them awhile. We have a good chance of knocking them out.”291 By
December 1968, the tenor of the Afro-American’s reporting had changed significantly. Unlike
the editorializing in the earlier articles, which clearly pointed to the hypocrisy of “choice,” the
headline of one article unironically proclaimed, “Wider choice okayed for public homes.” The
article itself hewed closely to the words of Housing Authority Chairman Feinblatt, and his claims
that the federal government’s required plans would have “arbitrarily” assigned residents to
housing projects.292 Still, when compared with the Baltimore Sun’s reporting on the new policy,
the Afro-American was hardly exuberant. While both newspapers quoted Feinblatt’s claims, the
Sun went further in espousing his views, heralding the new policy as “a plan to give
applicants...more choice of a place to live than federal officials had wanted for them.”293
Even as the HABC and HUD debated the specifics of Baltimore’s plan, the fundamental
basis of federal housing law changed with the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair
Housing Act. The first piece of federal legislation to address racial discrimination in housing, the
Fair Housing Act specifically prohibited private and public housing markets at all levels from
practices that created and continued residential segregation. Unlike the previous nondiscrimination rules put in place by the Executive Order 11063 and the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
the Fair Housing Act directed federal agencies and grantees to act “affirmatively” to further fair
housing policies, rather than simply requiring non-discrimination. Unfortunately, as a result of
the many fights and horsetrading in Congress over the law, many of the enforcement provisions
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were stripped away, which meant that while HUD could investigate complaints of housing
discrimination, it had no power to enforce remediation of offenses. For those cases that HUD did
refer to the Justice Department for prosecution, the Attorney General was only authorized to act
following evidence of “a pattern or practice” of discrimination or issues of “general public
importance.”294
Even after all the debates and wrangling needed to force the HABC into a first come-first
served policy, just two years later, HUD again announced proposed changes in tenant selection
requirements to better align with the Fair Housing Act. While most of the 2,000 public housing
authorities under HUD’s jurisdiction had adopted some version of the first come-first served
plan, for most of them, the new measures had “not led to desegregation or to a decline in
discrimination.” To the contrary, HUD wrote in a 1971 report, “Empirical observations show that
racial segregation, and hence discrimination, are still the norm.”295 Laurance D. Pearl, Director
Program Compliance in the HUD Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, would later go
on to describe the first come-first served policy as “vacancy conscious” rather than racially
conscious, meant to “get a better use of the inventory” by encouraging the overabundance of
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black applicants to accept units in majority-white projects. Though the policy was generally in
line with the 1968 Fair Housing Act, its emphasis was not on eliminating racial disparity, but on
“HUD’s administrative responsibility to see that public housing units were used in an effective
and efficient way.”296
While the lack of impact can be blamed in part on the contents of the policy, HUD
officials discovered soon after the adoption of “first come-first served” that many authorities had
not actually complied with the requirements. Despite threats of programmatic funding cuts and
fear of legal action leading to cities like Baltimore accepting the tenant selection system, other
cities had not. Some, like Gadsden, Alabama, had never adopted an approved plan. Others,
including Lake Charles, Louisiana, had adopted a plan in compliance with HUD regulations but
failed to implement it. Still others, such as San Antonio, Texas, had adopted and implemented a
first come-first served plan, only to then rescind the plan and reinstate “freedom of choice” in
defiance of federal regulation.297 In all of these cases, refusal by the Department of Justice to
prosecute noncompliance left HUD with little recourse.
Those cities whose authorities did adopt, implement, and comply with the first come-first
served plan faced stumbling blocks within the plan itself. In the 1971 report, HUD laid out many
of these unforeseen issues, despite agencies including HABC using them as the basis for waiver
requests. Among the foremost was the “rigidity” of the three strikes policy. HUD felt it
necessary to limit the number of times an applicant could refuse a housing assignment, but
officials soon discovered the policy had the effect of “discouraging” white applicants. While
Baltimore had subverted the plan requirements through their 1969 waiver, the original
regulations limited applicants to the projects with the highest number of vacancies. As the HUD
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report explained, if these vacancies were all in majority-black projects and white applicants who
refused placement dropped to the bottom of the waitlist, this would further exacerbate the racial
imbalance already caused by the preference for applicants displaced by urban renewal, a group
that was overwhelmingly black. Combined with the dwindling numbers of white applicants to
public housing projects as white flight to the suburbs intensified, these admission standards could
have the effect of ensuring “that the waiting list, and, hence, the future of public housing in the
city” was all-minority. Like in Baltimore, many other cities continued to find mechanisms that
would in effect set aside some housing projects for white occupancy in order “to ensure that
whites would not flee from public housing” altogether.298
The three-strike requirement affected minority applicants as well. If all three of the
projects with the greatest number of vacancies were in undesirable locations, those black families
who were able would likely either refuse and drop to the bottom of the waiting list, or find other
accommodations outside of public housing. This would result in a waiting list “composed
exclusively of minority group families who are multiproblemed.”299 In addition, vacancy rates in
more desirable projects would rise as authorities were forced to refer repeated applicants to
undesirable locations with higher vacancy rates until the point that the vacancies equalized. This
could well lead to an increase in vacancies system-wide and have disastrous effects on the
amount of operating income collected from tenant rents.300
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HUD announced proposed revisions to the first come-first served policy in 1971 as a
result of these continued issues. In the new policy, all “rigid procedural requirements” for tenant
selection were removed, and the method of administration for Title VI compliance was left “to
the local authority, and to it alone.” Rather than strict rules and procedures to assure
desegregation, HUD would create performance standards to measure success in achieving
“nondiscrimination,” a much lower bar. These performance standards were to be based “largely
on occupancy ranges and timetable” reflective of “the racial characteristics of project occupancy,
the user group population, and the general population of the locality,” a move that would account
for white flight out of public housing. The announcement stated that the policy would have
“many advantages,” including minimizing HUD’s oversight, which would now be “limited to
examining and approving the ranges and timetables,” reviewing progress reports, and providing
guidance where needed. Local authorities could enjoy “the utmost flexibility to tailor their
procedures” to their local circumstances, which would “involve them in a positive manner in the
selection of both means and ends,” and “give them a greater sense of control” over their local
programs.301
HUD’s announcement concluded that “for the first time, there would be stated goals for
anti-discrimination, and a way to evaluate success in meeting those goals”—an emphasis on the
end results rather than the process. Despite having spent years struggling to convince and
admonish local housing authorities into abiding by the rules of Title VI, the federal government
now predicated its new policy upon the idea that the authorities would willingly create and
implement necessary procedures to end discrimination in their housing projects. The local
housing authorities of San Antonio and Lake Charles, both of which had been called out by name
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in HUD’s memo for refusing to comply with first come-first served policy, were held up as
examples of locations where officials “found that the new policy was strongly welcomed as a
realistic approach to the problem of segregated occupancy,” despite not yet having any indication
that the increase in flexibility had any positive effects on lessening segregation in either city.
Even still, this flexibility and focus on measuring results rather than procedural compliance,
HUD officials wrote, would “benefit both HUD and the Authorities, as well as the residents of
the housing.” Tellingly, though, the memo noted, “We do not believe that HUD can delay much
longer” in implementing a new policy due to a “spate of litigation” related to tenant selection and
segregation in public housing. These included Gautreaux in Chicago, Blackshear in Austin, and
Taylor v. City of Millington in Tennessee.302 Just as HABC officials had fretted in 1954 about the
possibility of a lawsuit leading to a judicially-mandated desegregation policy, in 1971, HUD
feared that a delay in changing the tenant selection requirements would lead to “a new policy set
by the judiciary over which we have no control.”303
This emphasis on being “results-oriented” was more than an attempt to shift
responsibility away from HUD and onto local housing authorities; it marked a major shift in
federal policy. On June 11, 1971, President Richard Nixon released a statement outlining his
administration’s approach to fair housing, in which he called for policy that was “results-oriented
so its progress toward the overall goal” could be evaluated. In this statement, Nixon likewise
emphasized that the problems facing public housing administrations were “uniquely local in
nature,” and thus the federal government should be limited in its interference with those policies.
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While Nixon insisted, “Denial of equal housing opportunity to a person because of race is wrong,
and will not be tolerated,” he simultaneously reasserted HUD’s original emphasis on choice and
expressed support for the “voluntary efforts” that had already taken place toward “correcting the
effects of past discrimination.” Finally, the president restated his administration’s goal of “a free
and open society,” by which he meant one of “open choices.” He wrote:
In speaking of “desegregation” or “integration,” we often lose sight of
what these mean within the context of a free, open, pluralistic society. We cannot
be free, and at the same time required to fit our lives into prescribed places on a
racial grid—whether segregated or integrated, and whether by some mathematical
formula or by automatic assignment…. An open society does not have to be
homogeneous, or even full integrated.
More than a decade and a half since after Baltimore School Superintendent John Fisher
wrote he believed it “wrong to manipulate people to create an integrated situation” and HABC
Housing Director Harry Weiss warned integration may require non-voluntary compliance in
order to be effective, HUD’s emphasis on substantive desegregation rather than passive
nondiscrimination was over.304 While the proposed 1971 policy was never put into place and first
come-first served approach remained the law into the 1990s, HUD relaxed its oversight of the
implementation and administration of these policies.305
The ability of residents to choose had, in the words of Van Story Branch, “always been
permissive.”306 During the era of “freedom of choice” policies, this permissiveness was
absolute––segregation lasted because white public housing residents were allowed to express
preference for all-white projects without any resistance on the part of the HABC. Even after the
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change to the “first come-first served” tenant selection policy, this permissiveness remained—
housing officials purposely subverted the implementation of federal policy in ways that allowed
applicants to surreptitiously express racialized preferences for public housing placements.
In 1989, twenty years after the Baltimore housing authority received approval for their
four-area plan, HUD Secretary Jack Kemp issued directions to all regional housing
commissioners that discontinued the practice of locational preferences for public housing
applicants. No matter whether “solicited, allowed, granted based on availability, or
ignored…expressed in terms of east side or west side, north quadrant or south quadrant,” public
housing authorities had 90 days to discontinue the use of location preferences in relation to the
first come-first served plan.307 In addition to Secretary Kemp’s reasoning that “projects which
are segregated or dominated by one race are often the result of or perpetuate such preferences,”
Director Pearl later explained that allowing separate waiting lists for individual or groups of
projects “would end up with something looking sort of like freedom of choice, which was that
not very much would happen.”308 In Baltimore, this was precisely the case: Claremont,
Brooklyn, and O’Donnell projects remained 70-82 percent white in 1985.309 Despite HUD’s
attempted intervention, “first come-first served” did as little to encourage integration as
“freedom of choice” had done before it.
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6

CHAPTER FIVE: FIRST COME – FIRST SERVED

Along with attempts to desegregate public housing through tenant selection and
placement, in the 1960s the Department of Housing and Urban Development saw the necessity
of deconcentrating public housing from poor minority neighborhoods in central areas of cities.
At the same time, HUD began experimenting with neoliberal forms of public housing
construction and operation that would eventually give rise to the voucher-based system still in
place today. In Baltimore, officials were forced to grapple with these questions of site selection
alongside struggles over how to move majority-black public housing around a city that was
rapidly losing white, middle-class families. While many of the city’s civil servants expressed a
desire and willingness to relocate public housing in some of the few remaining white areas of the
city, they were often stymied by the lack of necessary approvals by elected officials—whose
voters, they knew, were not willing to see public housing expand outside the boundaries of
already black areas.
As this chapter discusses, despite some attempts to deconcentrate public housing through
scattered site, turnkey, and leased housing programs, the HABC rarely followed the new site
selection requirements, and HUD rarely enforced their own rules. While regulations stipulated
new public housing development should take place outside areas of minority concentration,
between 1960-1970, 18 of the 21 project sites proposed by the HABC were in black
neighborhoods, which would later be used against the housing authority as “evidence of de jure
segregation” in court challenges to continued public housing segregation in the 1990s.310
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In 1945, when the Federal Public Housing Authority (FPHA) began the Low Rent
Housing Program, officials wrote that due to the “large number of variables” and locationspecific factors in housing site selection, “It is not possible to lay down definite rules to govern
this procedure.” Believing that “the full responsibility for site selection must be assumed
locally,” rather than by federal requirements, the agency offered advice and suggestions. They
recommended that local authorities consider the effects that site selection would have on the
future of a public housing development and on the city plan. On the latter, their directions were
more explicit, stating, “The housing program must be properly fitted into the city pattern, both
existing and as projected into the future.”311 It was thus in these very guidelines themselves that
early housing projects should be located along the racially segregated patterns already in place in
cities like Baltimore.
Along with the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
the 1965 Housing Act brought with it a change in official policies surrounding public housing
site selection. Rather than requirements to maintain existing racial patterns, HUD instructed
public housing authorities to take pains to avoid further concentration of minorities and poverty
through public housing programs. In 1967, following confusion on the latest HUD site selection
requirements, HUD Secretary Robert Weaver issued a memo to clarify the “proper
interpretation” of the policy. He explained that the purpose of the guidelines was to provide
housing opportunity and choice both within and outside areas of current minority concentration,
and as such, “any programs of public housing which provide sites only in areas of nonwhite
concentration are, on the face of it, unacceptable.” Recognizing that previous public housing
built for black and minority use had been built only in areas already inhabited by those groups,
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HUD mandated that new public housing developments were to be located outside of “racial
minority group ghetto areas.”312 In addition to providing better opportunities for black residents
outside of these areas, HUD hoped that rethinking site selection would also help to stave off
some of the increasing re-segregation of formerly all-white housing projects transitioning into
all-black occupancy.313 Alongside these new site selection regulations, the 1960s and 1970s saw
HUD and local housing authorities experimenting with new systems of public housing
acquisition and administration, namely scattered site projects, the turnkey program, and leased
housing.
Although the city did experiment with new forms of public housing, the majority of
development in the 1960s followed the same patterns––large-scale projects located in lowincome black neighborhoods. One of these developments that explicitly recreated the same
segregated patterns was the proposed expansion of McCulloh Homes. Located in a West
Baltimore public housing cluster that included the two high-rise projects of Murphy Homes and
Lexington Terrace, McCulloh Homes was one of the original eight segregated housing projects
in the city. When it opened in 1941, it joined the ranks of Poe Homes, Douglass, Gilmor, and
Somerset as housing for black low-income Baltimoreans.314 In the initial 1934 site report, the
State Committee on Housing in Baltimore called the area where McCulloh would be situated,
“emphatically a colored area.” Furthermore, the report stated, “The site has no other value except
for Negro residence, and never will have.” A report by the Associated Architects of Baltimore
(AAB) from the period called the area surrounding McCulloh, “the most advanced case of
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‘blight’ in the City.” The AAB report posited that if McCulloh could be redeveloped enough to
attract the “upper third” of the black housing market, it would “make possible the restoration to
white use” of the neighboring areas, “a much needed change for Baltimore.” These reclaimed
areas would then serve as a buffer to separate the black housing projects from the “well liked
white residence area to the North” and “buttress” property values for the wealthier white
neighborhood of Bolton Hill.315 The value of renewing McCulloh was further noted by city
inspector Homer Phillips, who claimed the neighborhood would “offer a splendid barrier against
the encroachment of colored.”316
Although the language of the 1930s reports is striking in its frank espousal of racist
viewpoints, many of the same underlying characterizations reemerged during discussions in the
1960s about expanding public housing in the neighborhood. In much the same way as 1930s
housing officials viewed McCulloh as a protective barrier to spare white home values in Bolton
Hill, 1960s housing officials saw expansion on the McCulloh site as a way to avoid affecting
property values in the few remaining white areas of the city. In writing their recommendations to
HUD, HABC officials described the neighborhood surrounding McCulloh as encompassing
various “fair to poor” housing sites, “a few small junk yards,” and a planned highway project that
would fragment and deteriorate the neighborhood. Because all dwellings within the boundaries
of the expansion site were deemed “substandard,” the proposal declared the area “an undesirable
place to live.” Furthermore, HABC noted, the site was located nearby five existing housing
projects encompassing 2,754 units, all of which “currently house Negro families.”317 The HABC
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was aware of the potential that HUD would reject the plans on the basis that they would increase
the concentration of public housing in the area.318 In an unusual and risky move, the HABC
touted the move as a benefit that could prove “a valuable asset in the relocation process” for the
many families being displaced by the city’s urban renewal projects. Even more brazen was the
outright lie that black residents in the area were concentrated by choice. HABC officials claimed,
“The housing market situation for Negro families is quite favorable,” and “Many areas [are] now
open to Negro occupancy outside of the rundown sections of the city.” In sum, the HABC
proposed adding 516 additional public housing units to the neighborhood, designated the
McCulloh Homes Extension.319
Unconvinced by the HABC’s claims, the NAACP filed a formal complaint about the
McCulloh Extension project and the pending dislocation of neighborhood residents in November
1966.320 Baltimore NAACP officials alleged that homeowners in the surrounding neighborhood
of Upton were being told that the “fair market value” of their homes was lower than the
municipal tax assessments, which were, by state statute, supposed to be set at 65 percent of fair
market value. This systemic undervaluing of property meant that either the city had been
inflating the tax assessments to collect additional property tax revenues, or were now undervaluing the properties to avoid paying displaced residents for the full value of their properties.321
In addition to receiving “fair” compensation for their homes, residents displaced by urban
renewal were to receive assistance in finding new dwellings, financial support for relocation, and
for those who were income-eligible, status at the top of waitlists for public housing. While

318

Memorandum from Edward Minor to Ellick Maslan, Aug. 12, 1960, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 6, Exhibit
177, ACLU.
319
HABC, McCulloh Extension Development Program MD 2-23, Dec. 1, 1964, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 6,
Exhibit 176, ACLU.
320
Complaint Filed with Department of Housing and Urban Development, McCulloh Homes Extension Public
Housing project, Baltimore, Maryland, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 6, Exhibit 178, ACLU.
321
NAACP News Release, June 24, 1966, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 6, Exhibit 178A, ACLU.

124

displacement was an issue for all residents, the elderly homeowners of Upton were especially
vulnerable. For these residents who owned their homes outright, returning to a rental situation
was not only insulting, but put their financial futures in jeopardy, forcing them to pay monthly or
weekly rent in perpetuity rather than owing yearly property taxes. The offer of placement into
public housing was also unappealing to those who had owned their homes and saw that
ownership, no matter how meager the property, as a marker of self-sufficiency. As such, the
NAACP demanded that displaced homeowners be compensated at a rate that would allow them
to repurchase homes in new neighborhoods.322 Moreover, the complaints alleged, HABC
relocation counselors only referred displaced residents to the “Negro listings” in local
newspapers that were unaffordable and in substandard conditions.323
The HABC responded denying any wrongdoing. While the NAACP claimed that
displaced residents were not receiving adequate relocation assistance, the HABC insisted that the
homeowners had “clearly expressed...unwillingness to even consider public housing,” and thus
their complaints were invalid. The agency flatly denied that properties were being undervalued
for relocation funds, claiming instead that market values in the area had been declining “fairly
rapidly” without tax assessments being adjusted, all but admitting that homeowners in the
neighborhood had been unfairly taxed while passing blame to the municipal tax assessor’s office.
Housing officials did concede that for the neighborhoods’ longtime homeowners, especially
those who had maintained their properties while the area deteriorated around them, relocation to
a similarly blighted neighborhood was unsatisfactory. Rather than propose any real solutions,
however, the HABC suggested that the federal government be responsible for providing the
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difference between the current “fair market value” of the homes and the cost to purchase a
similar home in a non-blighted area.324 Despite the NAACP’s complaints, HUD sided with the
Baltimore housing authority and ruled that the local office was “endeavoring to carry out its
relocation responsibilities... in a satisfactory and competent manner,” and approved the housing
development plans to move forward. The McCulloh Homes Extension opened to public housing
residents in 1971.325
Simultaneous with the NAACP’s complaints on behalf of displaced Upton residents,
another group called Activists for Fair Housing was forming. The group was founded in 1966 by
six former members of the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE), including well-known local
activist Walter P. Carter.326 That year, the group issued a report accusing the Baltimore housing
authority of reinforcing residential segregation in the city by only offering relocation for
residents displaced by urban renewal to areas “usually occupied by the Negro population.”327
Although the Fair Housing Act of 1968 had not yet been passed, the Activists for Fair Housing
argued that this was a violation of Brown v. Board, as segregated housing was “ipso facto
unequal and inferior.” Baltimore’s urban renewal and housing authority executive director
Richard Steiner defended the HABC, arguing that officials were working toward “improving
housing conditions” and “removing blight from residential neighborhoods,” and that they had
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“the best record and the most progressive outlook wherever race relations are concerned.”328 His
argument hinged on the constant refrain of “freedom of choice,” stating that the agency believed
in a “positive framework of free choice.”329 The activists’ complaints also implicated HUD,
leading the HABC and HUD to arrange a meeting in Washington, D.C. in November 1966. At
that meeting, HUD Secretary Weaver made clear that he was not interested in addressing the
specific points made by the Activists for Fair Housing, but that HUD and the HABC needed to
work together to set out plans that would “break down the patterns of the past.”330
The activists were not satisfied with the answers they received from HUD and the
HABC, and continued to write letters outlining their grievances. In January 1967, the group
wrote to HUD Secretary Weaver that they would not be satisfied with empty assurances that
HABC was “doing all it can,” and called into question whether the department was complying
with Executive Order 11063 requiring equal opportunity in housing.331 The Activists for Fair
Housing asked HUD to intervene in the city, questioning whether, “in light of previous city
council decisions,” any locations “outside of the ghetto” would be approved for public
housing.332 Although the HUD regional office in Philadelphia did launch an internal review of
the HABC’s policies, officials refused to release the study’s findings. Even so, HUD spokesman
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Jack Brian told the Baltimore Sun that the federal authority was “in the process of ‘juicing up’ its
anti-discrimination efforts.”333
Baltimore’s elected officials cast themselves as the maligned victims of unfair complaints
about racial discrimination. Soon after the protests by the NAACP and Activists for Fair
Housing, HUD was likewise facing claims by the National Committee Against Discrimination in
Housing that their urban renewal and public housing programs were building “racial ghettos.”
Baltimore Mayor Theodore McKeldin wrote to HUD Secretary Weaver offering his sympathies
and commending Weaver’s statements refuting the claims. McKeldin wrote that he was himself
“faced with somewhat the same situation” in Baltimore, with “inaccurate and unfair” accusations
“opposing improvements in housing and living conditions within areas of predominantly Negro
occupancy.” McKeldin expressed outrage that these groups were “castigat[ing] our continuing
and simultaneous efforts to improve...the slum and blight-ridden” neighborhoods that were
“occupied in the main by disadvantaged Negro families.” He also claimed that city officials were
making “every effort” to integrate public housing, unlike the NAACP and other groups who
were causing “injustice” and doing great “disservice...to the people they most want to help.” In
fact, McKeldin insisted, the “prognosis for success” in integrating public housing was good, and
he claimed to have “obtained the voluntary integration of a number of private housing
developments” through his own personal efforts. 334
McKeldin then created a strawman of the finest order. “Would these civil rights leaders,”
he lamented, “abandon all of these people indefinitely?” On the other hand, he himself refused
“to suddenly abandon neighborhoods,” as doing so would be “foolish, impractical, and short-
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sighted.” McKeldin was convinced he had the moral high ground. “Lest others forget,” he told
Weaver, “the first goal of national housing policy is a good home in a good environment for
every American family. Other objectives are important too, but this one is—and should remain—
foremost.” McKeldin’s line of reasoning failed to address the actual complaints made against the
HABC and HUD. Advocacy groups were not agitating to end urban renewal entirely, but to stop
corralling the displaced residents of color in the same ghettoized areas that gave rise to the
current issues of concentrated poverty. Clearly McKeldin did not see, or did not wish to
acknowledge, the concerns that state-sponsored retrenchment of segregated residential patterns
was in itself a violation of his “foremost” goal.335
Despite resistance from elected officials to deconcentrating public housing from poor
minority neighborhoods, it seemed that many civil servants within the Baltimore housing
authority did understand and support the goals of HUD’s site selection policies. Simultaneously,
officials were faced with rapidly shrinking white neighborhoods as thousands of white city
residents moved to the surrounding counties.336 Executive Director Steiner declared proudly to
the HUD regional office in February 1967 that seven of the nine sites submitted for city council
approval were located “quite a distance” from “conventional areas of non-white concentration.”
What he failed to mention was that while these neighborhoods were not historically black, many
of them were undergoing rapid transitions toward majority black occupancy. Still, Steiner
pointed to these site selections as “concrete evidence” that the HABC was “not only willing,
but...making a conscientious effort” to establish subsidized housing outside of the inner city.
Steiner expressed understanding that segregated housing “aggravates slums and conditions of
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blight and deterioration,” calling it demoralizing and discouraging, and adding, “No city can
expect equal responsibility, without advocating equal opportunity.”337
Displacement of residents in the name of “progress” through urban renewal was a
constant problem for rapidly changing cities across the United States during this era, not just
Baltimore.338 Residential displacement was a driving force in the rapid racial turnover of public
housing projects, in large part because federal regulations mandated that those supplanted by
urban renewal projects who were income-eligible for public housing be placed at the top of
housing waitlists.339
Urban renewal projects disproportionately displaced residents of color; between 1951 and
1960, the HABC reported that 3,722 non-white households had been forced from their homes,
compared to only 252 white households during the same period.340 While the vast majority of
urban renewal displacement was caused by “neighborhood development projects,” the
construction of new public housing projects themselves displaced thousands of low-income
residents.341
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Figure 6.1 Causes of Resident Displacement, 1951-1971342

Moreover, of the 10,000 families during those two decades who qualified for relocation
assistance due to displacement, 86 percent were black. According to a 1971 report by the
Department of Housing and Community Development, “The more affluent white residents are
leaving for surrounding counties... before neighborhood deterioration reaches the point” where
an area would be declared an urban renewal project, and thus eligible for relocation assistance.343
White residents of even modest means had enough options available to them on the open
housing market and through FHA and veterans’ home-financing programs that they were able to
leave areas that began to deteriorate; it was often only at that point that black residents were even
able to move into the declining neighborhoods. Conversely, even more affluent black residents

342

Chart from Department of Housing and Community Development, Residential Displacement Activity Analysis
1951-1971, May 1971, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 6, Exhibit 173, ACLU.
343
Department of Housing and Community Development, Residential Displacement Activity Analysis 1951-1971,
May 1971, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 6, Exhibit 173, ACLU, 4.

131

were often stuck in place as their neighborhoods began to fall apart around them.344 While white
Baltimore residents were fleeing the city in favor of surrounding Baltimore County, black
residents were leaving the county for the city. The County government did not have to resort to
overt racism; due to the combination of predatory zoning practices, denial of sewer services, and
other neglectful methods, the black population of Baltimore County fell from 18,026 residents in
1950 to only 16,580 in 1964, even as the overall population of the county more than doubled.345
Table 5 Baltimore County Population, 1950-1964 346
1950
1964
Total
220,273
541,600
Population
Black
Population
Black
Population %

18,026

16,580

8%

3%

One effort to deconcentrate poverty, support meaningful residential integration, and
reduce stigma surrounding public housing came with the creation of the scattered site housing
program. Officials saw developing smaller lower density projects “scattered” throughout
neighborhoods, rather than high-rise “towers in the park”-style public housing, as creating new
opportunities to build public housing in non-minority neighborhoods without the massive public
outcry they faced with Herring Run in the 1940s.347 Still, the shift to scattered-site housing
brought with it renewed questions about where to construct public housing projects, specifically
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whether to put them on vacant or “clearance” land where blighted housing and slums had been
torn down for urban renewal.
While the city outwardly embraced the scattered-site housing program, many public
housing officials disagreed with the vision of placing these projects in new neighborhoods. For
Assistant Director of Planning Ellick Maslan, the choice was simple: continue adding new
housing projects on the “fringes” of existing projects, as that was “where it was already
accepted.” Though not explicitly referring to the 1940s conflict over Herring Run, Maslan’s
comments reflected the city’s desire to avoid another protracted fight over the placement of
public housing. Despite being neutral on the surface, Maslan’s comments also had racial and
class undertones. Some housing officials raised concerns that adding more public housing would
constitute a “continuing policy of ringing the center of the city with permanent economic
ghettos.” It was politically more feasible, however, to continue concentrating public housing in
low-income, minority neighborhoods where residents had less political power than to attempt to
infiltrate the few white middle-class neighborhoods remaining in the city.348 Maslan’s suggestion
also ran directly counter to HUD requirements to avoid areas of poverty or minority
concentration. Despite HUD guidelines implemented in the 1960s, many of the public housing
projects developed in 1960s Baltimore—Emerson Julian and Spencer Gardens, Rosemont, and
McCulloh Homes Extension among them—were placed in census tracts of near-total minority
populations and areas of “extreme poverty.”349
In February 1970, a “package” of three projects in the northwest neighborhoods of
Rosemont, Dukeland, and Hilton came before the HABC Staff Commission for discussion.
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Despite purchasing parts of the land and hiring an architect in 1965, the HABC had allowed the
housing sites to sit undeveloped for five years amid concerns that the projects “would be difficult
to maintain” due to the unsuitability and “unattractiveness” of the “three odd pieces of land,”
which included bad terrain and railroad tracks.350
When plans resurfaced several years later, residents objected to the projects, reflecting
class stratification within Baltimore’s black community in the ways that middle-class black
residents expressed “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) objections to the development of public
housing within their neighborhoods. The Rosemont neighborhood embodied the aspirations of
the city’s middle-class black community. Characterized as a “stable, middle class Negro
community” in a 1968 Baltimore Sun article, Rosemont was 98 percent black and had a 72
percent homeownership rate—significantly higher than the city as a whole.351 In the mid-1960s,
the neighborhood successfully fought off design plans for the Baltimore East-West Expressway,
which would have run through the neighborhood, effectively destroying the community.352 In
1969, the HABC Commissioners decided to reopen plans for public housing in Rosemont,
stating, “The neighborhood is ready for these projects.” The neighborhood vehemently
disagreed.353
When word of the renewed plans reached the Rosemont Neighborhood Improvement
Association (RNIA), the group wrote to Commissioner of Housing Robert Embry that the
increase in private developments in the intervening years since Rosemont’s first approval as a
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public housing site meant the neighborhood’s service facilities were already at capacity. They
expressed concern that the project would overburden the already inadequate sanitation services,
police, and public safety, and exacerbate transportation problems in the neighborhood. While
facility upgrades had already been discussed for the neighborhood, RNIA representatives feared
the planned project density was too high and would “more than overcrowd” the planned
infrastructural improvements.354 Having experienced greater than a 15 percent population
increase in the previous decade, the group lamented, “We now find ourselves with inadequate
everything.”355 Moreover, the 98 percent black Rosemont residents saw the decision to develop
public housing in their neighborhood as “the fostering of ‘de facto’ segregation” and the
“establishment of a ghetto.”356 No projects had been proposed in the city’s few remaining white
middle-class neighborhoods, yet Rosemont was denigrated in the press for its refusal to accept
the plans. In 1969, the Baltimore Sun published an editorial complaining, “Nearly everyone
concedes the urgent need for new housing to accommodate low-income families, but when the
city tries to act, the howl is always: ‘But don’t built it here!’”357
Receiving no response, the RNIA wrote again to Embry in July 1970. This time, RNIA
President Joseph Wiles pointed out that the association had been warning of these problems for
years. The year before, then-President Rose Gallop had written a letter to the editor of the
Baltimore Sun declaring, “If that housing site is put there, you will be adding another slum to
Baltimore City.”358 In his letter, Wiles reiterated concerns about minority concentration. The

354

Letter from Joseph Wiles, President, Rosemont Neighborhood Improvement Association to Robert Embry,
DHCD, Mar. 6, 1970, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 6, Exhibit 196, ACLU.
355
Rose J. Gallop, “Rosemont’s Objections to Low-Rent Housing,” Baltimore Sun, June 26, 1969; Letter from
Joseph Wiles, President, Rosemont Neighborhood Improvement Association to Robert Embry, DHCD, Mar. 6,
1970, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 7, Exhibit 196, ACLU.
356
Ibid.
357
“Kibosh on Housing,” Baltimore Sun, May 30, 1969.
358
“Planning Unit May Review Housing Site,” Baltimore Sun, May 15, 1971.

135

creation of the Rosemont housing project, Wiles asserted, “would be in strict violation of Federal
statutes” for site selection policy. He pointed out that despite being “ghettoized,” the Rosemont
neighborhood was currently “stable,” and offered a number of suggestions “as means of
preventing further moral and physical neighborhood deterioration,” and to “prevent a ghetto
from becoming a slum.” These included new school facilities, a Mayor’s Station, administrative
facilities for the Baltimore Public School System, park and recreation facilities, a community
center, and reconstructed and realigned roads—all of which would require a number of housing
units to be deleted from the project plans, of course.359 Despite having successfully fended off
the East-West Expressway, the RNIA was unable to replicate their success in relation to public
housing. Construction on the Rosemont housing project was completed in 1975.360
Rosemont was not the only location in the scattered-site “package” to face neighborhood
opposition. Similarly, the Hilton neighborhood was 81 percent black; unlike Rosemont, however,
the bordering neighborhood of Saint Joseph’s was predominantly white.361 While the RNIA had
used all the avenues available to them to object—writing letters to the editor, complaining to the
HABC, and even bringing a proposed ordinance change to the city council—it was this
proximity to a white neighborhood that enabled Hilton to successfully stop plans for public
housing within their community, especially when State Senator Carl Friedler got involved.
Carl Friedler had served as Assistant City Solicitor from 1960-1963, and was elected to
the Maryland Senate in 1966. At the time of the Hilton proposal, Friedler was preparing to run
for the Democratic nomination in a U.S. congressional race, and fighting the “encroachment” of
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public housing into one of his constituent white neighborhoods was a banner opportunity.362
Unlike the RNIA’s letters to Housing Commissioner Embry, Friedler bypassed the Baltimore
civil servants and wrote directly to HUD Assistant Secretary Don Hummel. In a somewhat coded
appeal, Friedler said that despite the local school board’s plans to build a new school in the
neighborhood, it only “might be adequate for existing needs,” a position that does not hold up to
the barest scrutiny [emphasis in original]. Rather than noting the opportunity to revise the plans
before construction to take into account the additional need from children living in the proposed
project, Friedler insisted that the additional students would “overload, if not make obsolescent”
the new school before it was even built. Friedler insisted that HUD should essentially work
backwards, only allowing as many public housing units as the school could already
accommodate. Perhaps anticipating that the response to his objections would be to revise the
school plans to account for an increase in enrollment, Friedler then dropped the coded language.
The Hilton project, he wrote, would “unquestionably saturate the neighborhood with additional
unwanted people,” and be “a sick slum surrounded by new mortar.” In an echo of RNIA’s Rose
Gallop, he wrote, “I cannot understand why your agency is so determined to build a new
slum.”363
Because Friedler bypassed the local authority, HABC Commissioner Embry only found
out about the letter once it was forwarded by HUD Assistant Director Hummel with a request for
explanation. Embry responded that Friedler’s claims were “inaccurate and incomplete.” Despite
Friedler’s assertions that Hilton was a “high density” project, the scattered-site project was only
to include 84 units, with a planned density of 16 families per acre in an area zoned for 40.
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Furthermore, the Department of Housing and Community Development had given 35 percent of
the project area to the school board for construction of new school facilities, and were
coordinating with the school board “to ensure that adequate school facilities are available.”364
Not receiving the response he wanted from HUD, Friedler next turned to the Baltimore
City Council. Despite Friedler’s objections having no basis in fact, the pressure from him and the
Saint Joseph’s Improvement Association led City Council President William Schaefer to
introduce a motion to rescind approval for the Hilton project site. Following the motion’s
introduction, Embry wrote to Schaefer reminding him that, following approval by the city
council and mayor in 1965, the HABC had expended significant funds to purchase the site,
conduct a preliminary site preparation, and hire an architect. He also reminded the council that
they ought to be “fully aware” of the need for additional public housing and the “dearth of
suitable sites” available. As such, rescinding approval for the Hilton project, “would constitute a
serious retrogression in the Administration’s efforts to assure all Baltimore families a decent
home and a suitable living environment.” Furthermore, Embry voiced concern that the move
would “seriously complicate” the HABC’s relationship with the federal government, as federal
funds had already been spent and contracts made.365 Nevertheless, the City Council officially
rescinded permission to build on the Hilton site, killing the project.366
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Although the Hilton project was dead, Baltimore was still in desperate need of affordable
housing units, so the HABC asked for and received permission from HUD to add units to a
planned scattered-site project in the Upton neighborhood, where the Murphy Homes public
housing project already dominated the landscape.367 Murphy Homes, a massive block of public
housing located in the same West Baltimore cluster that included McCulloh Homes,
encompassed 758 units in high rises.368 When plans for Murphy Homes had first begun in the
1950s, the HABC proposed that the mix of high- and low-rise housing also include yards and
larger-sized units for families with more children. Instead, HUD insisted on higher density for
the site, increasing the number of units within the project from 643 to the 758 that were
eventually built.369 According to the Baltimore Sun, agency officials expected the four high-rises
and 19 low-rise buildings surrounding them would eventually “blend into” the surrounding area
as it was reconstructed through urban renewal.370
This plan did prove, in one sense, prophetic. By the time that the additional housing units
from the Hilton plan were transferred to Upton, more than 25,000 people had been displaced
from Baltimore neighborhoods due to highway construction and urban renewal demolition. This
left the remaining low-income housing residents over-represented in the neighborhood—a 1979
study found that more than half of the residents in Upton earned below 80 percent of the city’s
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mean family income.371 Despite the already heavy concentration of public housing residents, 99
percent of whom were black, HUD also approved the addition of the Emerson-Julian Gardens
and Spencer Gardens housing projects to the neighborhood.372 This was a direct contradiction of
HUD’s own site selection policies. Just four year earlier, HUD had rejected Upton as a site for
any additional public housing on the basis of the area’s extreme minority concentration and the
density of public housing already in the area; but with the mayor and city council blocking public
housing in non-minority areas, Steiner and his staff had few other options left.373 While the
general sentiment of HABC staff may have changed since Maslan’s 1960 suggestion to keep
building on the fringes of existing public housing, the political situation had not.
The late 1960s was also a time of innovation in public housing administration, made
possible through the 1965 Housing and Urban Development Act. Although the large-scale
change in public housing policy toward neoliberal, private-sector development is outside the
scope of this dissertation, two noteworthy early interventions took place in the Baltimore public
housing scene. In 1966, HUD Secretary Weaver introduced the Turnkey Housing program.
Under this program, private developers would construct housing on their own, privately-owned
land using private bank financing. Then, when the development was completed, the private
developer would sell it to the local housing authority to be used for public housing. The local
authority and HUD did not front any funding or take any of the risk associated with the project,
but the local authority would approve preliminary plans and sign a Letter of Intent and Contract
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of Sale. The Turnkey program was envisioned as a cost-reduction mechanism—estimated to save
10-15 percent of development costs per project—as well as a way to get public housing sites
built more quickly than local housing authorities could manage, reducing average construction
time from the three to four years necessary for traditional public housing, to under a year for
turnkey public housing.374
In July 1967, HABC commissioners met to consider several turnkey sites. Under the
turnkey program, private developers would remodel and rehabilitate a housing development to
then sell to the housing authority for use as public housing, with the expectation that the private
developer could do the work at a lower cost and on a shorter timeline than the public agency
could build new projects. One site, Belle Vista in northeast Baltimore, was considered especially
advantageous by the housing authority as it would provide 77 four-bedroom units, sixteen units
with three bedrooms, and ten with two bedrooms, for a total for 103 new dwelling units available
to the city public housing program. The proposal included the costs of converting smaller units
into the larger three- and four-bedroom rentals, along with additional upgrades to stairwells,
kitchens, and playground equipment. In total, the cost per unit of $14,809 was significantly
below the estimated cost of new public housing construction. HABC Assistant Director L.S.
O’Gwynn recommended that, “Giving due weight to the desirability of the Belle Vista site,” as
well as the relatively short timeline needed for completion of the rehabilitation, commissioners
should move forward with the project.375
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In consideration along with Belle Vista was another turnkey site, Shirley-Oswego.
Although HUD preferred turnkey projects be acquired in “all white” neighborhoods, regulations
allowed for projects in non-white areas if “paired with one in an all white neighborhood.” At
first, HABC officials tried to claim that the Shirley-Oswego area was “racially mixed,” but this
claim did not hold up to scrutiny by HUD, as the neighborhood was in the midst of racial
transition from white to black.376 With the delay in approval, HABC Chairman Eugene Feinblatt
penned a scathing letter to HUD Assistant Secretary Don Hummel decrying what he saw as a
“seeming lack of urgency” and “bureaucratic inflexibility and administrative regulation which
sometimes defy belief.” Feinblatt declared the agency’s determination against Shirley-Oswego as
“totally indefensible under the circumstances” of the dire need for additional public housing in
the city. With these added delays, Feinblatt explained, it was becoming increasingly difficult for
the Baltimore housing authority to claim “that turnkey is a method for getting public housing
built quickly.”377
In reply, Hummel wrote that his office was “fully cognizant of the great need for
housing” in Baltimore and would do “everything we can to expedite your housing program.” 378
Although Belle Vista was in a “racially mixed neighborhood,” not an all-white one, HUD
relaxed their requirements and approved of the pairing of the two areas to satisfy site regulations.
HUD’s regional office wrote in September 1967 that, “taken as an entity” with Belle Vista, the
Shirley-Oswego site was approved for a 35-unit turnkey project.379 Belle Vista had been
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determined as an ideal site for a larger, 103-unit project to house many of the larger families in
need, but despite Shirley-Oswego’s approval being contingent on the pairing with Belle Vista,
the latter site was never actually acquired for housing development. After having bent their
regulations to approve Shirley-Oswego, HUD failed to follow through on the very project that
would have advanced, even if slightly, a deconcentration of public housing.380
Another major innovation in public housing came in 1965, when the Housing and Urban
Development Act created the first publicly-administered housing program to use private housing
units.381 The Section 23 program, also known as Leased Housing, authorized local housing
authorities to lease units from private owners and sublet the units to public housing-eligible
tenants at affordable rents, with the housing authority using federal funds to cover the cost
difference. Units leased through the program were required meet minimum condition standards,
and were intended to “be dispersed as widely as practicable throughout the community.” HUD
also mandated that the neighborhood surrounding the leased housing “be free of characteristics
seriously detrimental to family life,” which included the note that “substandard dwellings...
should not predominate” without an active plan for neighborhood improvement.382
Section 23 Leased Housing programs had to be approved by the local public housing
authority. In Baltimore, this required the approval of Mayor Theodore McKeldin and the City
Council. While Section 23 guidelines recommended dispersal of leased housing units throughout
the city, the mayor and council only approved Baltimore’s program for designated “urban
renewal areas,” the boundaries of which were generally drawn along racial lines and, by design,
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only encompassed those areas already in need of great repair.383 This decision drew ire from
legal scholars, who referred to the actions later as clearly “evidencing...de jure segregation” and
“having the natural and foreseeable consequence of causing segregation in public housing in
Baltimore.”384
Although the Fair Housing Act had not yet been passed, HUD still prohibited public
housing authorities from building new subsidized housing units in areas of minority
concentration. When the mayor and city council limited leased housing to urban renewal areas,
HUD Secretary Robert Weaver and Assistant Secretary Don Hummel both expressed concern
that doing so would limit the program to only black areas of the city and thus not meet HUD site
selection requirements. In response, Baltimore executive director Steiner attempted a sleight of
hand, claiming that because the urban renewal areas in Baltimore totaled roughly 2,750 acres,
leased housing would not be limited to all-black neighborhoods. While Steiner was attempting to
claim that this large acreage would include some white areas, it ignored the way that urban
renewal area boundaries outlined economically depressed, predominantly black neighborhoods.
Despite expressing trepidation, Weaver and Hummel accepted Steiner and the HABC’s
assurance that the agencies understood and would abide by HUD rules. Secretary Weaver noted
that despite his reservations, it was due to the “need for additional housing for large low-income
families” that he allowed the Baltimore leased housing program to go through.385
Section 23 was seen, in part, as a way to provide public housing authorities with the
larger unit sizes needed for large families, as well as a way for housing authorities to obtain new
public housing units more quickly than new conventional public housing construction could be
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completed.386 Baltimore had a particular need for larger unit sizes; the problem of overcrowded
families had plagued Baltimore’s housing program from the start and created a backlog of
waiting applicants who needed more than three bedrooms for their families. While many of these
families would have undoubtedly accepted fewer bedrooms than federal guidelines mandated in
order to obtain subsidized housing, the HABC was constrained by HUD limits on how many
people could occupy a unit. In its response to an NAACP complaint in the 1960s, the HABC
noted the extreme shortage of housing available for larger families, and declared their hope that,
“If leased housing could be utilized as a public housing resource, then such large families could
be accommodated by the leasing of entire houses.”387 Yet, as can be seen in the chart of proposed
unit distribution and the actual leased housing units, one- and two-bedroom units predominated
in the program after all:
Table 6 Baltimore Leased Housing Program388
Number of
Bedrooms
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total:

Units
Proposed
50
35
40
50
45
30
250

Units
Leased
57
34
34
13
17
10
145
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HUD Secretary Weaver approved Baltimore’s program due to the need for larger unit sizes, yet it
was precisely these larger units that would be cut when quotas were reduced.389
Despite HUD’s concerns, the agency approved Baltimore’s leased housing program.
Assistant Secretary Hummel warned in a letter to Baltimore officials that while he accepted their
assurances that the limitation of leased housing to urban renewal areas would not violate the
Civil Rights Act, he expected them to report “frequently” and be “constantly alert” to conditions
that might “perpetuate Negro concentration.”390 As with approval of the “four locations” plan
under Baltimore’s first come-first served tenant selection policy in the traditional public housing
projects, HUD officials lacked meaningful regulatory enforcement powers and thus acquiesced
to local alterations in implementation, which undercut the policy.
Hummel’s fears soon came to pass. Fewer than three months later, he wrote again to
Baltimore officials that they were in violation of HUD regulations and his own specific
instructions because of where the leased housing units were located. Of the 75 units leased in
June 1968, all were in areas with highly concentrated black populations—80-99 percent.
Baltimore’s new acting executive director of urban renewal attempted to show compliance by
pointing to situations where the leased housing units were situated in a majority-white
“individual structure or apartment building,” within an otherwise majority-black neighborhood.
Hummel summarily dismissed this as unacceptable. In attempting to skirt HUD regulations
against minority concentration, the leased housing program was replacing white occupants of
these buildings with black public housing residents. This then increased the concentration of
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black residents in the neighborhood—exactly the effect that the HUD site selection requirements
were meant to prevent.391
Although the Baltimore City Council did eventually vote to increase the eligible Section
23 program area, it was too late to save the program. The restriction of leased housing to urban
renewal areas, paired with the requirement that any housing leased through the program must
meet minimum housing standards, meant that the city was unable to fill its HUD-authorized
quotas.392 Even after those quotas were reduced from 250 to 145 units of leased housing, HUD
pressed HABC administrators to proceed “as rapidly as possible” with the program. This
pressure led officials to accept properties into the program at a “lower standard” than what was
originally proposed, a decision that HABC Van Story Branch would refer to a few years later as
“unwise,” and which directly led to the resulting failure of the city’s leased housing program. By
1970, housing officials openly discussed the declining quality of the housing provided, the high
turnover of renters, and the limited program funding.393 The program limped along for a few
more years, but by 1976, only one lease of the revised 145 unit quota remained.394 Branch
explained the failure of the program as the result of several external circumstances limiting the
effectiveness of the program. First, the mayor and city council’s restriction of the leased housing
program area to only those places already designated as urban renewal areas led to difficulty
obtaining “standard and satisfactory dwelling units” for use as leased housing.395 Second, city
contracts with landlords did not have a mechanism to increase rents as tax and utility rates
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increased, causing some to pull out of the program or refuse necessary repairs. Finally, because
of the problems with quality of both the physical dwellings and their locations, those who
applied to leased housing did so “with great reluctance or in desperation,” and were not “the
more desirable low-income families” the housing authority sought to attract and retain. “More
desirable” families were those with middle-class cultural markers, traditional family structure,
and low-paying but steady employment. Instead, the leased housing residents “required constant
monitoring by the meager management staff” to make sure they were not disturbing the
neighborhoods or damaging the leased property through malice or neglect. Although the leased
housing program was an attempt to provide a desperately needed expansion of the public housing
program, Branch wrote, “At its best, I would say that the program was mediocre.”396
The 1960s saw new innovations in public housing through the scattered site, turnkey, and
leased housing programs. While the new site selection requirements handed down by HUD failed
to effectively deconcentrate new public housing in major cities, they did help pave the way for
the requirements that housing authorities “affirmatively further fair housing” in the 1968
Housing Act. In Baltimore, the housing authority generally failed in their aim to develop public
housing outside of the same low-income black neighborhoods where projects had traditionally
been located; even into the 1970s, low-income projects sat in clusters, while projects for elderly
residents were scattered throughout the city.
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Figure 6.2 Locations of Baltimore Public Housing Projects, 1970 397

Taken together, the effect of white flight to the suburbs of Baltimore County, site
selection decisions by the HABC and Baltimore elected officials, the majority black population
topping the public housing wait lists, and continued housing discrimination throughout the
region meant the city’s public housing projects remained essentially segregated into the 1970s.
More than a decade after HUD ordered HABC to support and encourage black residents move
into the three all-white projects of Claremont, O’Donnell, and Brooklyn, all three remained
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strikingly segregated. While the vast majority of the other housing projects maintained 95-100
percent black occupancy, these three were 71 percent, 77 percent, and 84 percent white. In fact,
in 1977, these the projects alone accounted for 78 percent of all the white people remaining on
Baltimore’s public housing rolls.398
Table 7 Black and White Tenants by Project, June 1977 399
Total
Project
White
Black
Other
Tenants
Latrobe
701
11
690
0
McCulloh
433
0
433
0
McCulloh
516
1
515
0
Extension
Poe Homes
298
0
298
0
Douglass
388
0
388
0
Homes
Perkins
685
63
619
3
Gilmor
586
0
586
0
O'Donnell
900
689
201
8
Somerset Court
420
0
420
0
Cherry Hill
600
0
600
0
Cherry Hill
637
0
637
0
Extension 1
Cherry Hill
Extension 2
Claremont
Lafayette Courts
Flag House
Courts
Lexington
Terrace
Murphy Homes
Westport
Homes
Westport
Extension
Fairfield
398

% NonWhite
98.4%
100.0%
99.8%
100.0%
100.0%
90.8%
100.0%
23.2%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

358

0

358

0

100.0%

292
813

207
1

84
812

0
0

28.8%
99.9%

483

13

469

1

97.3%

674

0

674

0

100.0%

756

0

756

0

100.0%

198

0

198

0

100.0%

232

0

231

1

100.0%

300

0

300

0

100.0%
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Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 7, Exhibit 193, ACLU.
399
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Brooklyn
Mt. Winans
Oswego Mall
Somerset Court
Extension
Rosemont
DuBeland
Hollander Ridge
Used Housing
Program
Vacant Home
Program

499
140
35

419
0
0

73
140
35

7
0
0

16.0%
100.0%
100.0%

60

0

60

0

100.0%

105
30
985

0
0
238

105
30
737

0
0
10

100.0%
100.0%
75.8%

86

0

86

0

100.0%

1,260

37

1,219

4

97.1%

As the city’s racial demographics continued to shift to ever-larger black majorities, the inability
of the HABC to fix the problem of segregated projects would make its way to the federal court
system in the 1990s as the ACLU of Maryland sued HUD and the HABC on behalf of the city’s
public housing residents. The patterns set through decades of city planning and public housing
policy had solidified and would remain into the present day.
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7

EPILOGUE: MEANINGFUL CHOICE?

The problems of segregation in Baltimore’s public housing persisted throughout the
remainder of the twentieth century, despite the turn to Section 8 and other Housing Choice
voucher programs, culminating in what NAACP Legal Defense Fund President Theodore Shaw
called “the most important housing desegregation lawsuit in a generation.”400 In the nearly
twenty-year court case of Carmen Thompson et. al. v United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development et. al. (also known as Thompson v. HUD), the Federal District Court
grappled with questions of choice, meaningful opportunity, and policy solutions for decades of
residential segregation. The case culminated with the creation of a new housing voucher mobility
program for the five-county Baltimore region to address the inability of the City of Baltimore to
solve the public housing problems within its borders.
In 1995, the City of Baltimore received funds under HUD’s HOPE VI plan to finance
demolition of the city’s public housing high-rises. As plans for the demolition became public, the
ACLU of Maryland filed suit against the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, the mayor and
city council, HUD, and the current HUD Secretary. 401 The lawsuit included six named current
residents of HABC public housing, but achieved class action status on behalf of “all African
Americans who have resided or will reside in Baltimore City family public housing units at any
time from January 31, 1995 until January 1, 2027.”402 The suit alleged that both Baltimore and
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federal officials were responsible for perpetuating residential segregation through public housing
site selection practices well after segregation had been ruled unconstitutional in Brown v. Board
and the city had officially desegregated its public housing projects. Plaintiffs pointed to many of
the practices described throughout this dissertation, including the dubious nature of “freedom of
choice” as a program to provide meaningful choices, the subversion of the “first come-first
served” plan, and the refusal of Baltimore authorities to abide by (and HUD officials to enforce)
site selection policies, as evidence of the responsibility HABC and HUD had for the city’s
continued segregation. The need for an immediate response was urgent, plaintiffs alleged, as the
HABC and HUD were embarking on “a major program to demolish and replace up to 3,000
housing units,” with “virtually all the sites under development for replacement housing” located
in low-income, minority areas with existing concentrations of public housing. “If not halted by
this Court,” plaintiffs warned, “the defendants will rebuild segregation for generations of public
housing families to come” and “squander a rare opportunity to right a wrong of historic
dimension.”403 The following year, the involved parties signed a partial consent decree requiring
that the 3,000 units of public housing be replaced with 1,000 new public housing units in mixedincome neighborhoods on the sites of the demolished housing, and 2,000 units made available
through housing vouchers and subsidies.404
Following the partial consent decree, the lawsuit continued on for nearly a decade,
culminating in a month-long trial in late 2004. Finally, in January 2005, Judge Marvin J. Garbis
issued a decision on the liability of the HABC and HUD in perpetuating public housing
segregation in the city. First and foremost, Garbis emphasized, “Baltimore City should not be
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viewed as an island reservation for use as a container for all of the poor.” Due to the rapid
demographic changes within the city that left it home to a disproportionately low-income, black
population, it had become “impossible to effect a meaningful degree of desegregation of public
housing by redistributing the public housing...within the City limits.”405 Quoting from the 1987
court case NAACP v. Secretary of HUD, Garbis wrote that the Fair Housing Act “requires
Defendants to do something ‘more than simply refrain from discriminating.’”406
While Garbis found that HUD’s “failure adequately to take a regional approach to the
desegregation of public housing in the region...violated the Fair Housing Act and requires
consideration of appropriate remedial action by the Court,” he failed to issue a similar ruling on
the responsibility of the HABC. Instead, subscribing to the liberal rhetoric of choice espoused by
the HABC since the 1950s, Garbis described the “prompt desegregative action” by Baltimore
officials as acting “rapidly, responsibly, and effectively” after the 1954 Brown v. Board ruling.407
In his decision, Judge Garbis placed the responsibility on HUD for having “failed to take
adequate action to disestablish the vestiges of the discrimination they participated in imposing,”
and stated they “may have worsened the racially discriminatory situation” by focusing only on
“rearranging Baltimore’s public housing residents within the Baltimore City limits.”408 As the
city’s housing agency had no authority to force the surrounding counties to participate in public
housing construction or voucher programs, Garbis’ ruling hinged on the ability of HUD to
intervene in the region—and their failure to do so.409
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With his decision, Judge Garbis implemented interim updates to the partial consent
decree. HUD was to provide funding for 168 subsidized homeownership units, 1,342 tenantbased vouchers, 646 project-based vouchers, and 2,600 “Moving to Work” vouchers.410 While
the Section 8 voucher programs limited to Baltimore City had often resulted in unused vouchers
due to an inability of program participants to find eligible housing, this separate category of
“Thompson vouchers” came with the explicit ability to use them region-wide without permission
to transfer between county housing authorities.411 The vouchers were targeted for use in
“Communities of Opportunity”—census tracts with a lower than 10 percent poverty rate, less
than 30 percent minority population, and fewer than 5 percent of housing units in public housing
or HUD-subsidized housing complexes.412
In addition to the financial subsidy HUD provided through the Thompson vouchers,
recipients were given extensive mobility counseling, financial literacy classes, and credit repair
services. As voucher recipients needed to compete in the private housing market, program
counselors also worked with landlords to “counter negative biases” about program participants
and explain the ongoing support given to tenants. Recipients were also given employment
assistance through job training, and transportation assistance including low-cost financing to
purchase used vehicles and financial subsidies to attend driving school. Finally, participants were
offered post-move counseling to help the transition to their new community and “second-move”
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counseling in case of future relocation to help “minimize disruptive and unwanted moves out of
opportunity neighborhoods due to market barriers.”413
With the demolition of high-rise housing in the city, the vast majority of the subsidized
housing provided by the HABC came in the form of Section-8 tenant-based vouchers. While
many policy officials viewed vouchers as a way to deconcentrate public housing while providing
a mechanism for recipients to express choice, plaintiffs to the suit called in experts to argue the
use of Section 8 vouchers was just as unlikely to provide meaningful choice as the other
desegregation programs. Gerald Webster, a professor of geography at the University of Alabama,
testified that while “black voucher holders largely use their vouchers in Baltimore City in census
tracts that are largely African American and poor,” white voucher holders “largely use their
vouchers in the five surrounding counties” outside of the city, “in tracts that are less
proportionately African American and less comparatively poor.”414
While Webster spoke of the program’s results, former Acting Assistant HUD Secretary
for Policy Development and Research, Xavier de Sousa Briggs, testified that the stated objective
of the Section 8 program to desegregate subsidized housing and promote access to desirable,
quality locations was the “stepchild on the list” of program goals. “The voucher program is run
primarily to minimize costs and to meet basic shelter needs,” he contended. Moreover, due to the
“few incentives and resources” provided by HUD to promote desegregation and increase
opportunity, the lack of penalties for local agencies who failed to do so, and “several perverse
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incentives,” “not only does [the program] not advance the cause of desegregation, but in some
ways the program is run in ways that exacerbate it.”415
Jill Khadduri, former Director of the Division of Policy Development at HUD pointed to
the need for regional administration of housing vouchers to enable recipients to move outside of
the city limits with minimal impediments. All of these problems could be effectively addressed
through Thompson vouchers. The program quickly showed successes; in the program’s first six
years, 1,522 families moved to low-poverty, integrated neighborhoods, nearly 90 percent of
which were in the suburban counties.416 Eighty-five percent of participants reported improved
quality of life, feeling “safer, more peaceful, and less stressed,” while experiencing health
improvements and gaining access to better schools.417
Federal defendants objected to the provisions of the 2005 interim remedy. In a response
filed after the trial, defendants referred to continuing residential segregation as “the reality of
racial housing preference patterns,” and proclaimed that the goal of racial integration “will be
elusive” due to the “interplay of the choices that members of different racial groups make about
where to live.” Defendants once again hearkened back to liberal views of choice, claiming that
Section 8 vouchers provided “remarkable” opportunity to exercise free choice, building off the
“ingrained American value of freedom to choose where to live”—a choice, they claimed, “would
be denied by plaintiffs’ proposed remedy.” In this classical liberal view, the requirements that
Thompson vouchers be used in Communities of Opportunity were in fact restrictions on freedom
of choice, an expression of “sheer paternalism” on the part of attorneys and lawmakers.418
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Due in part to continued disagreements over proposed remedies for the fault found in
2005, it was not until 2012 that the plaintiffs and HUD were able to come to a final settlement
agreement. By that time, Shaun Donovan had been appointed HUD Secretary and changed the
department’s course. Unlike the defendant briefing in 2005, Donovan understood the limitations
of traditional voucher programs and continued concentration of poverty and lack of mobility of
vouchers across housing authority jurisdictions. Moreover, Donovan said in a 2012 speech:
When you don’t have mobility, you don’t have access to opportunity.
That’s because when you choose a home, you choose so much more than a home.
You also choose access to jobs, to schools for your children, to public safety. You
choose a community––and the choices available in that community.
Donovan thus embraced Thompson as “not only justice for families who were wronged—
but also a testing ground for mobilities policies and lessons” for communities nation-wide.419 In
the final settlement agreement, HUD agreed to maintain the Thompson voucher program; create
a Regional Administrator for the vouchers; create an online listing of subsidized housing
opportunities in the region; fund a study on the patterns of public housing and vouchers in the
region to identify impediments to accessing housing units outside of Baltimore City and examine
the “locational patterns” of quality-of-life opportunity in the region; and undertake civil rights
reviews of any “significant decisions” made by public housing authorities in the Baltimore
region including agency plans, demolition applications, and site proposals for new or
rehabilitated subsidized housing.420
In addition to statements of support by Thompson voucher recipients, Greater Baltimore
Urban League President J. Howard Henderson, Citizens Planning and Housing Association
Executive Director Mel Freeman, U.S. Congressman Elijah Cummings, and former HABC
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Commissioner Robert Embry issued a declaration praising the settlement plan. Embry stated that
he “wholeheartedly support[ed] the settlement in this case,” as he felt “Baltimore can move
forward only by taking a regional approach to housing opportunity.”421 As former HUD
Secretary George Romney had stated during the Gautreaux hearings more than 30 years prior,
“The impact of the concentration of the poor and minorities in the central city extends beyond
the city boundaries to include the surrounding community. The city and suburbs together make
up what I call the ‘real city.’ To solve the problems of the ‘real city,’ only metropolitan-wide
solutions will do.”422
Despite the initial successes of the Thompson voucher project, the dire need for
affordable housing in Baltimore has proven beyond the scope of the program’s ability to remedy.
In March 2017, the Baltimore Regional Housing Partnership, which administers the vouchers,
decided to stop accepting new applications after the waitlist grew to more than 12,000 applicants,
despite the program only having 1,000 remaining to distribute. The Housing Authority of
Baltimore City had closed its waitlist for the traditional Housing Choice Vouchers two years
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earlier, when 75,000 people signed up for a lottery to join the 25,000-name waitlist, from which
1,000 to 1,500 vouchers are distributed each year.423
As the affordable housing crisis expands, the neoliberal, market-based solution will
become even more inadequate for addressing these problems. Even if housing vouchers were
funded at a level that would have an effect on the growing backlog of applicants, they are
predicated upon the idea that they enable “free choice” in a “free market.” Unless and until the
federal government mandates source of income protections for voucher recipients, forbidding
landlords from discriminating against tenants whose rents are subsidized through housing
vouchers, the assumption that recipients are making free choices unconstrained by the structural
inequality and systemic prejudices of those who own and manage property is false to its core.
That our society refuses to accept this reality––because it is too uncomfortable, or too
complicated, or just goes against our foundational ideology of the freedoms we have available to
us––will continue to prevent meaningful change.
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8

CONCLUSION

The story of public housing is not solely one of tragedy and loss, blight and apathy. At its
beginning, many housing reformers thought they were doing the right thing—eliminating the
slums where they themselves could not imagine living, and replacing them with more modest
versions of middle-class homes for the deserving poor in need of temporary uplift. As the history
of public housing repeatedly shows, however, intent does not always translate to impact. From
its legally segregated beginnings to its effectively segregated ends, policy decisions made in
Baltimore’s public housing projects have repeatedly failed to address—and have in many ways,
exacerbated—the city’s issues of urban poverty and wide-scale disinvestment.
As this dissertation has shown, a policy emphasis on individual “freedom of choice” does
nothing to address the problems and results of systemic racism. Whether in the HABC’s “free
choice” desegregation policy of 1954 or the “first come-first served” policy of 1966, the liberal
emphasis on individual decision-making ignored the ways that communities, environments, and
political systems all affected the availability of options, the ability to choose between them, and
the potentially devastating consequences of structural limitations. Given long enough, this
emphasis shifted the responsibility for segregation from systemic inequality to individual
“preferences.” Expecting black tenants to move into all-white projects with no institutional
support not only fundamentally misunderstood the depths of systemic racism, but dangerously
underestimated the bounds of white racism. As the protests and backlash against the HABCsupported integration efforts that did occur in the 1960s shows, black tenants moving into white
projects would risk not merely dislike from their new neighbors, but Klan violence and death
threats. To ask black residents to face this alone was morally indefensible.
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Officials had understandable reasons for their desire to maintain some all-white projects
in the 1950s and 1960s. The way that public housing was funded, relying on tenant rents to pay
for maintenance and operation costs made it necessary for the housing authority to capture as
much rent as possible. The economics of race, then and now, meant that poor whites as a group
were still better off economically than poor blacks. Still, playing in to white racism—whether by
holding aside space in all-white projects or acquiescing to white complaints about the impact of
black neighbors on their property values—should never be the solution. As the history of
Baltimore public housing shows, pandering to white racism is at best a temporary fix. By the late
1970s, the out-migration of white residents fleeing to the suburbs and in-migration of black
residents being pushed out of the suburbs resulted in a majority-black, majority-poor city.
The interplay between Baltimore City and Baltimore County, though not the focus of this
dissertation, reminds us that while local politics are important to local policy, so too are regional
and federal politics. The federal government had numerous opportunities to intervene in the
region, including when Baltimore County withdrew an application for a water/sewer master
planning grant upon finding out the grant would require a low-income housing program.424 The
Supreme Court ruling in Milliken v. Bradley determined in 1974 that “Without inter-district
violation and inter-district effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an inter-district
remedy.” Even so, the repeated refusal of Baltimore County to cooperate with the HABC’s
requests to build and operate low-income housing projects outside of the city boundaries
constituted just such an inter-district effect.425 As Judge Garbis rightly noted in his Thompson v.
HUD decision, Baltimore City housing officials had no authority to force Baltimore County to
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let in public housing; but that does not mean that Baltimore City officials are absolved of
responsibility. From the moment that the city began constructing public housing, officials made
conscious decisions to place the projects in low-income black neighborhoods. These choices left
the segregation and poverty of such neighborhoods even more deeply entrenched, and spurred
further disinvestment in nearby areas. Rather than alleviate slums, Baltimore’s public housing
projects exacerbated them. Decisions made by local and federal officials created this situation,
and it is the responsibility of local and federal officials to address the reverberating problems that
remain even today.

Limitations of the Project
This project relies on close readings of written archival documents, a method that does
carry with it significant limitations as to the conclusions that can be drawn. Throughout my
dissertation, I have attempted to focus on policy decisions and the motives that can be easily read
through the records. Those motives I have ascribed to historical actors came only after careful
consideration of the documents available, the conversations recorded in their pages, and the
patterns evident over time. Even so, I do not wish to make any claims of being able to reach into
the minds of policymakers to cast aspersions on their characters. While some in these pages were
willing to make their racism clear, for others, we can only see the racist effects their actions (or
lack of actions) have caused. We should also stop short of ascribing pure motives of altruism for
those who did attempt to change the systems of poverty and public housing in Baltimore.
Even with these limitations, the memos and meeting minutes, letters and newspaper
editorials have a story to tell. By focusing on the rhetorical hinge of “choice” and the myriad
ways such a concept was used through decades of subsidized housing policy, we can put these
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documents into conversation with one another. Still, were I able to pour many more years and
thousands more dollars of research funding into this dissertation, I would track down those
housing officials who still remain and ask them about their thoughts and motivations. I would
also speak to public housing residents, past and present, and ask the question of how much
agency they feel they have in making decisions about where to live. Alas, both of those resources
are in short supply.
If I somehow had the ability to start this project again, knowing what I know now, it
would have also taken a much different direction. I began this project as a public historian,
envisioning an investigation into place-making and community-building in public housing.
Along the way, I became a historian of policy and city planning, discovering the depths of policy
decisions and the ways that city planners and developers have shaped our lives without most of
us even noticing. I end it having completed a transition out of academia, becoming a practitioner
of city planning and policy myself. Where I had previously written about the conflicts between
civil servants and elected officials, I have now experienced first-hand the very real challenges
that civil servants face in making community-centered policy in a capitalist society where the
decisions of elected officials are far too often predicated upon the calculus of gathering future
votes. Finally, though the decision to cut my timeframe off just before the wide-scale change to
Section 8 vouchers was a purposeful one at the time I made it, as I now venture into the
affordable housing policy world, I am faced with a future working in public policy for exactly
that voucher system. While I do not regret any of the choices I made along the way, my
movement from the theoretical realm to that of practice would have resulted in a wholly different
project.
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The policy ideal of “individual choice” is one we still grapple with today. From health
insurance to schools, the rhetoric of choice becomes a shield beyond which it is difficult to
pierce. As opponents to the Thompson v. HUD remedy argued, what right do housing officials
have to insist that voucher recipients move to “Communities of Opportunity” to receive
assistance? These are the same arguments we hear when people ask what right does the federal
government have to insist that all citizens purchase health insurance, or that said insurance
policies cover contraception? While there are policy nuances that need to be considered and
discussed, the emphasis on individual choice precludes our ability to have these nuanced
conversations. As our society becomes ever more deeply entrenched in staggering inequality, we
must find ways to confront systemic problems without falling back on the excuses of individual
decision making and responsibility. American liberalism has proven largely unable to deal with
structural inequality because our resistance to asking the right questions means we cannot begin
to contemplate the right answers. We have a lot to learn from these twentieth-century attempts to
reckon with inequality, however well-intentioned or misguided or inadequate they might have
been. The world our kids are going to grow up in is ever-more warped by our inability to
acknowledge these shortcomings.
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